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Common law declarations of unconstitutionality 

 
Steve Mccrae and Bincham
Manchester
England
 xxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxx Magistrates' Court
The Court House
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx                                                                                                               22/11/2014


               Common law declarations of unconstitutionality 

I Steve Mccrae and Bincham put a formal declaration of unconstitutionality to the Lord Chancellor the Great Keeper of the State Seal of Commonwealth of Great Britain . I am putting you : xxxxxxxxxxxx Council and xxxxxxx Magistrates' Court on a

                                        Formal Notice of a Cease and Desist
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 Section 2 (1) and (2) and 3 (c) A Colonial Court of Admiralty shall not have Jurisdiction under this act to try or punish a person for an offence which according to law of England is punishable on Indictment. 

The Kings Privy Council under The Provisions of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. The Vagabonds Act of 1530 (22 Henry VIII c.12) was an act passed under Henry VIII and is a part of the Tudor Poor Laws of England. In full, it was entitled an "Act how aged, poor and impotent Persons, compelled to live by Alms, shall be ordered; and how Vagabonds and Beggars shall be punished.

  The Documentary Evidence Act 1868  and the Controller for Her Majesty's Stationary Office to come forward to explain the legals behind a Registered Birth Certificate. Which in turn would bring in Wills Act 1837, Cestui Que Vie Acts of 1666 and 1707.

Constitutional Reform Act 2005: The rule of law : The corporate status of the Ministry of Justice 2.The Directors (Lord Falconer of Thoroton & Others) 3.The fact that Ministry of Justice has County Court Judgements against it 4.The trading styles of MOJ which includes “Magistrates Courts”
Ministry of Justice are corporation they are bound by Companies act 2006 which brings them under The Law Commission the execution of Deeds and Documents by or on behalf of Bodies Corporate, companies act 2006, misrepresentation act 1967,conflict of interest, HMCTS is a corporation and the Ministry of Justice is a corporation  Dun & bradstreet number : 225498526 and also has CCJs against them : Case number:3YJ68358,2YL84427,3YK14710,C85YJ706,C20YP105,D43YJ740,D41YJ471,D60YJ339,B86YM006,D63YJ693 AND E05YX187.

That is why there is no Liability Order signed or Warrants signed or publication on The Registry Trust (RTL). HMTCS and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and the 1992 Financial Act Section 3 are being ignored whereby under  the treasury’s consolidated fund for mandated services they must supply for inhabitants for free. National Loans Fund, National Loans Act 1968

Full Disclosure and Validate the debt (the actual Promissory Note )and a full forensic Audit of the chain of Assignment of the note and Title. Full Disclosure and Validate of Securitisation of the Note ( Promissory Note) and a full forensic Audit of the Assignment of the Promissory Note. Full Disclosure and Validate of your claim against me (a sworn affidavit or a hand signed invoice in accordance with  The Bills of Exchange Act (1882) ) ;
Full Disclosure and Validate the contract signed by both parties and therefore binding both parties under Company law, Corporate law and Unidroit.

Full Disclosure and Validate the true and certified copy (NOT photocopy) of the Original Note (Credit Agreement), under penalty of perjury and with unlimited liability and confirm that this Note, has never been sold. Please also confirm the name of the individual who is the duly authorised representative from your company, who has carried out due diligence under The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 and what actions she/he has taken in relation to this account.

The word Person on your letters or in court under the Interpretation Act 1978, the British Nationality Act 1948, Person " includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporated. The definition of "person ", so far as it includes bodies corporate, applies to any provision of an Act whenever passed relating to an offence punishable on indictment or on summary conviction.

I would further advice that I do not give my consent and decline the offer to hearings conducted in a Court de facto and insist that this matter be dealt with in a Court de jure under common law and under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 rule of law.

I would further advice that the xxxxxxxxx Council legal team should be fully aware of the status of xxxxxxxxxx Magistrates' Court as being a branch of the Ministry of Justice which is a registered corporation, and as such conducts its business under admiralty Jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 whose rulings are invalid on dry land without the consent of both parties to the hearing, and that I specifically do not consent to these proceeding under this Jurisdiction.

The following will be used for a Emergency Judicial Review under Pubic Interest and Case Law and  'Declaration of unconstitutionality', Due to a failing of Due process ,Duty of care and a Tort of Misfeasance by all involved .

            qui litem suam facit

Under the doctrine as it exists today, two delimited requirements determine whether judges may incur civil liability. First, judges may be subject to civil liability when they perform a non-judicial act.' Second, judges may be subject to civil liability for any act performed in complete absence of jurisdiction. To decide whether an act is judicial, courts look to "the nature of the act itself. Quasi Delict is a French legal term used in some civil law jurisdictions. It refers to a negligent act or omission which causes harm or damage to the person or property of another, and thus exposes a person to civil liability as if the act or omission was intentional.

In short, by means of these Writs or Orders the courts perform the value and essential functions of interpreting the limits of the power of the administrative authorities and issuing Writ or Orders to prevent and authority from exceeding it's powers. I hereby give notice of motion I wish to appeal on a point of law of exceptional constitutional importance where the matter involves a matter of general public importance and it is in the interest of justice requires it where there are 'exceptional circumstances' warranting a direct appeal, to the Supreme Court of Judicature 1873 Vict 36 & 37 c.66 in accordance with the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1934.

Sovereignty is defined as Supreme unfettered and unlimited power. God gave man Dominion of Earth. Genesis 1:26 And God said let us make man in our image after our likeness and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over the cattle and over all the Earth.
 My God enables me to have the all seeing eye off truth and simple heart, under oath to please God to do good to my fellow man and woman and all creatures of all life, and swore under oath and testify my gratitude to my Divine Creator God.
Having seen and heard all of this, you may choose to look the other way but you can never again say that you did not know which is a Tort of Misfeasance.
                We all are answerable to the Divine Creator God in this life or the afterlife 

Apostolic Letter Issued MOTU PROPRIO of The Supreme Pontiff Francis  1 September 2013.On The Jurisdiction of Judicial Authorities of Vatican City State in Criminal Matters.
Unam Sanctam 18 November 1302,Boniface, Bishop, Servant of the servants of God.

Yours Sincerely : Steve Mccrae and Bincham                                                       22/11/2014

  
Subject access request

       I Gary and Stafford of the Stafford Estate 
.
Please supply the information about me I am entitled to under the Data Protection Act 1998 relating to:

Provisions of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601
It [43 Eliz I Cap. 2], consolidated all the previous legislation into one massive law and made provision for
a compulsory poor rate to be levied on every parish
the creation of 'Overseers' of relief
the 'setting the poor on work'
the collection of a poor relief rate from property owners
The Kings Privy Council An Act for the Punishment of idle and disorderly Persons, and Rogues and Vagabonds, in that Part of Great Britain called England, [21st June 1824.]

Please supply all the information about me I am entitled to under the Data Protection Act 1998 relating to:

 Full Disclosure and Validate my Council Tax Bill :5000988080 that has been used and enforced by The Kings Privy Council under The Provisions of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. That is why there is no Liability Order signed or Warrants signed or publication on The Registry Trust (RTL) HMTCS and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and the 1992 Financial Act Section 3. the treasury’s consolidated fund for mandated services they must supply for inhabitants for free. National Loans Fund, National Loans Act 1968

1: Full Disclosure of the what Jurisdiction the Council and Magistrates are enforcing Council Tax To the Civil and Criminal Procedure Rules .

2: Full Disclosure of ASSIZES Quarter Session and The Kings Privy Council Rules
3: Full Disclosure of The Court Act 1971 abolished Assizes and Quarter Session but the Magistrates Courts were unaffected by the 1971 Act

4: Full Disclosure of the Government Order that never passed through Parliament in 1971/72 that gives the council the authority to issue multi claims for liability orders that are not printed or signed under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 as of 2012.  

5: Full Disclosure and Validate The Human Rights Act 1998 is an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom which received Royal Assent on 9 November 1998, European Convention on Human Rights that have been breached by you the council and magistrates court on the enforcement of council tax

6: Full Disclosure and Validate the word Person on your letters or in court under the Interpretation Act 1978, the British Nationality Act 1948, Person " includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate. The definition of "person ", so far as it includes bodies
corporate, applies to any provision of an Act whenever passed
relating to an offence punishable on indictment or on summary
conviction.

 Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. Section 1 and 2 and 3 (c) A Colonial Court of Admiralty shall not have jurisdiction
under this Act to try or punish a person for an offence which
according to the law of England is punishable on indictment.

Full Disclosure and Validate why HMCTS is a corporation and the Ministry of Justice is a corporation  Dun & bradstreet number : 225498526 and also has CCJs against them : Case number : 3YJ68358, 2YL84427,3YK14710,C85YJ706,C20YP105,D43YJ740,D41YJ471,D60YJ339,B86YM006,D63YJ693 AND E05YX187 So produce the written signed contract between  HMCTS and Ministry of Justice and the Stockport  Council  and myself .

which brings them under The Law Commission the execution of Deeds and Documents by or on behalf of Bodies Corporate, companies act 2006, misrepresentation act 1967,conflict of interest.
The following will be used for a Emergency Judicial Review under Pubic Interest and Case Law and  'Declaration of unconstitutionality', Due to a failing of Due process ,Duty of care and a Tort of Misfeasance by all involved .

qui litem suam facit
Under the doctrine as it exists today, two delimited requirements determine whether judges may incur civil liability. First, judges may be subject to civil liability when they perform a non-judicial act.' Second, judges may be subject to civil liability for any act performed in complete absence of jurisdiction. To decide whether an act is judicial, courts look to "the nature of the act itself. Quasi Delict is a French legal term used in some civil law jurisdictions. It refers to a negligent act or omission which causes harm or damage to the person or property of another, and thus exposes a person to civil liability as if the act or omission was intentional.

In short, by means of these Writs or Orders the courts perform the value and essential functions of interpreting the limits of the power of the administrative authorities and issuing Writ or Orders to prevent and authority from exceeding it's powers. I hereby give notice of motion I wish to appeal on a point of law of exceptional constitutional importance where the matter involves a matter of general public importance and it is in the interest of justice requires it where there are 'exceptional circumstances' warranting a direct appeal, to the Supreme Court of Judicature 1873 Vict 36 & 37 c.66 in accordance with the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1934.

                                                          
All digital or hard copy information held with my details i.e. Gary and Stafford and Account Number : 5000988080 any other relevant unique information relating to me personally.
 
                               Yours faithfully Gary and Stafford 

                                Great Seal :

                                General Executor Seal :

                                Date : 16/11/2018

  
Before the Reformation, it was considered to be a religious duty for all Christians to undertake the seven corporal works of mercy. These were deeds aimed at relieving bodily distress: in accordance with the teaching of Jesus (Matthew 25 vv. 32-46) people were to
feed the hungry
give drink to the thirsty
welcome the stranger
clothe the naked
visit the sick
visit the prisoner
bury the dead
After the Reformation and the establishment of the Church of England, many of the old values and moral expectations disappeared so it became necessary to regulate the relief of poverty by law. During the reign of Elizabeth I, a spate of legislation was passed to deal with the increasing problem of raising and administering poor relief.
1552 — Parish registers of the poor were introduced so that there was an official record of those who fell into the category of 'poor'
1563 — Justices of the Peace were authorised and empowered to raise compulsory funds for the relief of the poor and, for the first time, the poor were put into different categories
those who would work but could not: these were the able-bodied or deserving poor. They were to be given help either through outdoor relief or by being given work in return for a wage.
those who could work but would not: these were the idle poor. They were to be whipped through the streets, publicly, until they learned the error of their ways.
those who were too old/ill/young to work: these were the impotent or deserving poor. They were to be looked after in almshouses, hospitals, orphanages or poor houses. Orphans and children of the poor were to be given a trade apprenticeship so that they would have a trade to pursue when they grew up.
1572 — the first compulsory local poor law tax was imposed making the alleviation of poverty a local responsibility
1576 — the idea of a deterrent workhouse was first suggested although nothing was done at this point
1597 — Justices of the Peace once more were authorised and empowered to raise compulsory funds for the relief of the poor and the post of 'Overseer of the Poor' was created. The position continued after the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act
1601 — the 'Elizabethan Poor Law' was passed
Provisions of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601
It [43 Eliz I Cap. 2], consolidated all the previous legislation into one massive law and made provision for
a compulsory poor rate to be levied on every parish
the creation of 'Overseers' of relief
the 'setting the poor on work'
the collection of a poor relief rate from property owners
The law required each parish to elect two Overseers of the Poor every Easter: those who were elected were unpaid and often were unwilling appointees who acted under the supervision of the JPs. However, the means of poor relief did provide a way of controlling the 'lower orders' and reinforced a sense of social hierarchy. The Elizabethan Poor Law were appropriate for the society of the time.
The duties of the Overseers were to
work out how much money would be needed for the relief of the poor and set the poor rate accordingly
collect the poor rate from property owners
relieve the poor by dispensing either food or money
supervise the parish poor-house
Two types of relief were available
Outdoor relief: the poor would be left in their own homes and would be given either a 'dole' of money on which to live or be given relief in kind - clothes and food for example. This was the norm.
Indoor relief:
the poor would be taken into the local almshouse
the ill would be admitted to the hospital
orphans were taken into the orphanage
the idle poor would be taken into the poor-house or workhouse where they would be set to work
Part of the 1601 Law said that poor parents and children were responsible for each other, so elderly parents were expected to live with their children for example. However, everyone in need was looked after at the expense of the parish, which was the basic unit of poor law administration. There were 15,000 parishes throughout England and Wales, each based on a parish church. However, no mechanism was introduced to enforce any of the measures stated by the 1601 Act and the operation of the poor law was inconsistent. The legislation did not set down any administrative standards so parishes were at liberty to interpret the law in any way they wished. There were great differences between parishes which varied between extreme laxity and extreme stringency in the interpretation of the law. Some towns, such as Bristol, Exeter and Liverpool, obtained local by-laws that established corporations of the poor: their responsibilities extended over several of the urban parishes within their jurisdiction.
The Elizabethan legislation was intended to help the 'settled' poor who found themselves out of work (for example) because of illness, or during a hard winter or a trade depression. It was assumed that these people would accept whatever work or relief the parish offered, whether that was indoor or outdoor relief. Neither method of assistance was seen as punitive or harsh. It was intended to deter or deal with the 'sturdy beggars' who were roaming the roads, robbing travellers and generally posing a threat to civil order. The increase in the numbers of beggars was probably the historical background to the nursery rhyme
Hark! Hark! The dogs do bark!
The beggars are coming to town:
Some in rags, some in tags
And one in a velvet gown
The first adaptation of the 1601 Act came in 1607 and provided for the setting up of Houses of Correction in each county. Here, work was provided for the unemployed at local rates of pay; work could be forced on the idle and on vagabonds. The Houses of Correction were not part of the Elizabethan system of poor relief and were totally separate from the parish poor houses because the law made a clear separation between the settled and 'wandering' poor.
The 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law continued with further adaptations — for example the 1662 Settlement Act, Gilbert's Act (1782) and the Speenhamland system of 1795 — until the passing of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act and formed the basis of poor relief throughout the country for over two centuries. It was a fair and equitable system run for and administered by local people at a time when the population was small enough for everyone to know everyone else and his/her circumstances. This meant that the idle poor were known as such and would be given short shrift at the hands of the Overseers of the poor.
One of the later complaints about the 1601 Act was that the basis of the law was that it rated land and buildings but not personal or movable wealth. Consequently it benefited the industrial and commercial groups in society who did not fall within the parameters of the legislation and so did not pay into the poor rates unless they also happened to own landed property.
    
The Vagabonds Act of 1530 (22 Henry VIII c.12) was an act passed under Henry VIII and is a part of the Tudor Poor Laws of England. In full, it was entitled an "Act how aged, poor and impotent Persons, compelled to live by Alms, shall be ordered; and how Vagabonds and Beggars shall be punished.”
  
