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Hillary Clinton's Benghazi Leaked Emails

Below is an embedded version of wikileaks custom web search tool for the Hillary Clinton Leaked Email Archive. I have set a keyword of Benghazi, but you can just click in the search bar and change that to whatever word you might be interested in.

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2012-07-18 02:06 Subject: FT OP-ED ON SYRIA (THEY REQUESTED IT) THAT WILL RUN NEXT WEEK
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05791383 Date: 12/31/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: Anne-Marie Slaughter Sent: Friday, July 27, 2012 9:06 AM To: Cc: Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov ); Cheryl Mills; Abedin, Huma Subject: FT op-ed on Syria (they requested it) that will run next week I thought you should see a preview. I will send it to folks at the WH as well. Note that Reuters reports this morning that the Turks have been "begging Washington for drones and surveillance, but to no avail." http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-syria-crisis-centre-idUSBRE86Q0JM20120727 That may be wrong, but it's out there and it's a v detailed article. "When we control Syria, we won't forget that you forgot about us." That is how the sister of a dead Free Syrian Army member responded when NPR reporter Kelly McEvers told her family that Americans are afraid of getting mired in another Iraq or Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, she and millions of her fellow Syrians cannot not understand why with all the U.S. government's talk of freedom, democracy, and human rights, its willingness to send hundreds of thousands of troops to topple a government in neighboring Iraq and to provide air cover for Libyan rebels, it will not send the types of arms necessary to allow zones controlled by the opposition to defends themselves against counter-attack by Bashir al-Assad's regime and gradually to extend their territory. Sooner or later some combination of the groups currently fighting to carry forward the revolution begun by millions of peaceful protesters 16 months ago will indeed control Syria. And when they do, their allegiances and memories of who did what during the struggle to achieve a democratic Syria are going to matter far more to the U.S. and Europe than policymakers currently calculate. That is the long game (although it may well be shorter than many people think). It is essence of strategy to plan for and play that game, identifying long-term goals and charting a path to achieve them. One of President Obama's top goals coming into office was to forge a "new beginning" between the United States and the Muslim world, a goal that he announced in Egypt. Revolutions like the one unfolding in Syria would seem to afford the perfect opportunity. But he and his fellow NATO leaders are far more focused on the short-term risks than the long-term gains. Those risks are plentiful. They include: ■ Getting too enmeshed in Syria will hurt President Obama's chances of re-election. ■ Sending arms, much less planes, to Syria without UN approval will put the U.S. on the wrong side of international law and undo three years' worth of work patiently restoring U.S. credibility as a multilateral player in the U.N. and regional organizations. ■ Acting more strongly and visibly to help the Syrian opposition will tie the U.S. to the opposition's fortunes in ways that will inhibit the U.S. "rebalancing" toward Asia. ■ Providing anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to the FSA, together with active intelligence and communications assistance to help individual FSA units use those weapons effectively, risks fueling the ongoing conflict and possibly even arming al-Qaeda fighters who are infiltrating into Syria. ■ Providing weapons to the FSA when Iran and Russia are arming the Syrian regime will drag the U.S.. into a proxy great power war. All of these risks are real, although some are much more likely than others. The American public, for instance, may be for or against more active engagement in Syria, but the idea that any foreign policy issue is going to determine the election in the current economic environment is laughable. The one exception may be perceived support for Israel in key states like Florida, but in that case moving to help remove a key Iranian ally in the region and help stabilize a growing threat on Israel's borders can only help Obama. The larger point is that all policies carry risks. Many in Washington would argue that the current U.S. policy toward Syria, which is to squeeze the regime diplomatically and economically as tightly as possible; work with expatriate opposition groups to help unite them and plan for a transition; push for resolutions against the Assad regime in the UN and thereby force China and Russia to repeatedly side with Assad; provide an increasing flow of intelligence and communications equipment and vetting of opposition groups on the ground for the receipt of Turkish arms; and build international consensus to make clear to Assad the costs of using chemical weapons while planning for a possible military operation to UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05791383 Date: 12/31/2015 secure those weapons in the case of regime collapse and chaos, is working. Assad's government is visibly weakening; the opposition is making steady gains in terms of controlling parts of the country and bringing the fight to Aleppo and Damascus. But the risks of this multi-pronged incrementalism are enormous. ■ The arms that are flowing, at least from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are going to. Islamist members of the opposition, many of whom are strongly opposed to the U.S. and could push a future Syrian government in directions dangerous to the U.S. and to Israel. ■ The longer the conflict rages, the more likely revenge killings will turn a revolution into a sectarian civil war that cannot be staunched even by a political transition, and the more chance al Qaeda has to infiltrate and coopt it. ■ The more Syria fragments, the more danger of conflict spilling over into Lebanon (via the Allawites), Turkey (via Syrian Kurds), Iraq (via al-Qaeda) and even Jordan (via refugees). ■ The more fragmented the Syrian opposition becomes on the ground the more chance of the kind of chaos following regime collapse that will leave chemical weapons stocks unsecured. It is time for bold action, of the kind Obama took in deciding to go after Bin Laden in Abbottabad and to intervene in Libya. In Syria that would mean putting together a coalition of countries to change the game. This coalition would commit to provide heavy weapons and possibly air cover to all commanders on the ground in Syria who sign the "Declaration of Values" supporting a peaceful, democratic, and pluralist Syria put forward last week by the 9 Commanding Generals of the Military Council of the FSA. Moreover, these commanders must admit foreign journalists, NGO activists, and UN monitors into the zones they control to monitor their actual implementation of those principles and to allow citizen journalists from all groups to upload photographs of what they witness to an official website maintained by the coalition. The U.S. is consumed with domestic politics. European leaders are focused on the Olympics, the Euro crisis, and August vacations. But the eventual winners in Syria will matter a great deal to the health, wealth, and stability of what is still the most strategic region in the world. They will remember those who remember them and cared enough to level the playing field to help them win. Anne-Marie Slaughter Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs Princeton University 440 Robertson Hall Princeton, NJ 08544 Assistant: Terry Murphy Website: www.princeton.edut—slaughtr



LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION

From: To: Date: 2011-03-20 02:00 Subject: LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779476 Date: 12/31/2015 RELEASE IN FULL Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction London Hub & RRU coverage Pan-Arab Media 3-20/21-2011 5:00 am LONDON HUB COVERAGE Pan Arab TV coverage, Monday March 21, 2011 Main news on all channels today was air attack on Qaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli (Bab al-Aziziya) which serves as his military headquarters. Channels report there was no news of civilian casualties. Other developments in Libya include: • Libyan army orders ceasefire • Celebrations in Benghazi • Sec Gates says the US will not have a major role in operations in Libya and will transfer mission leadership to France and Britain or to joint NATO command. • Qatari planes are heading towards Libya, some to take part in enforcing UN resolution and others to carry humanitarian needs for the Libyan people. • Un-named Arab countries are reported by al-Jazeera to be taking part in the Libya operations too. • Amr Mousa's comments were responded to by Abdel Hafeez Ghouka, a spokesman of the Libyan National Council who asked Mousa how else to enforce a no-fly zone and save the Libyan people. It is reported that Mousa has an eye on Egyptian presidential elections. • While Gates says that Qaddafi is not a target; Hague confirms that Qaddafi has to go. Pan-Arab TV snapshot: 3-20-2011 5 EST/9 GMT Of note: News on Libya talks about the damage wrought by Western bombing raids, reactions of people in the region, and the situation of refugees on the border. Libya is not at all the sole focus this morning; the news bulletins give equal focus to events in Syria, Yemen, Morocco, and Bahrain; William Hague's comments reported; AJ reports goals of operation unclear - topple Qaddafi or not? - and hints that that is the US' goal. Al-Jazirah: UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779476 Date: 12/31/2015 • Bombing raids continue; Washington emphasizes it is a "limited" operation; • In Tunis: A] conducts interviews with Tunisians in the street about Libya; those interviewed support the Libyan uprising but reject the "imperialist intervention;" • From the refugee camps on the Libyan-Tunisian borders: UN official confirms that over 800,000 refugees have fled Libya; A] reports from the borders and interviews Africans fleeing Libya; "we worked hard; we just want to go home," they say; IOM official interviewed at a camp about its efforts; some are young men who are coming to support the Libyan fighters; • Reports efforts by the Libyan authorities' attempts to persuade other news agencies to stop transmission of Al's signal; report accompanied by film of the incident in question; • Terror in Tripoli as it is exposed to a second night of bombing; • Huge explosion targets Qaddafi's residence in Bab al-Aziziyah; • French government spokesman says no reports of civilian casualties; • AJ comments that Washington says it does not aim to .topple Qaddafi but its actions speak otherwise; • Crowds celebrating in liberated town; • Gates says US will not take the lead in this operation but will hand over to the UK and France via NATO: West is very cautious of Arab fears; • Hague shown saying it's hard to predict the future of Libya; • A] reports much debate over the real goals of the US ad its allies; • Fears among some of a situation like Iraq emerging in Libya; • Amr Mousa (3/20) quoted saying this is not what the Arab League agreed to; an opposition spokesman challenges him, asking who will stop the annihilation of the Libya people otherwise; • Position of Western allies unclear on final goal: EU leaders' statement contrasted; • Qatar's military participation reported, with footage of planes taking off from Doha; • Demonstrations in front of French embassy in Tunis protesting France's involvement in the Libya operation; Al-Arabiyah: • Reports on Qaddafi's whereabouts and asserts that the Western forces bombed undisclosed places; • Reports that the situation in side Libya is extremely difficult; • Due to blocking efforts from the Libyans, AA has changed its satellite frequency; • Covers UK FM's statements on events in Libya including his comment that no planes are being used to target civilians BBCArabic: UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779476 Date: 12/31/2015 • reports on the destruction by allied forces of Qaddafi's residence; eyewitnesses describe how civilians had come to protect it and were a 100 meters away when the bombs hit; • Continued to carry clips of Amr Mousa's comments 3/20 that the Arab League had not agreed to the bombing; • Reports on reactions among European countries OTHERNEWS: • In other news, BBC Arabic reports extensively on the protests in Dera, Syria, and the destruction of two offices owned by the Syria President's cousin, Rami Makhlouf; ; BBC reports conflicting positions by the Government; eyewitnesses interviewed by phone; • Al-Arabiyah likewise carries an extensive report on Dera and the use by the Syrian authorities of tear gas; unconfirmed reports of protests in areas of Damascus; • BBC Arabic reports on the 3/20 protests by the Feb. 20 movement in Morocco; • AJ reports on the Yemeni President's dismissal of his cabinet and on the huge protests in Sanaa 3/19 calling Salih to step down; Protestors quoted saying they will not leave until he does; • Al-Arabiyah reports that the Bahraini authorities claim to have stopped a foreign plot against Bahrain; there are allegations of extensive Iranian interference and the use of media equipment to record events in side Bahrain; a person has been detained in this regard; • AJ reports on the results of the Egyptian referendum; voting participation reached unprecedented levels RRU COVERAGE Pan-Arab Al-Jazeera TV comments weapons companies are the biggest beneficiary from this operation. Al-Hayat newspaper demands a wider participation from Arab countries in imposing the no-fly zone on Libya and calls on countries that have strong Air Forces, such as Saudi Arabia, to take part. Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper reports that the Libyan army orders a cease fire and a "peaceful march" towards Benghazi. Al-Quds al-Arabi sees "media propaganda" for the military campaign and compares it to the falsification of information in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. It opines history is being repeated, and expects "US intervention" to cause bloodshed with unknown results. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779476 Date: 12/31/2015 Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper reports that the air strikes paralyze the Libyan Air Force and that Qaddafi distributes weapons among his supporters and promises that this "Christian crusade" will be a long war. Al-Sharq al-Awsat thinks that Qaddafi may have now "a last chance" to find a peaceful exit from the crisis after passing up several previous chances. Al-Sharq al-Awsat opines although the UNSC resolution doesn't demand the removal of the Qaddafi regime, the fierceness of the initial attacks indicates that is the Allies' aim. The writer thinks the region will be better without Qaddafi. Jordan Al-Ghad newspaper finds strong support from Arab public to the military operations, which is a shift from their position on the Iraq war. Qatar Al-Raya newspaper sees the position taken by the government of Qatar is right and important to stop the bloodshed against the innocent Libyan. Saudi Arabia Al-Ryadh newspaper thinks Qaddafi ruled his country ignorantly and calls on him and his sons to be wiser in dealing with their people. UAE Al-Bayan newspaper urges Qaddafi to be wiser and take "a suitable decision" while dealing with opposition as there is an international consensus on stopping his belligerence.