  
  

True Timeline of Slavery 

Let us stick to what we know makes it simple to understand 
  
Property Held By Foreign Powers
The General Executor and Guardian is empowered with the Rights and authority defined herein to grant by warrant and letters patent to Beneficiaries, Fiduciaries or Agents, one (1) or more of those rights possessed by Our Estate, whether or not the associated property is in direct possession of Our Estate subject to these Degrees; and
Where certain Property or Rights belonging to Our Estate is held, possessed or claimed for use by a foreign State, it shall be the obligation of the General Executor and Guardian to ensure a Claim of Right is duly lodged within the records of Our Estate and that Notice of the Claim of Right including an extracted copy be provided to the officials of the foreign state seeking the return or surrender of the false Claim and possession, where beneficial Rights have not been granted. If such Claim is ignored, it shall be the duty of the General Executor and Guardian to seek any and all forms of legitimate and lawful remedy including assistance through Our allies; and
    
By the Power and Authority of Our Right of Ius Testamentum, we hereby give, grant, devise, convey, vest and entrust all Our powers and authority by the present Sacred Instrument and Great Charter to the Office of General Executor and Guardian as Sovereign over Our entire known and unknown Estates. We, hereby revoking any and all previous authorities, powers of attorney, powers of guardianship, agency or personal representation whether explicit or implied, presumed or knowingly granted by signature, name, fair use or some other legal device. Furthermore, we hereby fulfill and dissolve any all previous trusts, oaths and bonds of former trustees associated with the granting of all previous authorities, powers of attorney, powers of guardianship, agency or personal representation whether explicit or implied, presumed or knowingly granted by signature, name, fair use or some other legal device. Therefore, no one shall be permitted to occupy or hold or claim any office, agency, power, employment or authority over any part of the Superior Estate except through the expressed written authority of the General Executor and Guardian; and
    
Where clear written evidence exists of a fiduciary capacity or fiduciary relation between Our Superior Estate and a foreign Agent and that Agent then refuses to obey a direction by the Minister-General, then such an Agent is not only guilty of bad faith but gross dishonor. If the foreign State, entity or Corporation then fails to reprimand and remedy such action then such failure to act shall be ecclesiastically, lawfully and legally construed as Public Notice and Official Record that the Rule of Law and Justice in that foreign State has ceased to exist; and
    
The General Executor and Guardian is empowered with the Rights and authority defined herein to grant by warrant and letters patent to Beneficiaries, Fiduciaries or Agents, one (1) or more of those rights possessed by Our Estate, whether or not the associated property is in direct possession of Our Estate subject to these Degrees; and
Where certain Property or Rights belonging to Our Estate is held, possessed or claimed for use by a foreign State, it shall be the obligation of the General Executor and Guardian to ensure a Claim of Right is duly lodged within the records of Our Estate and that Notice of the Claim of Right including an extracted copy be provided to the officials of the foreign state seeking the return or surrender of the false Claim and possession, where beneficial Rights have not been granted. If such Claim is ignored, it shall be the duty of the General Executor and Guardian to seek any and all forms of legitimate and lawful remedy including assistance through Our allies; and
  

I Adrian Duncan And Frost being stopped by 1 policy enforcer PC Constable BEETON 1134, on the 16/11/2018 forcibly detained & arrested and against my will in police custody £1,000 per minute Being physically forced under duress and threaten with physical force to contract,

without my consent. Here are the following terms and conditions of my contract of the AGENT of ADRIAN DUNCAN FROST as follows from the date 17/11/2018 , £20,000 per violation and thereafter £5,000 per day until my information or personal data or intellectual property is removed and returned. The removal or damage of property from my ownership without my consent and without lawful excuse £25,000 per violation and then £5,000 per day until my property is returned
My being questioned, interrogated, harassed, made fearful or a threat made against me, and assaulted. £25,000 per violation My self being handcuffed, wrongfully arrested, transported, assaulted or battered or attacked, incarcerated or subjected to any adjudication process that is outside common law jurisdiction £500,000 per violation
My self being attributed anything that I did not actually say or write or do, in the event that by written or spoken communication are tampered with £500,000 per violation
My self being refused or denied immediate access to an appropriate adult of my choice and or to a doctor and or legal advisor £250,000 per violation
My self having to suffer the effects of what has become known as a non lethal or less than lethal weapon, including but not limited to, taser, PAVA spray, Mace, Baton , Asp and or any other device or weapon or tool £500,000 per violation My self being subjected to West yorkshire Police and or its agents, fabricating evidence and or planting of evidence against myself in an attempt to pervert the course of justice. £1,000,000 My self being wrongfully identified as any legal fiction without my consent or knowledge £10,000 per violation My home being raided and or entered by force
without my consent and without lawful excuse, £100,000 per violation per officer or West Yorkshire police employee and or their agent, excluding costs to repair damages to my home, which will be invoiced to you later.
My self-having to suffer slanderous or malicious or libellous allegations which West Yorkshire Police or its agents inform my neighbours, friends or local community £ 25,000 per violation. My self being forced to undergo any ingestion of energies or substances forced into or onto my body, whether in the guise of medication or not, without my expressly notarised consent. £1,000,000 per violation Myself to be abused verbally or physically causing distress or pain or humiliation £500,000 per violation for any wrongful allegation or false claim made against myself £1,000,000 per violation
My self being strip searched and humiliated against my consent £25,000 per violation for myself to endure any court cases due to West Yorkshire Police officer’s or their employee’s and or their agent’s misconduct £1,000,000 per day in court. Thank you for your business. These terms and conditions may be adjusted without warning and the terms may be added to in the future. 17th Nov 2018 Without prejudice and with all Natural and inalienable rights reserved.
Kind regards
Adrian Duncan And Frost  

This rule of construction gives the U.K., according to Justice Laws, “most of the benefits of a written constitution,” while “preserv[ing] the sovereignty of the legislature and the flexibility of our uncodified constitution.”84 Where a court concludes that Parliament does expressly legislate against a constitutional statute, it therefore indicates that Parliament has acted in an unconstitutional, if strictly legal, way. This interpretive process reconciles the rule of law with parliamentary sovereignty, while a declaration of unconstitutionality would openly acknowledge that, in the view of a court, a conflict had arisen between them.85

Under the reasoning of Thoburn, outright amendment or repeal of the Human Rights Act itself, for example, would require that Parliament unambiguously do so in order to restrict or “dis-incorporate” convention rights. Even in that event, the Magna Carta, Bill of Rights 1689, and Great Reform Bill constitutionally establish basic rights principles such as habeas corpus, a right to petition, and a right to vote. Constitutional statutes in this way insinuate themselves into the common law, with both mutually informing and reinforcing each other.86 Through their normative force, the principles enshrined in these special statutes have a value beyond their explicit text, elevating them above ordinary statutes and setting them in a substantive rule-of-law framework that restrains government power independently of the HRA.

Like conventions, some fundamental statutes go beyond particular rights in order to define the government's institutional structures and regulate democratic decision-making processes. The Parliament Acts, the Act of Settlement, and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (not yet in force)87 do just this, while the Acts of Union and the devolution acts respect the values of regionalism. While not directly affecting individual rights, these structurally significant statutes do so indirectly by establishing the institutional mechanisms or regional levels through which Parliament and the government must act. Institutional mechanisms prevent institutional or personal concentrations of power, which might permit decision makers to interfere arbitrarily, oppressively, or undemocratically with individual rights. Regionalism mitigates the overcentralization of   
government power for the same ends, by promoting some degree of regional equality, identity, or decision-making autonomy for the U.K.’s constituent national communities.