LIBYA PAN-ARAB MEDIA REPORT 3-21 0500

From: Cheryl Mills To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2011-03-19 23:24 Subject: LIBYA PAN-ARAB MEDIA REPORT 3-21 0500
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779460 Date: 12/31/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From: Mills, Cheryl D Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 6:24 AM To: Subject: Fw: Libya Pan-Arab Media Report 3-21 0500 Attachments: Libya Pan-Arab media report 3-21 0500.docx; Libya Pan-Arab media report 3-21 0500.docx Note: Al-Arabiyah reports that the Bahraini authorities claim to have stopped a foreign plot against Bahrain; there are allegations of extensive Iranian interference and the use of media equipment to record events in side Bahrain; a person has been detained in this regard; From: Rapid-Response [mailto:Rapid-Response©STATE.GOV ] Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 05:05 AM To: MAJOR_HEADLINES_REPORT@STATELISTS.STATE.GOV Subject: Libya Pan-Arab Media Report 3-21 0500 Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction London Hub & RRU coverage Pan-Arab Media 3-20/21-2011 5:00 am LONDON HUB COVERAGE Pan Arab TV coverage, Monday March 21, 2011 Main news on all channels today was air attack on Qaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli (Bab al-Aziziya) which serves as his military headquarters. Channels report there was no news of civilian casualties. Other developments in Libya include: • Libyan army orders ceasefire • Celebrations in Benghazi • Sec Gates says the US will not have a major role in operations in Libya and will transfer mission leadership to France and Britain or to joint NATO command. • Qatari planes are heading towards Libya, some to take part in enforcing UN resolution and others to carry humanitarian needs for the Libyan people. • Un-named Arab countries are reported by al-Jazeera to be taking part in the Libya operations too. • Amr Mousa's comments were responded to by Abdel Hafeez Ghouka, a spokesman of the Libyan National Council who asked Mousa how else to enforce a no-fly zone and save the Libyan people. It is reported that Mousa has an eye on Egyptian presidential elections. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779460 Date: 12/31/2015 • While Gates says that Qaddafi is not a target; Hague confirms that Qaddafi has to go. Pan-Arab TV snapshot: 3-20-2011 5 EST/9 GMT Of note: News on Libya talks about the damage wrought by Western bombing raids, reactions of people in the region, and the situation of refugees on the border. Libya is not at all the sole focus this morning; the news bulletins give equal focus to events in Syria, Yemen, Morocco, and Bahrain; WilliamHague's comments reported; Al reports goals of operation unclear —topple Qaddafi or not? —and hints that that is the US' goal. Al-Jazirah: • Bombing raids continue; Washington emphasizes it is a "limited" operation; • In Tunis: Al conducts interviews with Tunisians in the street about Libya; those interviewed support the Libyan uprising but reject the "imperialist intervention;" • From the refugee camps on the Libyan-Tunisian borders: UN official confirms that over 800,000 refugees have fled Libya; Al reports fromthe borders and interviews Africans fleeing Libya; "we worked hard; we just want to go home," they say; IOM official interviewed at a camp about its efforts; some are young men who are coming to support the Libyan fighters; • Reports efforts by the Libyan authorities' attempts to persuade other news agencies to stop transmission of Al's signal; report accompanied by filmof the incident in question; • Terror in Tripoli as it is exposed to a second night of bombing; • Huge explosiontargets Qaddafi's residence inBabal-Aziziyah; • Frenchgovernment spokesmansays noreports of civiliancasualties; • AJ comments that Washington says it does not aim to topple Qaddafl but its actions speak otherwise; • Crowds celebrating in liberated town; • Gates says US will not take the lead in this operation but will hand over to the UK and France via NATO: West is very cautious of Arab fears; • Hague shown saying it's hard to predict the future of Libya; • Al reports much debate over the real goals of the*US ad its allies; • Fears among some of a situation like Iraq emerging in Libya; • Amr Mousa (3/20) quoted saying this is not what the Arab League agreed to; an opposition spokesman challenges him, asking who will stop the annihilation of the Libya people otherwise; • Position of Western allies unclear on final goal: EU leaders' statement contrasted; • Qatar's military participation reported, with footage of planes taking off from Doha; • Demonstrations in front of French embassy in Tunis protesting France's involvement in the Libya operation; Al-Arabiyah: • Reports on Qaddafi's whereabouts and asserts that the Western forces bombed undisclosed places; • Reports that the situation in side Libya is extremely difficult; • Due to blocking efforts fromthe Libyans, AAhas changed its satellite frequency; • Covers UKFM's statements on events in Libya including his comment that no planes are being used to target civilians UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779460 Date: 12/31/2015 BBCArabic: • reports on the destruction by allied forces of Qaddafi's residence; eyewitnesses describe howcivilians had come to protect it and were a 100 meters away when the bombs hit; • Continued to carry clips of Amr Mousa's comments 3/20 that the Arab League had not agreed to the bombing; • Reports on reactions among European countries OTHERNEWS: • In other news, BBC Arabic reports extensively on the protests in Dera, Syria, and the destruction of two offices owned by the Syria President's cousin, Rami Makhlouf; ; BBCreports conflicting positions by the. Government; eyewitnesses interviewed by phone; • Al-Arabiyah likewise carries an extensive report on Dera and the use by the Syrian authorities of tear gas; unconfirmed reports of protests in areas of Damascus; • BBC Arabic reports on the 3/20 protests by the Feb. 20 movement in Morocco; • AJ reports on the Yemeni President's dismissal of his cabinet and on the huge protests in Sanaa 3/19 calling Salih to step down; Protestors quoted saying they will not leave until he does; • Al-Arabiyah reports that the Bahraini authorities claimto have stopped a foreign plot against Bahrain; there are allegations of extensive Iranian interference and the use of media equipment to record events in side Bahrain; a person has been detained in this regard; • AJ reports on the results of the Egyptian referendum; voting participation reached unprecedented levels RRU COVERAGE Pan-Arab Al-Jazeera TV comments weapons companies are the biggest beneficiaryfromthis operation. Al-Hayat newspaper demands awider participationfromArabcountries inimposingthe no-flyzone onLibya andcalls oncountries that havestrongAirForces, suchas Saudi Arabia, totakepart. Al-Quds al -Arabi newspaperreportsthat theLibyanarmyordersaceasefireanda"peaceful march"towards Benghazi. Al-Quds al -Arabi sees "mediapropaganda"for the militarycampaignandcompares it tothe falsificationof information in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. It opines history is beingrepeated, andexpects "USintervention"to cause bloodshed with unknown results. Al-Sharq al -Awsat newspaper reports that the air strikes paralyze the Libyan Air Force and that Qaddafi distributes weapons among his supporters and promises that this "Christian crusade" will be a long war. Al-Sharq al -Awsat thinks that Qaddafi may have now "a last chance" to find a peaceful exit from the crisis after passing up several previous chances. Al-Sharq al -Awsat opines although the UNSC resolution doesn't demand the removal of the Qaddafi regime, the fierceness of the initial attacks indicates that is the Allies' aim. The writer thinks the region will be better without Qaddafi. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779460 Date: 12/31/2015 Jordan Al-Ghad newspaper finds strong support from Arab public to the military operations, which is a shift from their position on the Iraq war. Qatar Al-Raya newspaper sees the position taken by the government of Qatar is right and important to stop the bloodshed against the innocent Libyan. Saudi Arabia Al-Ryadh newspaper thinks Qaddafi ruled his country ignorantly and calls on him and his sons to be wiser in dealing with their people. UAE Al-Bayan newspaper urges Qaddafi to be wiser and take "a suitable decision" while dealing with opposition as there is an international consensus on stopping his belligerence.

FT OP-ED ON SYRIA (THEY REQUESTED IT) THAT WILL RUN NEXT WEEK

From: Hillary Clinton To: Monica Hanley Date: 2012-08-04 03:36 Subject: FT OP-ED ON SYRIA (THEY REQUESTED IT) THAT WILL RUN NEXT WEEK
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795607 Date: 01/29/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Sunday, August 5, 2012 10:36 AM To: 'monica.hanley Subject: Fw: FT op-ed on Syria (they requested it) that will run next week Pls print. From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [mailto: Sent: Friday, July 27, 2012 09:06 AM To: H Cc: Jacob 3 Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov) ; Cheryl Mills ; Abedin, Huma Subject: FT op-ed on Syria (they requested it) that will run next week I thought you should see a preview. I will send it to folks at the WH as well. Note that Reuters reports this morning that the Turks have been "begging Washington for drones and surveillance, but to no avail." http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-syria-crisis-centre-idUSBRE86Q0J M20120727 That may be wrong, but it's out there and it's a v detailed article. "When we control Syria, we won't forget that you forgot about us." That is how the sister of a dead Free Syrian Army member responded when NPR reporter Kelly McEvers told her family that Americans are afraid of getting mired in another Iraq or Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, she and millions of her fellow Syrians cannot not understand why with all the U.S. government's talk of freedom, democracy, and human rights, its willingness to send hundreds of thousands of troops to topple a government in neighboring Iraq and to provide air cover for Libyan rebels, it will not send the types of arms necessary to allow zones controlled by the opposition to defends themselves against counter-attack by Bashir al-Assad's regime and gradually to extend their territory. Sooner or later some combination of the groups currently fighting to carry forward the revolution begun by millions of peaceful protesters 16 months ago will indeed control Syria. And when they do, their allegiances and memories of who did what during the struggle to achieve a democratic Syria are going to matter far more to the U.S. and Europe than policymakers currently calculate. That is the long game (although it may well be shorter than many people think). It is essence of strategy to plan for and play that game, identifying long-term goals and charting a path to achieve them. One of President Obama's top goals coming into office was to forge a "new beginning" between the United States and the Muslim world, a goal that he announced in Egypt. Revolutions like the one unfolding in Syria would seem to afford the perfect opportunity. But he and his fellow NATO leaders are far more focused on the short-term risks than the long-term gains. Those risks are plentiful. They include: ■ Getting too enmeshed in Syria will hurt President Obama's chances of re-election. ■ Sending arms, much less planes, to Syria without UN approval will put the U.S. on the wrong side of international law and undo three years' worth of work patiently restoring U.S. credibility as a multilateral player in the U.N. and regional organizations. ■ Acting more strongly and visibly to help the Syrian opposition will tie the U.S. to the opposition's fortunes in ways that will inhibit the U.S. "rebalancing" toward Asia. ■ Providing anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to the FSA, together with active intelligence and communications assistance to help individual FSA units use those weapons effectively, risks fueling the ongoing conflict and possibly even arming al-Qaeda fighters who are infiltrating into Syria. ■ Providing weapons to the FSA when Iran and Russia are arming the Syrian regime will drag the U.S. into a proxy great power war. All of these risks are real, although some are much more likely than others. The American public, for instance, may be for or against more active engagement in Syria, but the idea that any foreign policy issue is going to determine the election in the current economic environment is laughable. The one exception may be perceived support for Israel in key states like UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795607 Date: 01/29/2016 Florida, but in that case moving to help remove a key Iranian ally in the region and help stabilize a growing threat on Israel's borders can only help Obama. The larger point is that all policies carry risks. Many in Washington would argue that the current U.S. policy toward Syria, which is to squeeze the regime diplomatically and economically as tightly as possible; work with expatriate opposition groups to help unite them and plan for a transition; push for resolutions against the Assad regime in the UN and thereby force China and Russia to repeatedly side with Assad; provide an increasing flow of intelligence and communications equipment and vetting of opposition groups on the ground for the receipt of Turkish arms; and build international consensus to make clear to Assad the costs of using chemical weapons while planning for a possible military operation to secure those weapons in the case of regime collapse and chaos, is working. Assad's government is visibly weakening; the opposition is making steady gains in terms of controlling parts of the country and bringing the fight to Aleppo and Damascus. But the risks of this multi-pronged incrementalism are enormous. ■ The arms that are flowing, at least from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, are going to Islamist members of the opposition, many of whom are strongly opposed to the U.S. and could push a future Syrian government in directions dangerous to the U.S. and to Israel. ■ The longer the conflict rages, the more likely revenge killings will turn a revolution into a sectarian civil war that cannot be staunched even by a political transition, and the more chance al Qaeda has to infiltrate and coopt it. ■ The more Syria fragments, the more danger of conflict spilling over into Lebanon (via the Allawites), Turkey (via Syrian Kurds), Iraq (via al-Qaeda) and even Jordan (via refugees). ■ The more fragmented the Syrian opposition becomes on the ground the more chance of the kind of chaos following regime collapse that will leave chemical weapons stocks unsecured. It is time for bold action, of the kind Obama took in deciding to go after Bin Laden in Abbottabad and to intervene in Libya. In Syria that would mean putting together a coalition of countries to change the game. This coalition would commit to provide heavy weapons and possibly air cover to all commanders on the ground in Syria who sign the "Declaration of Values" supporting a peaceful, democratic, and pluralist Syria put forward last week by the 9 Commanding Generals of the Military Council of the FSA. Moreover, these commanders must admit foreign journalists, NGO activists, and UN monitors into the zones they control to monitor their actual implementation of those principles and to allow citizen journalists from all groups to upload photographs of what they witness to an official website maintained by the coalition. The U.S. is consumed with domestic politics. European leaders are focused on the Olympics, the Euro crisis, and August vacations. But the eventual winners in Syria will matter a great deal to the health, wealth, and stability of what is still the most strategic region in the world. They will remember those who remember them and cared enough to level the playing field to help them win. Anne-Marie Slaughter Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs Princeton University 440 Robertson Hall Princeton, NJ 08544 Assistant: Terry Murphy Website: www.princeton.edui—slaughtr