The decision in Jackson v. Attorney General88 not only illustrated the importance that fundamental statutes have but went so far as to suggest, in dicta, that, conceivably, they could legally limit parliamentary power under some circumstances. In Jackson, the appellants argued that the Hunting Act 2004, passed under the procedures of the Parliament Act 1949, was not actually an act of Parliament because the 1949 act itself was not legally valid. The appellants argued that the government of the day had secured passage of the Parliament Act 1949 improperly through the procedures of the Parliament Act 1911, which, correctly construed, did not permit the House of Commons to reduce further the legislative power of the House of Lords without that chamber's consent. The Lords disagreed with the appellants’ argument and declared both the 1949 Act and the Hunting Act to be valid acts of Parliament, finding that the Parliament Act 1911 changed the definition of primary legislation and so gave power to the House of Commons to pass any statute whatsoever under its procedures without the consent of the Lords  

Section 2(1) of the 1911 Act, however, expressly made one notable exception on the use of its procedures, excluding from these any bill extending the life of Parliament beyond five years. Although unnecessary for deciding the case before them, some Lords of Appeal speculated on the hypothetical issue of whether or not the House of Commons could use the Parliament Act 1949 to amend section 2(1) of the 1911 Act, so as to permit the Commons to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years without the consent of the House of Lords. Lord Bingham expressed an opinion that the House of Commons, in this way, could indirectly achieve what it could not directly legislate under the unamended 1911 Act.89 Lord Nicholls disagreed, however, arguing that section 2(1) necessarily implied that the House of Commons could not indirectly extend the life of Parliament by first amending section 2(1),90 leading to a conclusion that any bill purporting to do so by this two-step procedure could not be an act of Parliament and would, therefore, be legally invalid. 
 
Most interesting, however, was the decision of Lord Steyn. He agreed with Lord Bingham that the House of Commons could use the procedures of the two Parliament acts to amend section 2(1) of the 1911 Act so as to permit the Commons to extend the life of Parliament without consent of the House of Lords. However, he explored the constitutional implications of such unicameral authority in the House of Commons. Under this interpretation of section 2(1), “the 1949 Act could also be used to introduce oppressive and wholly undemocratic legislation.”91 Although the supremacy of Parliament remained the “general principle” [italics original] of the constitution, it was not absolute. Lord Steyn mused: “In exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a New Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.”92 Lord Steyn's warning raised doubts about the orthodox doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the constitutional responsibility of the courts to enforce a statute, should a government introduce legislation manifestly at odds with liberal democracy.93 While one might not wish to speculate about or doubt the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as did some of the Lords in Jackson, the case, nonetheless, reveals the special status that some statutes have in constructing the rule-of-law framework within which Parliament legitimately exercises its power.  

Jackson also drew attention to regionalism, alongside bicameralism and the separation of powers, as a constitutional principle enshrined in fundamental statutes. Lord Hope re-affirmed the Acts of Union as constitutionally significant statutes, leading him to opine that “here too it may be said that the concept of a Parliament that is absolutely sovereign is not entirely in accord with the reality.”94As Lord Hope recognized in his citations, some judges have questioned whether the Acts of Union might not, in some circumstances, even legally limit Parliament's sovereignty rather than provide only unenforceable but normative baselines.95  

In any case, as illustrated by Thoburn, the Acts of Union or any other fundamental statute need not limit Parliament's sovereign power legally in order to generate higher-order principles that guide a court's statutory interpretation and support a nonbinding declaration of unconstitutionality. Furthermore, as with any fundamental statute, the higher-order status of the Acts of Union would not necessarily foreclose a judicial distinction between their material and immaterial breach, allowing Parliament to amend them in ways that would not undermine their normative principles.96 The justiciability of a claim that Parliament has violated a fundamental statute, and the suitability of a declaration as a remedy in the case, would depend, accordingly, on the nature and seriousness of the alleged breach. With the Acts of Union, for example, some breaches might be minor or nonjusticiable,97while others will be of a constitutional order; for example, if “the United Kingdom Parliament passed an Act purporting to abolish the Court of Session or the Church of Scotland or to substitute English law for the whole body of Scots private law.”98 This emphasis on principle, rather than strict text, results from the higher-order nature of fundamental statutes, which, like conventions or common law rights, make up a substantive rule of law that, at once, constrains and accommodates parliamentary power.99
  
Other statutes, in addition to the Acts of Union—the Scotland Act, the Northern Ireland Act, and the Government of Wales Act—establish quasi-federal principles promoting regional autonomy and democratic governance. The Scotland Act, however, is perhaps the most interesting of the three statutes, in giving back to Scotland a parliament that can make primary legislation on devolved issues. Scotland's history as an independent nation with its own Crown and Parliament, and its having voluntarily united with England and Wales, arguably enhances the constitutional status of the Scotland Act by setting it within a unique historical and political context.100 Although it retains sovereign power to legislate for Scotland, the Westminster Parliament will refrain from doing so without consent of the Holyrood Parliament. This political practice quickly achieved constitutional status as the Sewel Convention, revealing an interesting relationship between conventions and fundamental statutes.101 Along with the Acts of Union, therefore, the Scotland Act, Northern Ireland Act, and Government of Wales Act represent constitutional principles of devolved decision making that Parliament is constitutionally bound to respect.102
    
Accordingly, should Parliament expressly amend or repeal a constitutional statute, as it did previously in suspending the Northern Ireland Act 1998 following the impending breakdown of the Good Friday Agreement,103 the courts would then have to determine whether the interference so undermined the statute's underlying principles that it would justify a declaration. The Northern Irish situation, for instance, suggests the delicate political issues that courts would confront in deciding not just what alterations to constitutional statutes are serious or minor but also whether they are consistent with the statutes’ principles. For example, the U.K. Parliament took the extreme step of authorizing the suspension of devolved government under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, doing so in order to salvage the peace process and ensure stable, peaceful self-government in the region for the long term. From this perspective, the suspension of Northern Irish government arguably would have been constitutional in the sense of being consistent with the principles of devolution, although the Northern Ireland Act itself (for various reasons) might not have “constitutionally embedded” itself as quickly or as firmly as, say, the Scotland Act seems to have done.  

The point is, faced with Parliament's express amendment or repeal of any of the terms of a constitutional statute, a court will be faced with two choices with regard to making a declaration. First, a judge must cautiously distinguish the constitutional from the unconstitutional alteration of a fundamental statute, looking beyond strictly textual alterations to overarching constitutional principles and the legislative purposes motivating the amendments in question. This assessment will require a teleological approach to constitutional adjudication. Taking again the example of the suspension of the Northern Irish government, Parliament's actions might arguably have been constitutional regarding the devolution project as a whole, especially given that devolution was itself in an early, somewhat experimental stage.104 Furthermore, legislative changes to fundamental statutes might also be consistent with emerging constitutional norms, valuably amending “out-of-date” ones.105 Just what standards a judge would apply in distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional alterations of fundamental statutes—and in deciding whether a declaration would be appropriate in the latter case—will require further elaboration by the courts. For now, however, it may be said that where Parliament has expressly and seriously contravened not only the terms but the spirit of a constitutional statute in an unjustifiable, disproportionate, or wanton way, courts can legitimately consider declaring the interfering law to be unconstitutional, leaving it for Parliament and the public to consider the ramifications of the offending actions.  

The second approach toward declaring some infringement of a fundamental statute unconstitutional is strictly and more simply rooted in the text. That is, if Parliament expressly amends or repeals a fundamental text in any way, a court could consider making a declaration of unconstitutionality, highlighting the inconsistency of the resultant law with the special statute and then leaving it for parliamentary reconsideration through the political processes. With this second approach, a declaration of unconstitutionality would flow more directly from an interpretive conflict between contradictory, new legislation and the existing constitutional text, just as it would with the infringement of common law rights or conventions. Unlike with those rights or conventions, however, the hard text of fundamental statutes leaves less room for flexible judicial interpretation of the constitutional norms involved, or for their reconciliation with potentially conflicting, subsequent legislation. This could make a strict approach to judging a conflict between new legislation and a fundamental statute, perhaps, undesirable. The lack of flexibility might also make it more problematic for judges who, on wider principles, might be indisposed to declare the changes in question to be unconstitutional, especially as otherwise there would be no “amending procedure” by which the permanent alteration of a written constitutional norm could be achieved.  

The above questions notwithstanding, Britain's new constitutional jurisprudence has now developed in a way that logically points toward a declaration of unconstitutionality based upon special textual provisions. Discerning the standards to be applied in distinguishing a constitutional from an unconstitutional breach is the next step on the path of legal development already chosen by the courts. While courts have long recognized certain documents to have special constitutional significance for purposes of statutory interpretation, the decision in Thoburn settled the fact that courts will now require Parliament to amend or repeal constitutional statutes by express language only.  

The interpretive approach toward these statutes is, therefore, the same as that taken toward common law rights and conventions. Whether protecting individual rights directly or indirectly through the establishment of institutional structures and respect for regionalism, constitutional statutes establish the norms by which courts must assume Parliament exercises its supreme legislative power. Thus, “[i]t is possible to achieve the same practical effect as entrenchment whilst preserving continuing parliamentary legislative supremacy.”106 Where a court finds that Parliament does clearly wish to amend or repeal a fundamental statute—at least in a material way that offends that statute's transcendent principles—the interpretive process points toward a conclusion that Parliament has legislated in an unconstitutional way. This, in turn, leads to and justifies a nonbinding declaration to that effect.  

Is a Constitutional remedy foreclosed?

Until the Human Rights Act, no court had ever declared formally, as a remedy, that an act of Parliament violated individual rights. Of course, one might say that courts, once, were less protective of fundamental rights, more deferential to the political branches, and made little distinction between constitutional law and statutory law than is now the case.107 Breaking with this more radical formalistic tradition, judicial recognition of substantive, higher-order values has risen in the past decades, along with a more assertive view of the judiciary in guarding the rule of law. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that no British court has ever explicitly disavowed the power to grant a declaration that Parliament has violated constitutional principles.  

That said, some pre-HRA challenges to government action did seek declaratory relief, potentially raising this kind of constitutional conflict. In Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner108 and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind,109 courts refused to issue declarations that the Crown had violated convention or common law rights unlawfully; this was under circumstances where doubt might have arisen about the compatibility of the statute with fundamental rights. These two cases are often cited as showing the lack of rights protection before the HRA, as well as the unavailability of a judicial remedy for rights infringements.110 These cases, then, have the greatest potential for undermining the argument that courts have the authority to make a declaration of unconstitutionality against Parliament. A reexamination of these cases, however, shows that they did not categorically reject a declaratory power in situations where a government infringes basic rights but only denied the higher status of the particular rights at issue. Malone and Brind, despite refusing to declare that the Crown had infringed any fundamental rights, actually left open the possibility that such declarations might issue against either it or Parliament under appropriate circumstances.  

In Malone, the claimant sought declarations that, among other things, the police had tapped his telephone in the absence of statutory authorization, in contravention of rights at common law, and against section 8 of the unincorporated ECHR. The Chancery court refused to grant the declarations. Sir Robert Megarry V.C. made clear that declarations were available only as to “rights and liabilities that are enforceable in the courts, and not merely moral, social or political rights or liabilities that are not.”111 In the case before him, Sir Robert found that rights under the convention were nonjusticiable—and so unenforceable—because they arose under a treaty unincorporated into domestic law.112 Furthermore, the claimant had no legally recognizable rights of property, privacy, or confidentiality at common law that wiretapping would violate.113 The claimant simply had no legal rights that would support the desired declaration that the wiretapping warrant was

unlawful.114Moreover, Malone concerned wiretapping ordered by the executive and done without (but not contrary to) either common law or statutory authority; in the absence of any prohibitions against it, the tapping was lawful.115Malone, therefore, did not even address the issue of whether a declaration would be inappropriate or impossible as a remedy, where an act of Parliament itself violated a fundamental common law right. The closest Sir Robert came to analyzing the idea of a fundamental right was to reiterate that the court's declaratory power was “confined to making declarations on matters that are justiciable in the courts.”116 However, there existed no plausible domestic rights in the case—either under common law or the convention, and thus the situation failed to present a justiciable controversy. Accordingly, Malone left open the possibility that, in other circumstances, a court might indeed consider declaratory relief, where a statute and some constitutional right could not be reconciled.  

Brind also concerned a request for a declaration that the Crown had violated an individual's fundamental rights; the request was made under the unincorporated convention alone, without any appeal to common law. Like Malone, Brind did not reject outright the idea of constitutional rights and did not categorically preclude a court's making the kind of declaration sought by the claimant. In Brind, the home secretary exercised a statutory power to order that the BBC and Independent Broadcasting Authority refrain from broadcasting any matter spoken by persons representing proscribed terrorist organizations. The applicants claimed that this order was ultra vires by arguing that the home secretary had a legal duty to comply with section 10 of the convention, to be imputed into the primary legislation under which the order was made. The House of Lords rejected that argument. While Lord Donaldson recognized the similarities between many common law and convention rights, he noticed that “in this case we are invited to grapple with the fundamental question of the effect of the Convention as distinct from any common law to the like effect.”117Brind rested upon the status of convention rights only and did not address the apparent conflict between the authorizing statute itself and rights at common law. Like the Chancery court in Malone, the House of Lords found that the convention was a legally unenforceable treaty. The Lords admitted that English courts would consider the convention when construing ambiguous statutory language but dismissed its relevance where the statute's meaning was clear.118 In Brind, however, Parliament's intent was quite apparent and to find an implied intention that the executive must comply with the convention would be to incorporate the treaty “by the back door.

Brind, like Malone, therefore rejected the unincorporated convention as a source of domestic legal rights, which might otherwise support the declaration sought. As a result, the convention created no legal rights against which the statute could have been considered “incompatible,” in the later terms of the HRA. Essentially, both cases only reaffirmed the accepted English rule that unincorporated treaties and international law are no more than aids to statutory construction.120 Neither decision resolved a conflict between any act of Parliament and higher-order principles, for the simple reason that the courts found that the claimed rights did not exist in domestic law  

Malone and Brind, as the two most prominent pre-HRA cases where declarations based on fundamental rights were sought and refused, never actually dealt with a conflict between Parliament and a higher-order principle. Instead, both cases left open the possibility of such a conflict, as well as of declaratory relief in that event. If one objects that there is no direct precedent for a declaration against Parliament, neither is there any against it. Therefore, any reading of these cases as foreclosing a declaration of unconstitutionality as a constitutional remedy is too broad. Such a broad reading would, furthermore, be at odds with the new constitutional jurisprudence and the courts’ interpretive process—both of which now clearly point toward a declaration where higher-order principles and a statute are irreconcilable.  

Conclusion

In the years since the Human Rights Act came into force, courts have for the first time directly and substantively reviewed acts of Parliament against fundamental rights, incorporated in the form of the European Convention on Human Rights. Where Parliament violates those rights, the HRA allows courts to make nonbinding declarations of incompatibility; ideally, this will increase Parliament's political accountability for respecting human rights. However, the declaration made in cases such as A and Others (No. 1) and other decisions under the HRA have incited criticisms of both judges and of the act itself, prompting not-so-veiled threats that future amendment of the HRA is not a political impossibility. It is perhaps not too outrageous to fear that, one day sooner or later, Parliament might amend or even repeal the Human Rights Act so as to “dis-incorporate” convention rights.  

This article has argued, however, that such an unfortunate development would not extinguish the judicial power to declare acts of Parliament incompatible with constitutional norms, such as common law rights. Indeed, this constitutional remedy would be available even with the HRA in place; indeed, common law rights might offer greater protection than the ECHR, even as indigenous legal conventions and fundamental statutes can promote the systemic mechanisms of democratic government. Such a declaratory power resides in the courts by virtue of the interpretive process by which they apply a constitutional jurisprudence that exists and evolves independently from the HRA These multiple sources of higher-order law, subject only to express amendment or repeal, establish principles within a substantive rule-of-law framework that both constrains legislative power and gives legitimacy to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Courts, therefore, will not lightly find statutory conflict with these constitutional principles and will require that Parliament make a contrary intent unmistakably clear. Where a court finds that Parliament has indeed exercised its sovereign power against these principles, it will also, and necessarily, conclude that Parliament has acted unconstitutionally. The logical extension of this interpretive process is that courts can formally issue a declaration of unconstitutionality in the event of a constitutional conflict.  