SYRIA

From: Sidney Blumenthal To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2011-06-19 02:31 Subject: SYRIA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788971 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 CONFIDENTIAL June 20, 2011 For: Hillary From Sid Re: Syria Enclosed is an article by David W. Lesch, perhaps the U.S. expert with the closest relationship with Bashar al-Assad, developed out of my continuing correspondence with him, an edited version which I have appended. The bottom line is that Assad' s gestures at reform are delusional attempts to recreate the pattern of his own recent past when he gained a modicum of respect from the West. Likely the most important event that could alter the Syrian equation would be the fall of Qaddafi, providing an example of a successful rebellion. What could shake Syria's regime Editor's note: David W. Lesch is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio. Among his books are: "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria"; "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History"; "The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics and Ideology"; and "1979: The Year That Shaped the Middle East". (CNN) -- Of the many occasions that I met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from 2004 to 2009, this one seemed different. He was always very affable and unpretentious, certainly not the profile of the brutal Middle East dictator that he appears to be today with the violent crackdown against Syrian protesters. But in a February 2006 meeting, he was much more confident than usual in discussing the state of U.S.- UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788971 Date: 01/07/2016 Syrian relations; in fact, he was almost cocky. He knew by then that he had survived the intense pressure the United States and its allies had applied on him following the U.N. investigation into the assassination the previous year of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, which initially had implicated the Syrian leadership. His new-found confidence lasted. A few months later in a follow-up meeting, he triumphantly remarked that, "I don't want the United States. I don't need the United States." After successfully weathering that storm, Assad and his cohorts may well believe that they can once more emerge intact from a major challenge to their regime. Assad has an exaggerated sense of Syria's importance on several Middle East fronts, from Lebanon and Iraq to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Before policymakers in the West started thinking that Syria was too big to fail, he thought it. To Assad's way of thinking, the enemies of Syria are at it once again in 2011, somehow transporting premeditated instability to Syria under the guise of the Arab Spring. What other delusion could have possibly led to the pathetic speech he gave on March 30 -- his initial public response to the uprising -- in which he blamed terrorists and malevolent external forces for the unrest rather than the underlying socioeconomic problems and political repression that lay at the root of the protests in other Arab countries and his own. He had an opportunity to get ahead of the curve of the opposition; instead, he chose the the too- little-too-late route of Mubarak (Egypt), Ben Ali (Tunisia), Saleh (Yemen) and Gadhafi (Libya). This is not to diminish the difficulty of initiating transformational change. There are powerful pockets of resistance to this in Syria. But Assad thought Syria was different from the others. He was wrong, and he is probably still in a state of denial. The sad part is that he had history as a guide right before his eyes, but he chose to ignore it. The regime has fallen into full survival mode, having retreated into an Alawite sectarian fortress. When pressured, the military-security apparatus convulsively leapt to the fore, and Assad appears to have dutifully acquiesced. He is an authoritarian ruler without absolute power, and the disconnect between him and the security forces that he allowed to fester in good times has come back to haunt him -- and many Syrians -- in bad. With few exceptions, the international community has aided and abetted the Syrian regime's confidence that it can survive and be resuscitated. The regime has been able to act with virtual impunity because of the international community's fear of the chaos that might occur in such a strategic part of the Middle East should the central authority in Syria precipitously fall from UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788971 Date: 01/07/2016 power. The potential sectarian strife in Syria and spillover effects into Iraq, Lebanon and Israel are too chilling to consider. And Russia continues to protect Syria in international forums for strategic and diplomatic reasons. One game-changer could be the fall of Col. Moammar Gadhafi in Libya. Until now, the only models for removing dictatorial regimes in the region have been mass unrest combined with the splitting of the military from the ruling circle, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt (and unlikely in Syria), or many American boots on the ground, as happened in Iraq (and is unlikely to happen again anytime soon). If Gadhafi falls within the next few months, there will be another model for regime change: that of limited but targeted military support from the West combined with an identifiable rebellion. Not that this can be easily applied in Syria. It hasn't even been easily applied in Libya, and Syria would be a much harder nut to crack. Furthermore, the Syrian opposition is far from united or being able to establish a Benghazi-like refuge from which to launch a rebellion and to which aid can be sent. But if there is regime change in Libya, the international community would be emboldened with the precedent, with maybe even the Russians finally getting on board, and it would give the Syrian regime something to really think about. Perhaps it would even give Bashar al-Assad the upper hand with his ruthless brother and security minders to finally do what he should have done in the beginning -- forgo violence, offer and implement real reform and enter into a national dialogue with the opposition. The options are not pretty. The Syrian regime does not want, nor can it probably survive, long- term international pressure or isolation, but it is used to sanctions, special tribunals, the withdrawing of ambassadors and similar actions. These are marginal levers that will have very little effect on the regime in the near term. Success for the rebels in Libya might change that. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of David W. Lesch. Find this article at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/16/lesch.syria.repression UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788971 Date: 01/07/2016 David: Hear anything about these divisions? Sidney [This is an article below from Le Monde ' reporting on rebellious sentiment within the Syrian army.] 2011/6/13 wrote: What effect would an ICC referral have? Lesch: At a policy level probably not much in the near term. The big thing for them is the UNSC, and as long as Russia and China aren't playing along, the Syrians feel somewhat protected (same thing happened in Dec 2005 when Russia refused to support a US-sponsored UNSC resolution on more sanctions against Syria in wake of Hariri assassination). Bashar and others prefer looking to the West, but they have also always left open the option (and some have preferred it although not Bashar) of looking eastward (Russia, Iran, India, China). Not as viable, but they do think this it is a real option (economically and politically) if they feel forced into it. Also, having re-directed and apparently survived for now the Special Tribunal in Lebanon on the Hariri, again they feel they can re-emerge out of these types of international constraints, although the ICC is a different animal in many ways, especially if Bashar himself is indicted. At a personal level, however, if it is referred and Bashar is indicted, it has to be personally devastating to him and his wife, Asma. They both, especially Asma, see themselves as cosmopolitan, internationally oriented, love to travel together internationally, etc. They also believed they were finally emerging out of the Bush shadow into international acceptability, even respect. That would all officially end with an indictment--and certainly a conviction. It is another level of pressure, but I think it is something of a point of no return in the long term and in a brutally ironic way, may free up the regime to do more b/c it has nothing to lose w/o really gaining anything in return. The possibility of an ICC referral and indictment I think would be more psychological to Bashar and some of his inner circle than anything else, which may be more potent than the actual thing. So I think public discussions about the possibility are useful, but at some point, regime brutality may leave us with no choice but to refer it.