No precedent precludes this constitutional remedy, nor would it undermine the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Such a declaration, like its statutory counterpart under section 4 of the Human Rights Act, would be nonbinding and not affect the legal validity of a statute. A declaration of unconstitutionality would instead complement parliamentary sovereignty, within the liberal democratic context, by enhancing government's political awareness of its constitutional obligations and its accountability to the electorate. Resolution of the constitutional conflict, then, would be appropriately left to the democratic political process. With its sovereignty intact, the only objection Parliament could have to a declaration would be the desire to exercise its legislative power free from open and full accountability in the courts for violations of its constitutional obligations. And any attempt by Parliament to forbid a declaration—should a judge first be brave enough to take this important next step of constitutional jurisprudence—would be, no doubt, unconstitutional.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

The Legal Name Fraud from Councils/County Courts and Masgistrates'

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Legal Fiction by Lon L.Fuller

High Treason Laws Against Establishing a Foreign Power In England.


According to the old laws of England, which are still in force, many current British politicians qualify for hanging and their laws are null and void
                                                                                                                   HIGH TREASON
The Complete Text of Capt. K. R. McKilliam, M.A.

The British Nation is bedevilled today by alien organisations that have established themselves within our Christian Nation and aim to take us over, to destroy our Christian culture and force us to follow their preconceived designs. Unfortunately they have infiltrated themselves into our educational and religious systems and have educated many adepts among our people who unknowingly carry out their will. Many of them have been advanced to high places.

[Gentile Home Secretary Roy Jenkins gets his latest set of instructions]
“Gentile Home Secretary Roy Jenkins gets his latest set of instructions from Lord Fisher and Maurice Orbach.” Published with this caption in Let My People Go! c. 1976


                                                                        LAWS AGAINST ESTABLISHING A FOREIGN POWER IN ENGLAND

In 1353 Edward III by his statute of Praemunire forbade appeals being made to foreign courts. Richard II who came to the throne in 1377 issued a Statute of Praemunire (16 Richard II II C5) which stated that anyone who procures from Rome or any other place any thing which touches the King, against him or his Crown or realm and all those aiding and abetting them shall be out of the King’s protection. Their goods and land would be forfeited and they would be made to answer to the King and his council and a process of Praemunire Facias made against them. The learned constitutional lawyer, Blackstone, in Book 4, C8, states that Praemunire is “introducing a foreign power into the land and creating an Imperium in Imperio [State within a State] by paying obedience to other processes which constitutionally belong to the King alone.” But although this is a general protection of the King, the constitutional lawyer Littleton states that Praemunire Facias also extends to the King’s loyal subjects and this particular protection is of two sorts, firstly it gives the subject immunity or freedom from action or suite and secondly to protect the safety of the subject and his goods, lands and possessions from violence, unlawful molestation and wrong. This the subject gains by right and by law. Subjects are protected by the King, by the law and by the King’s writ.
Praemunire doth fortify Jurisdictionem Jurium Coronae Suae of the Kingly laws of the Crown against foreign jurisdiction and against the usurpers upon them as by divers acts of parliament appears.... A man who by judgement given against him upon writ of Praemunire Facias etc. is out of the King’s protection. For such of these crimes for which any shall have this judgement, to be hanged by the neck until he be dead and shall forfeit all his lands and chattels.


                                                                                                                  HIGH TREASON

Treason is the act of betraying; betrayal of a trust undertaken by or reposed in anyone; a breach of faith, treachery. High Treason or Treason Proper is the violation of a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or to the state, levying war on the King’s dominions, adhering to the King’s enemies in his dominions, or aiding them in or out of the realm. In 1795 the offence was extended to include the contemplated use of force to make the King change his counsels.


                                                                                                           MISPRISION OF TREASON
Misprision of Treason is an offence or misdemeanor akin to treason or felony. It is the neglect of duty by a public official who conceals a knowledge of treasonable actions or designs. At an assize it may warrant the same penalty as High Treason. A subject of the Crown is also bound to inform the magistrates if he knows that High Treason is being contemplated.

                                                                                   ESTABLISHING AN IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: THE JEWS

The Jews had been in England in Anglo-Saxon times dealing in slaves. Jews however came into England with the Norman Conquest. They made themselves a threat to the people of this country by (1) clipping the gold coinage and turning the clippings into bullion for sale overseas (2) dispossessing good Christian Englishmen of their lands and property by high interest rates in usury (3) by the ritual murder of young Christian boys by crucifixion and drawing off the blood for ritual purposes; particularly Hugh of Lincoln in 1255; a child sacrificed in Nottingham in 1279; and the ritual murder of a boy in Oxford by the Jew Isaac de Pulet in 1290 (Patent Roll. Edward I, mem. 21 21st June, 1290; Public Records Office).
On the 18th of July 1290, by a royal decree, King Edward I in his council expelled all Jews forever from England. Writs were sent out to the sheriffs of the English shires informing them that by royal edict all Jews were to leave the English realm before November 1st 1290, anyone who remained were to be executed. The population and parliament reacted with relief and great joy (Calendar of Close Rolls, 18 Edward I, Public Records Office). In his book Edward I (London, 1988) page 343, Michael Prestwick states that at a Parliament summoned to Westminster in that July a subsidy was granted and was collected. This subsidy was a thank offering for the Jews’ expulsion.

                                                                                    THE JEWS PRESENT BEGGING LETTERS TO CROMWELL

Various Jews made begging petitions to Oliver Cromwell to get him to revoke the Edict of Expulsion; but Cromwell, being only a commoner, could not revoke a royal edict and knew this. In February 1658 Cromwell is said to have made an oral commitment to Antonio Fernandes Cavajal, the leader of the Jews (buried under the name of Abraham in the Jews’ cemetery, London 1659), assuring his protection. This was in defiance of the recommendations of the council that the Jews should only be permitted the standing of ordinary aliens. This is the situation today (lecture by Lucien Wolf to the Jews College Literary Society in 1877).

Joan Comay, wife of the Israeli Ambassador to the Court of St. James and to the United Nations wrote in her book Who’s Who in Jewish History After the Period of the Old Testament, published in 1974:

Manasseh [ben Israel] returned to Holland in October 1657, deeply distressed at what he considered to be the failure of his mission. Cromwell remained on friendly terms with him and granted him a pension of £100 a year. Although Edward I’s edict of expulsion was not formally revoked as Manasseh had hoped, the resumption of Jewish worship achieved the same practical result. The edict has actually not been revoked to this day.

Because of the expulsion of the Jews from Europe, the Jews sent an appeal for advice to the Sanhedrin on the 13th of January 1489. The reply came back from the Prince of the Jews in Constantinople. It advised the Jews of Europe to adopt the tactics of the Trojan Horse: to make their sons Christian priests, lawyers, doctors etc. and to destroy the Christian structure from within. Thus, by 1990, we have had one known Bah-Mitzvahed bishop in the Church of England, Bishop Hugh Montefiore, numerous Jewish Queen’s Counsels in the legal profession and at least seven foreign Jews in the House of Lords.

It may be disputed that these old edicts have fallen into disuse and are no longer applicable. At a celebration to commemorate the conquering of England by William Duke of Normandy in 1066 held at Caen, the Mayor of Bordeaux assured all those present that the town of Bordeaux had faithfully paid the levy on wine placed on the town throughout the whole period of 900 years. An attempt had been made to have the levy annulled but this could not be done since the Queen of England is still Duke of Normandy, and Count of Aquitaine.

Israel Moses Sieff with his Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.) tried to get rid of ancient territorial boundaries for the new county councils. Although the new county councils are in operation, all law officers functioning in Lancashire are appointed by the Duchy and County Palatine of Lancaster and not by the Lord Chancellor of Parliament. The courts are Duchy courts and all offences are against the Duke’s peace. The County Palatine of the Duchy of Lancaster is outwith the jurisdiction of parliament under the wills of Henry II, Henry III and Henry IV, and certain acts of parliament are inapplicable within the Duchy. A similar position is found in the Principality and County Palatine of Durham.

Being prohibited aliens by the Edict of Expulsion Jews have no right to sit in our houses of parliament, nor on our local government councils. They have no right to be in the judiciary nor to hold office in the executive of government nor in the police force. All purported laws and purported acts of parliament in which Jews have taken part in the voting are illegal, unconstitutional: null and void.
Contrary to the Statutes of Praemunire traitors we elect to parliament have allowed the Jews to establish an Imperium in Imperio, the ‘Board of Jewish Deputies,’ which have gained to themselves powers to influence the policies of British governments to their own universal advantage. The Daily Telegraph of 19th January 1972 stated: “The Zionist Congress is the head of the world’s political movement.” World’s Works – Inner Mountain Jewish News on 1st March 1976 stated:

This world organization has a highly centralized form of government, this consists of an international committee including representatives from all countries that have a local organization. But the real control is vested in what is known as the Inner Actions Council. This is a compact body of only seven men and it is dominated by the Jews of Europe.


                                                                       MUSLIMS ATTEMPT TO SET UP ANOTHER IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO

It is the function of the Attorney General to advise governments and government departments (see Whitaker’s Almanac). Succeeding Attorneys General have failed to advise governments of the implications of the contents of Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights and Habeas Corpus. This is a dereliction of duty. Another attempt to establish an Imperium in Imperio by aliens, a felony of Praemunire, was reported in the Daily Telegraph of 15th July 1990. It was stated that the Muslim leader Kalim Siddiqui called for a special relationship between Muslims here and the government of Iran. He launched a manifesto to politicize Britain’s Muslim community which aimed to establish an Islamic parliament, to persuade Muslims to discriminate in favour of other Muslims, to place the names of all Muslims in Britain on a computer database and to raise five million pounds to establish a Muslim parliament in Britain. To do this is to commit the felony of Praemunire punishable with death by hanging. The culprits are those subjects of the Crown who have allowed this situation to arise. It is up to the government to give all Muslims their marching orders out of this country or incur the penalties laid down for Praemunire, allowing aliens to establish an Imperium in Imperio.
In bringing this matter to the attention of fellow subjects of the Crown I am under the Queen’s protection for as Fitzherbert wrote (Vide 7 Co. 8, 9, Calvin’s Case ANT 130a, Sect 199) “Every loyal subject is in the Queen’s Protection.”


                                                                                             THE PURPORTED RACE RELATIONS ACTS

The so-called Race Relations Acts are conspiracies to use acts of parliament to enforce the racial integration of subjects of the Crown with Negroes and Asiatics especially brought here for the purpose. They are acts of racial hatred against us by prohibited immigrants. The Race Relations Act of 1965 was introduced to parliament by the Russian Jew Frank Soskice, purported Labour Attorney General. Further Race Relations Acts were devised by the Board of Jewish Deputies. The Jewish Chroniclestated that amendments must be made to the Race Relations Act since the 1965 Race Relations Act was not working the way they wanted it to. The 1976 Race Relations Act was passed in the Commons by default, with only 132 of the 635 members present; 124 Labour and Liberal traitors voted for the bill with eight Tories against.
To terrorize the masses it was required to establish a network of so-called human rights agencies, the ‘Race Relations Industry.’ Ivor Benson writes that:

the task was to penalize the instinctive responses of the local resident population in the presence of unassimilable neighbours who have been forced upon them... Hereto there are rich pickings for decadent, deracinated elements who help to impose the tyranny, like human dregs who rule the roost and spend millions of the tax-payers’ money in Britain’s innumerable inner-city ghettoes. Nor should we omit to mention the zealous active connivance of politicians and bureaucrats whose greed for personal advancement is rationalized with a spurious humanistic ideology.

There are three phases in this Jewish imposition of race mixing:

Phase One: Unassimilable population elements are introduced into all-White communities of the West as legitimate immigrants, supposedly because their labour was needed.

Phase Two: Public opposition is circumvented by introducing them as refugees.

Phase Three: Which came into effect right from the start, is a massive and sustained campaign of mental terrorism aimed at suppressing every form of popular dissent and opposition. The campaign of terrorism has taken two forms, one aimed at the leadership and the other at the masses. Any political leader who dares to give voice to what his own people think and feel is at once made the target by the Jews by an orchestrated campaign of vilification with Jewish-devised swear words “Nazi,” “Fascist,” “racialist,” “racist” while support in money and publicity is diverted to political rivals and opponents. The masses are terrorized by Jewish-led Socialist Workers Party mobs who are quite prepared to use violence when necessary.


IMMIGRATION
The massive immigration of Islamics and other coloured peoples is illegal and the British people, subjects of the Crown, were never consulted about whether they wanted their country to become a multi-racial, multi-cultural society. Mrs Margaret Thatcher deceived the nation in 1979 when she declared that Britain was becoming swamped with immigrants, using the fears of the subjects of the Crown to gain votes and giving the impression that she would stem the flow. Having got her party into government she did nothing about it, only allowed vast numbers more into the country. Multi-racialism and multi-culturalism has been illegally and unconstitutionally imposed on this nation and the Jewish power controlling the government will ensure that the nation will never be consulted.

THE PURPORTED PUBLIC ORDER ACT OF 1986
The so-called Public Order Act of 1986 is a conspiracy to use an act of parliament to enable investigators to enter the homes of subjects of the Crown to gain evidence to initiate action in the law courts against those offending against the purported Race Relations Act. This Act was placed before parliament by the purported Conservative Home Secretary, the prohibited Jewish immigrant from Lithuania, Leon Brittanisky, also known as Leon Brittan, assisted by his cousin, another Lithuanian Jew, Malcolm Rivkind, also know as Malcolm Rifkind. This bill was primarily to prevent subjects of the Crown from discussing and revealing the Jewish take-over of our nation.

                                                                                               THE PURPORTED NATIONALITY ACT

The so-called Nationality Act is a conspiracy to use an act of parliament to take away our rights as subjects of the Crown. This act makes the place of birth rather than the genetic and racial identity of the individual the criteria for nationality. Britons from Australia and Canada visiting the continent from Britain were surprised on their return to be presented with documents to sign marked “Alien” while Pakistanis and other Asians passed through with British passports as British nationals.

This Act purports to replace ancestry, that for generations has been the practical definition of the British subject, by the definition of an accidental place of birth. Thus it seeks to encourage the development of a nation of half-breeds and to swamp and destroy the British people and their customs.

In The Common Law of England, 198. N2, Sir Edward Coke states:

Persons born beyond the seas, if their fathers or paternal grandfathers were natural born subjects, are likewise made so, though with an exception of some unfavourable persons.... Liegeus is ever taken for a natural born subject... Liegeance, a liegando, being the highest and greatest obligation of duty and obedience that can be. Liegance is the true and faithful obedience of a liegman or subject to his liege lord or sovereign. Alliegeance is born of faith: alliegeance is the essential law.

Until William Whitelaw’s Nationality Act we have been subjects of the Crown and under the protection of the Crown. This Act purports to deprive us of this and make us merely British citizens. This Act together with the European Communities Act and the Treaty of Rome aims at destroying the British Monarchy as soon as possible. It is High Treason.

By signing the United Nations Charter in 1946 and passing an act before parliament so-called British politicians were obliged to carry out the terms of the Charter. This entails the mixing of the races of the world to form a degraded population and the eradication of the British and other White races. These the planners regard, together with Christianity, as the main obstacles to the establishment of a totalitarian one-world government.

The United Nations Charter was drafted by Alger Hiss, a convicted communist and Soviet agent together with Andrei Gromyko, a senior Soviet official. Alger Hiss occupied the directional chair at the organizational conference of the United Nations. These people are aiming at genocide of the White race.

According to this Nationality Act the Queen is no longer our Queen and we are no longer her subjects. If we are no longer the subjects of the Crown this Act deprives us of the protection of the Crown, for according to the patent rolls of the Statute of Northampton 1328 it is the duty of the Queen to protect her subjects despite parliament; thus we are protected from a possible anti-White anti-British parliament. This Act purports to deprive the Queen of her titles, lands and prerogatives. We no longer go to war for the Crown but for parliament. This is High Treason.

A letter from the Home Secretary dated 31st May 1988, which appeared in the Independent newspaper on Monday 17th June 1988, made it plain that Her Majesty the Queen is prepared to place at the disposal of parliament all her remaining prerogatives: the power to make war or peace, to ratify treaties, to grant honours; the list is formidable embracing just about all those powers which remained to the monarch after the glorious revolution of 1688. The signature at the bottom of the letter is that of Douglas Hurd. The person who drew the Home Secretary into weighty correspondence is the cryptic left-winger, Tony Benn. Benn laid before parliament his Crown Prerogatives Bill to deprive the Crown of all the remainder of her prerogatives.

                                                                                        THE PURPORTED EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT

The European Communities Act of 1972 and the Treaty of Rome aims at destroying the British monarchy as soon as possible.
This is High Treason the penalty for which is death by hanging and this is still on the statute books. Likewise any subject of the Crown who knows that High Treason is being carried on and fails to report it is guilty of Misprision of High Treason, the penalty may be death: to deprive the Queen of her Crown or any of her dominions.

Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome is irreconcilable with the Oath of Allegiance. There is an absolute constitutional case that there is no statute authority for the executive acts that have bound the UK to the EEC, nor for the British Nationality Act. Both are contrary to the interests of the Crown and people.

The High Court of Great Britain disallowed an Act which was passed by our House of Commons and House of Lords and received the Royal Assent. This Act was the Shipping Act of 1988. The High Court referred the case to the European Court. This was the first case in the history of parliament that an Act passed by both houses of parliament with the Royal Assent and the regulations under it have been set aside. A British Court has interfered with an act of parliament in the interests of a foreign court. This is High Treason.

We can claim that the Queen carry out her coronation oath and protect us from alien and foreign-made laws.

We are legally not in the Common Market nor are we constitutionally a multi-racial multi-cultural society. Traitor Edward Heath carried out the plans of international Jewish financiers and multinational companies, the Imperial Institute for International Affairs and the Rothschilds to deceive the Queen in her grants. Many of us have taken the Oath of Allegiance to the Crown, her heirs and successors and demand protection from foreign-made laws made by aliens in Europe.

The Oath of Allegiance has been taken by members of parliament, Queen’s Councillors, members of the Judiciary, clergy of the Church of England and members of the executive yet many of them are working for our enemies, for a slave-state full of debt which our children will inherit. A charge of perjury of the Oath of Allegiance and High Treason must be laid against all those culprits who have allowed our government to be over-ruled by directives coming from beyond the seas – from foreigners in Brussels and Strasbourg.

Any attempt to take Scotland and England into the EEC is High Treason: “Depriving the Queen of her lands and titles.” All purported MEP’s are qualified for hanging. The basic statutes of the United Kingdom are still in force and are in conflict with growing foreign supremacy.
The full sovereignty of the United Kingdom is not now in the hands of the Queen; her powers have been handed over by a despicable traitor Edward Heath on the instructions of his Jewish mentors. Edicts and laws can be sent out from Brussels and Strasbourg which are enforced by traitors in the United Kingdom. European Law and Community Law is now destroying the respective laws and customs of the British realm and the very birthright of the British people.


High Treason: Laws Against Establishing a Foreign Power in England is published by the Heretical Press, ISBN 1-901240-15-0, 14pp.

                                                                                                                        Enacted 1290
The Edict of Expulsion was an act of Edward I which expelled all Jews from the kingdom of England. To understand why why Edward acted in this way, you have to go back in history. Biblical exhortations against the lending of money led to an attitude among the inhabitants of Christian Europe that the lending of money at interest was at best, un-Christian, and at worst, sinful and evil. The Jewish religion attached no such stigma to lending money, and as a result many Jews offered that service to Christians. 

In the years following the Conquest of 1066 the Jews were an important part of Norman English society. The nobility of England were constantly in need of money, and as a result, they borrowed heavily from Jewish moneylenders. William the Conqueror recognized the importance of the Jewish moneylenders to Norman society, and offered them special protection under law. Jews were declared to be direct subjects of the king, not subjects of their local feudal lord. 

Because of this special status, however, English kings saw the Jewish moneylenders as a convenient source of funds. The king could levy taxes against Jews without needing the prior approval of Parliament. So when a king needed money - as they often did - he could simply levy a special tax on the Jews. This system would work as long as the Jews were allowed to accumulate money, but that was about to change. 

Throughout the period following the Norman invasion the medieval world underwent a gradual shift towards religious heterodoxy (emphasis on a single belief system), epitomized by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. The Lateran, among other measures, required Jews and Muslims to wear special dress so that they could easily be distinguished from Christians. England enforced this proclamation by requiring Jews to wear a special badge.
Church proclamations like those of the Fourth Lateran Council really gave official approval to attitudes that were already prevalent in medieval society. The large landowners resented their indebtedness to the moneylenders. Attitudes of religious persecution became more and more evident. Even before the Lateran Council, outbreaks of mob violence aimed at Jews was not uncommon in England, for example, in 1190 a mob killed hundreds of Jews in York. 

At the same time as attitudes of intolerance were becoming more common - and more acceptable to both the Church and the state - the emergence of the Italian system of merchant banking made the Jewish moneylenders less vital to the nobility. Measures of punitive taxation against the Jews became more common, with the result that there were fewer Jewish moneylenders with ready cash to lend. In 1285 the Statute of Jewry banned all usury, even by Jews, and gave Jews 15 years to end their practice. Unfortunately, given prevailing altitudes towards Jews in trade, few avenues of livelihood were open to those affected by the Statute.
The Edict of Expulsion 
These matters came to a head in 1287 when Edward I peremptorily seized all Jewish property and transferred all debts to his name. In other words, everyone who had previously owed money to a Jewish moneylender now owed it directly to Edward himself. 

On 18 July, 1290, Edward I issued what came to be called the Edict of Expulsion. The same day that the Edict was proclaimed writs were sent to the sheriifs of most counties advising that all Jews in their counties had until 1 November to leave the realm. Any Jews remaining after this date were liable to be seized and executed. To rub salt into the wound a special tax on the Jews was agreed in Parliament. How many people were affected by the Edict of Expulsion? Records are inexact for this period, but it seems likely that about 3000 Jews were forced to leave England. 

Edward's Edict to banish the Jews was followed by his fellow Christian monarch in France, Philip le Bel, sixteen years later. It was not until 1656 that Jews were allowed back into England. In the intervening period Jews were required to obtain a special license to visit the realm, though it seems very likely that some Jews resettled in England while keeping their religion secret.

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Mrs Lynne Haynes JP – JCIO Investigation Statement – 5418 [PDF, 90 KB]
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                How to Claim Against Councils/ Banks/                         Elec/Gas/Water and Man and Woman 
N208

 If you deside to put in your own claim against corporations/ companies , In the Common Law of the Land you would take your evidence to your local police ,who then would investagate your claim and put it in front of the CPS.
 
But as you are aware the Police are trading as a corporation/company 

So the only option open to you is to fill your own claim under CPR Rules Part 8 N208

The Companies use the CPR Rules Part 7 against you the Man Or Woman.

So if you deside to go down this route make sure you understand the CPR Rules Part 8  inside out .

​So Drop your fear and become the claimant , They use your fear to win , take back your Divine rights under God.
So the Royal Courts of Justice at the Admin will try and get you to not to file your documents , telling you it is in the wrong jurisdiction, it is not , but they will try , So this is when you need to stand up and get it filed .

Things you will need for this as follows

1: Part 8 Claim Form
2: Acknowledgment of Service Form
3: Particulars of Claim 
Fixed N9A,N9B
Unspecified Amount N9C N9D
4: Send Court A Certificate of Service to Confirm You Have Sent Your Documents

They have 14 Days to Acknowledge the Claim 
Can be pushed to 28 Days

5: If They Dont Respond
N225: Case of Fixed Sum
N227: A Judge Will Be Deciding On Damages.

Here Is A N208 




So here is your remedy , be very careful if you are going to do this , but the more that put these into Court the quicker things will change , you can use this as a SAR Request ( the words ), Have fun and enjoy 2019 , this is for ever man and woman in every country , everything is under english words /latin.