H: MEMO, SYRIA ON THE EDGE. SID

From: Hillary Clinton To: Jake Sullivan Date: 2011-06-19 23:57 Subject: H: MEMO, SYRIA ON THE EDGE. SID
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788968 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 6:57 AM To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov' Subject: Fw: H: Memo, Syria on the edge. Sid Attachments: hrc memo syria on the edge 062011.docx Interesting take on Libya-Syria connection. From: sbwhoeor [mailto:sbwhoeop Sent: Monday, June 20, 2011 11:32 PM To: H Subject: H: Memo, Syria on the edge. Sid CO N FID EN TIA L June 20, 2011 For: Hillary From Sid Re: Syria UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788968 Date: 01/07/2016 Enclosed is an article by David W. Lesch, perhaps the U.S. expert with the closest relationship with Bashar al- Assad, developed out of my continuing correspondence with him, an edited version which I have appended. The bottom line is that Assad' s gestures at reform are delusional attempts to recreate the pattern of his own recent past when he gained a modicum of respect from the West. Likely the most important event that could alter the Syrian equation would be the fall of Qaddafi, providing an example of a successful rebellion. What could shake Syria's regime Editor's note: David W. Lesch is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio. Among his books are: "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria"; "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History"; "The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics and Ideology"; and "1979: The Year That Shaped the Middle East". (CNN) -- Of the many occasions that I met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from 2004 to 2009, this one seemed different. He was always very affable and unpretentious, certainly not the profile of the brutal Middle East dictator that he appears to be today with the violent crackdown against Syrian protesters. But in a February 2006 meeting, he was much more confident than usual in discussing the state of U.S.-Syrian relations; in fact, he was almost cocky. He knew by then that he had survived the intense pressure the United States and its allies had applied on him following the U.N. investigation into the assassinationthe previous year of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, which initially had implicated the Syrian leadership. His new-found confidence lasted. A few months later in a follow-up meeting, he triumphantly remarked that, "I don't want the United States. I don't need the United States." After successfully weathering that storm, Assad and his cohorts may well believe that they can once more emerge intact from a major challenge to their regime. Assad has an exaggerated sense of Syria's importance on several Middle East fronts, from Lebanon and Iraq to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Before policymakers in the West started thinking that Syria was too big to fail, he thought it. To Assad's way of thinking, the enemies of Syria are at it once again in 2011, somehow transporting premeditated instability to Syria under the guise of the Arab Spring. What other delusion could have possibly led to the pathetic speech he gave on March 30 -- his initial public response to the uprising -- in which he blamed terrorists and malevolent external forces for the unrest rather than the underlying socioeconomic problems and political repression that lay at the root of the protests in other Arab countries and his own. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788968 Date: 01/07/2016 He had an opportunity to get ahead of the curve of the opposition; instead, he chose the the too-little-too-late route of Mubarak (Egypt), Ben Ali (Tunisia), Saleh (Yemen) and Gadhafi (Libya). This is not to diminish the difficulty of initiating transformational change. There are powerful pockets of resistance to this in Syria. But Assad thought Syria was different from the others. He was wrong, and he is probably still in a state of denial. The sad part is that he had history as a guide right before his eyes, but he chose to ignore it. The regime has fallen into full survival mode, having retreated into an Alawite sectarian fortress. When pressured, the military-security apparatus convulsively leapt to the fore, and Assad appears to have dutifully acquiesced. He is an authoritarian ruler without absolute power, and the disconnect between him and the security forces that he allowed to fester in good times has come back to haunt him -- and many Syrians -- in bad. With few exceptions, the international community has aided and abetted the Syrian regime's confidence that it can survive and be resuscitated. The regime has been able to act with virtual impunity because of the international community's fear of the chaos that might occur in such a strategic part of the Middle East should the central authority in Syria precipitously fall from power. The potential sectarian strife in Syria and spillover effects into Iraq, Lebanon and Israel are too chilling to consider. And Russia continues to protect Syria in international forums for strategic and diplomatic reasons. One game-changer could be the fall of Col. Moammar Gadhafi in Libya. Until now, the only models for removing dictatorial regimes in the region have been mass unrest combined with the splitting of the military from the ruling circle, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt (and unlikely in Syria), or many American boots on the ground, as happened in Iraq (and is unlikely to happen again anytime soon). If Gadhafi falls within the next few months, there will be another model for regime change: that of limited but targeted military support from the West combined with an identifiable rebellion. Not that this can be easily applied in Syria. It hasn't even been easily applied in Libya, and Syria would be a much harder nut to crack. Furthermore, the Syrian opposition is far from united or being able to establish a Benghazi-like refuge from which to launch a rebellion and to which aid can be sent. But if there is regime change in Libya, the international community would be emboldened with the precedent, with maybe even the Russians finally getting on board, and it would give the Syrian regime something to really think about. Perhaps it would even give Bashar al-Assad the upper hand with his ruthless brother and security minders to finally do what he should have done in the beginning -- forgo violence, offer and implement real reform and enter into a national dialogue with the opposition. The options are not pretty. The Syrian regime does not want, nor can it probably survive, long-term international pressure or isolation, but it is used to sanctions, special tribunals, the withdrawing of ambassadors and similar actions. These are marginal levers that will have very little effect on the regime in the near term. Success for the rebels in Libya might change that. The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of David W. Lesch. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788968 Date: 01/07/2016 Find this article at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/16/lesch.syria.repression David: Hear anything about these divisions? Sidney [This is an article below from Le Monde reporting on rebellious sentiment within the Syrian army.] 2011/6/13

LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT

From: Hillary Clinton To: Lauren Jiloty Date: 2011-03-21 17:00 Subject: LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787475 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 12:00 AM To: 'JilotyLC@state.gov' Subject Fw: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT Pls print. From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:17 PM To: H Subject: Fw: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT Positive report. From: Hammer, Michael A Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:05 PM To: Smith, Dana 5; 'Benjamin_l_Rhodes 'Denis_R._McDonough Burns, William J; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob J; 'Shawn_S._Turner . ; NSC Deputy Press Secretary; Steinberg, James B Cc: Wells, Alice G; Mull, Stephen D Subject: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT RRU Special Report Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction Sunday, March 20, 2011, 1900 EDT Latest News on Libya from AI-Jazeera Al-Jazeera and Al-Jazeera English carry live the 4:10 pm (Washington time) Pentagon briefing by Navy Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, director of the Joint Staff, on progress in the Operation Odyssey Dawn. Later, Al-Jazeera continues to run the following quotes from his briefing on the bottom of its screen: - Operations against Qaddafi's forces to the South of Benghazi were successful - We doubt all Qaddafi's pronouncements including those declaring ceasefire - There are no indications that civilians have fallen in Libya as a result of Operation Odyssey Dawn UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787475 Date: 01/07/2016 Al-Jazeera highlights announcement by Libyan military that a complete ceasefire will be implemented as of 9:00 pm (Tripoli time) on Sunday 20 March in response to request by members of the African Union. Immediately following, Al- Jazeera interviews an opposition leader, Abd-al-Hafiz Fuqa, in Benghazi who stresses that Qaddafi and his forces have no intention of stopping their attacks but just want to deceive the international community. Fuqa expresses the delight of the rebels by Operation Odyssey Dawn because it has completely changed the equation in their favor as their forces stand now face to face with Qaddafi's forces. Fuqa denies reports that Misrata has been taken over by Qaddafi's forces saying that only one street and one square from Misrata are under Qaddafi's control. Al-Jazeera also contacts a rebel from Misrata who confirms the news. Other breaking news from Al-Jazeera on the situation includes: - Rebel forces are moving towards Ajdabia to help break its siege - Smoke is seen bellowing from Al-Azizya, Qaddafi's headquarters - Shelling continues in Tripoli Qatari News Agency announces that Qatari planes are helping in enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya Reuters reports that an unnamed US official responded to Arab League criticism of the West's action by stating that operations are in response to the UNSC resolution that all measures will be taken to protect Libyan civilians. - British Foreign Minister Hague stresses that there is no comparison between this operation and the attack on Iraq. Highlights from other Arab papers All papers headline the beginning of the operation, most depending on wire services with UAE Khaleej Times headlining: "Initial bombing called successful; endgame unclear." Qatar's Al-Raya reports that Qatar's Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jasem participated in the Paris summit and Sarkozy announces launch of operations. Pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi reports that influential Egyptian cleric Qardawi (resides in Qatar), said in an interview with Al-Jazeera that the "battles against Qaddafi are not a 'Crusade' and were requested by Arab countries." UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787475 Date: 01/07/2016 In an editorial entitled: "Attacks Cannot be Excuse for Invasion," UAE Gulf News argues that "building the future of Libya should be left to the people alone," stressing the importance that the "goal of military action in Libya be clearly defined," and the "goal not be altered" over time. In an op-ed in Lebanon's Daily Star, Rami Khouri is encouraged as the "chimes of freedom ring in Benghazi." He opines that the UNSC resolution is "complex and full of imprecision" but is necessary in face of Qaddafi's tyranny. From: Hammer, Michael A Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 12:45 PM To: Smith, Dana S; 'Beniamin J. Rhodes 'Denis_R._McDonouq Burns, William 3; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob 3; 'Shawn_S._Turner NSC Deputy Press Secretary; Steinberg, James B Cc: Wells, Alice G; Mull, Stephen D; Smith, Dana S Subject: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 Noon EDT Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction Pan-Arab TV snapshot: 3-20-2011 NOON EDT (prepared by London Media Hub) Al-Jazirah: reporting focuses on news of action on the ground and interviews with opposition figures in Libya; • Interview with opposition figure: The most important military targets have been struck; the conflict will go on until Qaddafi goes; • Straplines from Qaddafi's speech: We will never give up; Benghazi will rise up; the attacks are unjustified; • AJ continues to run its earlier interview with the Qatari Foreign Minister in which he justified Qatar's support for the military operations; • Russia calls on UK, France and the US to "stop the aggression on Libya"; Russia calls on all parties in Libya to observe a ceasefire immediately; • Interview with Sennoussi Sikri, opposition figure in Benghazi: There is no pity for Qaddafi or his troops; Reactions (to the military action) have been positive; he claims anti-regime fighters are ready to "complete the operation" now that they have air cover and once Qaddafi's overwhelming military forces have been reduced; he claims Mullen's comment that the military operation is merely to protect civilians was merely a diplomatic ploy; • Reuters reporting that Qaddafi forces have entered Misrata with tanks in central square; • From Misrata, spokesman for Youth Revolutionary Movement that Misrata has been exposed to heavy bombardment and attacks which reached the center of the town, where it met heavy resistance; Qaddafi's forces are following a scorched earth policy and destroying everything in their path; Qaddafi forces using mercenary snipers; • Russia calls on Britain , France and the US to stop using what it calls arbitrary force in Libya • AI-Jazirah's presenters covering unrest in the region are asking every guest, no matter what the country they are discussing, if events would justify external intervention such as is happening in Libya; UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787475 Date: 01/07/2016 • Opposition accuses Qaddafi of using civilians as human shields; • Qaddafi has no margin of maneuver beyond Bab al-Aziziyah; • New speech by Qaddafi accusing West of a Crusader war and vowing to battle to the end in a long war; claims the West is trying to "wipe out" Islam; • Pentagon says it has destroyed most Libyan air defenses; Al-Arabiya: • Qaddafi's forces are using boats to close the port of Misrata(little reporting on Libya in the afternoon) BBCArabic: • News headlines on the conflict; caption is: "The Western military operation in Libya." • Interview with an Arabic-speaking Russian analyst; Russia trying to walk a very fine line; General: • No Arab governments have voiced objections or criticism of Western intervention in Libya. Objections come from Russia, China, Chavez and the African Union. • Qatar's PM defended his country's participation in enforcing no-fly zone.in Libya saying it is to protect civilians from organized attacks by the military and mercenaries. • Libyan opposition welcomed intervention but maintained they do not want a direct foreign presence on Libyan soil. • Qaddafi describes intervention as a "Crusade" and says he has ordered arming of the Libyan people. • Misrata is said to be under siege by Qaddafi forces. • Elaph reports that the Western operation in Libya has no clear end-objective. Other news of note: • SYRIA: Al-Arabiya is focusing this afternoon on Syria; .it carries an interview by phone with a Syrian speaking about the protests in Der'a and elsewhere, comparing Syria to Libya; he accuses the Syrian government of using mercenary forces to attack civilians, including Hezbolla fighters from Lebanon; Al- Jazirah English also covers the Syria protests; • YEMEN: coverage on al-Arabiyah and al-Jazirah al-Mubashir of big protests in Sanaa and continued calls for Saleh to step down; Aden reported at a standstill because of protests. This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT

From: Hillary Clinton To: Jake Sullivan Date: 2011-03-19 13:26 Subject: LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787128 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:26 PM To: 'sullivanjj@state.goV Subject: Re: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT 10 minutes is fine--even later if that works better for you. From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:Sullivann@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:24 PM To: H Subject: Re: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT Actually - 10 mins would be better - I can reach out thru ops From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com] Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:21 PM To: Sullivan, Jacob J Subject: Re: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT One lesson learned: when it comes to Al-Jazeera news coverage, it helps having Qatar involved. Anything to report? I could call now if you're available. From: Sullivan, Jacob 3 [mailto:Sullivann@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:17 PM To: H Subject: Fw: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT Positive report. From: Hammer, Michael A Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:05 PM To: Smith, Dana S; 'Beniamin J. Rhodes 'Denis_R._McDonough Burns, William J; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob J; 'Shawn_S. Turner ; NSC Deputy Press Secretary; Steinberg, James B Cc: Wells, Alice G; Mull, Stephen D Subject: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT RRU Special Report Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction Sunday, March 20, 2011, 1900 EDT I ta c t K ifa lA ie n n I ik .in ft-n rn UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787128 Date: 01/07/2016 Al-Jazeera AI-Jazeera and Al-Jazeera English carry live the 4:10 pm (Washington time) Pentagon briefing by Navy Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, director of the Joint Staff, on progress in the Operation Odyssey Dawn. Later, Al-Jazeera continues to run the following quotes from his briefing on the bottom of its screen: - Operations against Qaddafi's forces to the South of Benghazi were successful - We doubt all Qaddafi's pronouncements including those declaring ceasefire - There are no indications that civilians have fallen in Libya as a result of Operation Odyssey Dawn Al-Jazeera highlights announcement by Libyan military that a complete ceasefire will be implemented as of 9:00 pm (Tripoli time) on Sunday 20 March in response to request by members of the African Union. Immediately following, Al- Jazeera interviews an opposition leader, Abd-al-Hafiz Fuqa, in Benghazi who stresses that Qaddafi and his forces have no intention of stopping their attacks but just want to deceive the international community. Fuqa expresses the delight of the rebels by Operation Odyssey Dawn because it has completely changed the equation in their favor as their forces stand now face to face with Qaddafi's forces. Fuqa denies reports that Misrata has been taken over by Qaddafi's forces saying that only one street and one square from Misrata are under Qaddafi's control. Al-Jazeera also contacts a rebel from Misrata who confirms the news. Other breaking news from Al-Jazeera on the situation includes: - Rebel forces are moving towards Ajdabia to help break its siege - Smoke is seen bellowing from AI-Azizya, Qaddafi's headquarters - Shelling continues in Tripoli Qatari News Agency announces that Qatari planes are helping in enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya Reuters reports that an unnamed US official responded to Arab League criticism of the West's action by stating that operations are in response to the UNSC resolution that all measures will be taken to protect Libyan civilians. - British Foreign Minister Hague stresses that there is no comparison between this operation and the attack on Iraq. Highlights from other Arab papers All papers headline the beginning of the operation, most depending on wire services with UAE UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787128 Date: 01/07/2016 Khaleej Times headlining: "Initial bombing called successful; endgame unclear." Qatar's Al-Raya reports that Qatar's Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jasem participated in the Paris summit and Sarkozy announces launch of operations. Pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi reports that influential Egyptian cleric Qardawi (resides in Qatar), said in an interview with Al-Jazeera that the "battles against Qaddafi are not a 'Crusade' and were requested by Arab countries." In an editorial entitled: "Attacks Cannot be Excuse for Invasion," UAE Gulf News argues that "building the future of Libya should be left to the people alone," stressing the importance that the "goal of military action in Libya be clearly defined," and the "goal not be altered" over time. In an op-ed in Lebanon's Daily Star, Rami Khouri is encouraged as the "chimes of freedom ring in Benghazi." He opines that the UNSC resolution is "complex and full of imprecision" but is necessary in face of Qaddafi's tyranny. From: Hammer, Michael A Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 12:45 PM To: Smith, Dana S; 'Benjamin_l_RhodeS 'Denis_R._McDonough Burns, William J; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob 3; 'Shawn_S._Turner NSC Deputy Press Secretary; Steinberg, James B Cc: Wells, Alice G; Mull, Stephen D; Smith, Dana S Subject: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 Noon EDT Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction Pan-Arab TV snapshot: 3-20-2011 NOON EDT (prepared by London Media Hub) Al-Jazirah: reporting focuses on news of action on the ground and interviews with opposition figures in Libya; • Interview with opposition figure: The most important military targets have been struck; the conflict will go on until Qaddafi goes; • Straplines from Qaddafi's speech: We will never give up; Benghazi will rise up; the attacks are unjustified; • AJ continues to run its earlier interview with the Qatari Foreign Minister in which he justified Qatar's support for the military operations; • Russia calls on UK, France and the US to "stop the aggression on Libya"; Russia calls on all parties in I ihvA to nhcprvp a rpA cpfirp im m arliataly UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787128 Date: 01/07/2016 • Interview with Sennoussi Sikri, opposition figure in Benghazi: There is no pity for Qaddafi or his troops; Reactions (to the military action) have been positive; he claims anti-regime fighters are ready to "complete the operation" now that they have air cover and once Qaddafi's overwhelming military forces have been reduced; he claims Mullen's comment that the military operation is merely to protect civilians was merely a diplomatic ploy; • Reuters reporting that Qaddafi forces have entered Misrata with tanks in central square; • From Misrata, spokesman for Youth Revolutionary Movement that Misrata has been exposed to heavy bombardment and attacks which reached the center of the town, where it met heavy resistance; Qaddafi's forces are following a scorched earth policy and destroying everything in their path; Qaddafi forces using mercenary snipers; • Russia calls on Britain , France and the US to stop using what it calls arbitrary force in Libya • AI-Jazirah's presenters covering unrest in the region are asking every guest, no matter what the country they are discussing, if events would justify external intervention such as is happening in Libya; • Opposition accuses Qaddafi of using civilians as human shields; • Qaddafi has no margin of maneuver beyond Bab al-Aziziyah; • New speech by Qaddafi accusing West of a Crusader war and vowing to battle to the end in a long war; claims the West is trying to "wipe out" Islam; • Pentagon says it has destroyed most Libyan air defenses; Al-Arabiya: • Qaddafi's forces are using boats to close the port of Misrata(little reporting on Libya in the afternoon) BBC Arabic: • News headlines on the conflict; caption is: "The Western military operation in Libya." • Interview with an Arabic-speaking Russian analyst; Russia trying to walk a very fine line; General: • No Arab governments have voiced objections or criticism of Western intervention in Libya. Objections come from Russia, China, Chavez and the African Union. • Qatar's PM defended his country's participation in enforcing no-fly zone in Libya saying it is to protect civilians from organized attacks by the military and mercenaries. • Libyan opposition welcomed intervention but maintained they do not want a direct foreign presence on Libyan soil. • Qaddafi describes intervention as a "Crusade" and says he has ordered arming of the Libyan people. • Misrata is said to be under siege by Qaddafi forces. • Elaph reports that the Western operation in Libya has no clear end-objective. Other news of note: • SYRIA: AI-Arabiya is focusing this afternoon on Syria; it carries an interview by phone with a Syrian speaking about the protests in Der'a and elsewhere, comparing Syria to Libya; he accuses the Syrian government of using mercenary forces to attack civilians, including Hezbolla fighters from Lebanon; Al- Jazirah English also covers the Syria protests; • YEMEN: coverage on al-Arabiyah and al-Jazirah al-Mubashir of big protests in Sanaa and continued calls for Saleh to step down; Aden reported at a standstill because of protests. This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT

From: Hillary Clinton To: Jake Sullivan Date: 2011-03-19 13:22 Subject: LIBYA: COALITION FORCES MEDIA REACTION - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787122 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:22 PM To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov' Subject Re: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction,- 3-20-2011 1900 EDT One lesson learned: when it comes to Al-Jazeera news coverage, it helps having Qatar involved. Anything to report? I could call now if you're available. From: Sullivan, Jacob 3 [mailto:Sullivann@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:17 PM To: H Subject: Fw: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT Positive report. From: Hammer, Michael A Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:05 PM To: Smith, Dana S; 'Benjamin_J._Rhodes 'Denis_R._McDonog i h Burns, William 3; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob 3; 'Shawn_S._Turner >; NSC Deputy Press Secretary; Steinberg, James B Cc: Wells, Alice G; Mull, Stephen D Subject: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 1900 EDT RRU Special Report Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction Sunday, March 20, 2011, 1900 EDT Latest News on Libya from Al-Jazeera Al-Jazeera and Al-Jazeera English carry live the 4:10 pm (Washington time) Pentagon briefing by Navy Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, director of the Joint Staff, on progress in the Operation Odyssey Dawn. Later, Al-Jazeera continues to run the following quotes from his briefing on the bottom of its screen: - Operations against Qaddafi's forces to the South of Benghazi were successful - We doubt all Qaddafi's pronouncements including those declaring ceasefire - There are no indications that civilians have fallen in Libya as a result of Operation Odyssey Dawn UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787122 Date: 01/07/2016 Al-Jazeera highlights announcement by Libyan military that a complete ceasefire will be implemented as of 9:00 pm (Tripoli time) on Sunday 20 March in response to request by members of the African Union. Immediately following, Al- Jazeera interviews an opposition leader, Abd-al-Hafiz Fuqa, in Benghazi who stresses that Qaddafi and his forces have no intention of stopping their attacks but just want to deceive the international community. Fuqa expresses the delight of the rebels by Operation Odyssey Dawn because it has completely changed the equation in their favor as their forces stand now face to face with Qaddafi's forces. Fuqa denies reports that Misrata has been taken over by Qaddafi's forces saying that only one street and one square from Misrata are under Qaddafi's control. Al-Jazeera also contacts a rebel from Misrata who confirms the news. Other breaking news from Al-Jazeera on the situation includes: - Rebel forces are moving towards Ajdabia to help break its siege - Smoke is seen bellowing from Al-Azizya, Qaddafi's headquarters - Shelling continues in Tripoli Qatari News Agency announces that Qatari planes are helping in enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya Reuters reports that an unnamed US official responded to Arab League criticism of the West's action by stating that operations are in response to the UNSC resolution that all measures will be taken to protect Libyan civilians. - British Foreign Minister Hague stresses that there is no comparison between this operation and the attack on Iraq. Highlights from other Arab papers All papers headline the beginning of the operation, most depending on wire services with UAE Khaleej Times headlining: "Initial bombing called successful; endgame unclear." Qatar's Al-Raya reports that Qatar's Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jasem participated in the Paris summit and Sarkozy announces launch of operations. Pan-Arab Al-Quds al-Arabi reports that influential Egyptian cleric Qardawi (resides in Qatar), said in an interview with Al-Jazeera that the "battles against Qaddafi are not a 'Crusade' and were requested by Arab countries." UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787122 Date: 01/07/2016 In an editorial entitled: "Attacks Cannot be Excuse for Invasion," UAE Gulf News argues that "building the future of Libya should be left to the people alone," stressing the importance that the "goal of military action in Libya be clearly defined," and the "goal not be altered" over time. In an op-ed in Lebanon's Daily Star, Rami Khouri is encouraged as the "chimes of freedom ring in Benghazi." He opines that the UNSC resolution is "complex and full of imprecision" but is necessary in face of Qaddafi's tyranny. From: Hammer, Michael A Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 12:45 PM To: Smith, Dana S; 'Benjamin_J._Rhodes 'Denis_R._McDonou h Burns, William J; Feltman, Jeffrey D; Sullivan, Jacob 3; 'Shawn_S._Turner NSC Deputy Press Secretary; Steinberg, James B Cc: Wells, Alice G; Mull, Stephen D; Smith, Dana S Subject: Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction - 3-20-2011 Noon EDT Libya: Coalition Forces Media Reaction Pan-Arab TV snapshot: 3-20-2011 NOON EDT (prepared by London Media Hub) Al-Jazirah: reporting focuses on news of action on the ground and interviews with opposition figures in Libya; • Interview with opposition figure: The most important military targets have been struck; the conflict will go on until Qaddafi goes; • Straplines from Qaddafi's speech: We will never give up; Benghazi will rise up; the attacks are unjustified; • AJ continues to run its earlier interview with the Qatari Foreign Minister in which he justified Qatar's support for the military operations; • Russia calls on UK, France and the US to "stop the aggression on Libya"; Russia calls on all parties in Libya to observe a ceasefire immediately; • Interview with Sennoussi Sikri, opposition figure in Benghazi: There is no pity for Qaddafi or his troops; Reactions (to the military action) have been positive; he claims anti-regime fighters are ready to "complete the operation" now that they have air cover and once Qaddafi's overwhelming military forces have been reduced; he claims Mullen's comment that the military operation is merely to protect civilians was merely a diplomatic ploy; • Reuters reporting that Qaddafi forces have entered Misrata with tanks in central square; • From Misrata, spokesman for Youth Revolutionary Movement that Misrata has been exposed to heavy bombardment and attacks which reached the center of the town, where it met heavy resistance; Qaddafi's forces are following a scorched earth policy and destroying everything in their path; Qaddafi forces using mercenary snipers; • Russia calls on Britain , France and the US to stop using what it calls arbitrary force in Libya UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787122 Date: 01/07/2016 • Al-Jazirah's presenters covering unrest in the region are asking every guest, no matter what the country they are discussing, if events would justify external intervention such as is happening in Libya; • Opposition accuses Qaddafi of using civilians as human shields; • Qaddafi has no margin of maneuver beyond Bab al-Aziziyah; • New speech by Qaddafi accusing West of a Crusader war and vowing to battle to the end in a long war; claims the West is trying to "wipe out" Islam; • Pentagon says it has destroyed most Libyan air defenses; Al-Arabiya: • Qaddafi's forces are using boats to close the port of Misrata(little reporting on Libya in the afternoon) BBCArabic: • News headlines on the conflict; caption is: "The Western military operation in Libya." • Interview with an Arabic-speaking Russian analyst; Russia trying to walk a very fine line; General: • No Arab governments have voiced objections or criticism of Western intervention in Libya. Objections come from Russia, China, Chavez and the African Union. • Qatar's PM defended his country's participation in enforcing no-fly zone in Libya saying it is to protect civilians from organized attacks by the military and mercenaries. • Libyan opposition welcomed intervention but maintained they do not want a direct foreign presence on Libyan soil. • Qaddafi describes intervention as a "Crusade" and says he has ordered arming of the Libyan people. • Misrata is said to be under siege by Qaddafi forces. • Elaph reports that the Western operation in Libya has no clear end-objective. Other news of note: • SYRIA: Al-Arabiya is focusing this afternoon on Syria; it carries an interview by phone with a Syrian speaking about the protests in Der'a and elsewhere, comparing Syria to Libya; he accuses the Syrian government of using mercenary forces to attack civilians, including Hezbolla fighters from Lebanon; Al- Jazirah English also covers the Syria protests; • YEMEN: coverage on al-Arabiyah and al-Jazirah al-Mubashir of big protests in Sanaa and continued calls for Saleh to step down; Aden reported at a standstill because of protests. This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID

From: Hillary Clinton To: Huma Abedin Date: 2011-03-11 06:36 Subject: H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05786463 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 1:36 PM To: Huma Abedin Subject: Fw: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid Attachments: hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311.docx Pls print. From: sbwhoeop B6 Sent: Thursday, '‘larch 03, 2011 09:45 PM To: H Subject: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth—his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05786463 Date: 01/07/2016 Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, training, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council (NLC), and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil have been chosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that Qaddafi's cousin, Col.. Ali Qaddafiddarn had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the conversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan Air Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel forces. (Source Comment: Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam Hallaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, to instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future.) On March 2, a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number of Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of the Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U.S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for opposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father, Hafez al- II. from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05786463 Date: 01/07/2016 Assad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long- standing, close links with Moscow. In exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds in support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money helped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etat in 1983, to leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. According to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second team of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime who are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they met with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. (Source Comment: During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi stated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the announcement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of the 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head of Gadhafi's personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization (Abuzaid Dorda), the spokesman of the regime (Musa Ibrahim), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mousa Kousa). This source added that Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing.) From: Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appears they have few missiles; the military in the East having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya.Iknow some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05786463 Date: 01/07/2016 victoryis possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. Pm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours Davi

H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID

From: Hillary Clinton To: Huma Abedin Date: 2011-03-11 06:36 Subject: H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785881 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 1:36 PM To: Huma Abedin Subject: Fw: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid Attachments: hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311.docx Pls print. From: sbwhoeok B6 Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 09:45 PM To: H Subject: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth—his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785881 Date: 01/07/2016 Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, training, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council (NLC), and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil have been chosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that Qaddafi's cousin, Col. Ali Qaddafiddam had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the conversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan Air Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel forces. (Source Comment: Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam Hallaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, to instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future.) On March 24 a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number of Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of the Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U.S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for opposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father, Hafez al- II. from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785881 Date: 01/07/2016 Assad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long- standing, close links with Moscow. In exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds in support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money helped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etatin 1983, to leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. According to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second team of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime who are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they met with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. (Source Comment: During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi stated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the announcement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of the 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head of Gadhafi's personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization (Abuzaid Dorda), the spokesman of the regime (Musa Ibrahim), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mousa Kousa). This source added that Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing.) From: Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appears they have few missiles; the military in the East having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. Iknow some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785881 Date: 01/07/2016 victoryis possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. I'm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours David

H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID

From: Sidney Blumenthal To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2011-03-03 14:45 Subject: H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779381 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: sbwhoeop Sent: Thursday, March 3, 2011 9:45 PM To: Subject: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid Attachments: hrc memo Syria aiding libya 030311.docx; hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311.docx CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth—his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, training, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council (NLC), and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil have been chosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779381 Date: 01/07/2016 Qaddafi's cousin, Col. Ali Qaddafiddam had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the conversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan Air Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel forces. (Source Comment: Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam Hallaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, to instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future.) On March 2, a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number of Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of the Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U.S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for opposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father, Hafez al- Assad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long- standing, close links with Moscow. II. Note from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05779381 Date: 01/07/2016 In exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds in support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money helped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etatin 1983, to leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. According to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second team of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime who are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they met with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. (Source Comment: During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi stated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the announcement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of the 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head of Gadhafi's personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization (Abuzaid Dorda), the spokesman of the regime (Musa Ibrahim), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mousa Kousa). This source added that Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing.) From: Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appears they have few missiles; the military in the East having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. I know some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi victory is possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. I'm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours David

H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID

From: To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2011-03-03 14:45 Subject: H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID
UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 Date: 05/13/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: B6 Sent: Thursday, March 3, 2011 9:45 PM To: Subject: H: Latest How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid Attachments: hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311.docx; hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311.docx CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth—his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, training, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council (NLC), and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Galil have been chosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Case No. F-2015-04841 Date: 05/13/20156 Qaddafi's cousin, Col. Ali Qaddafiddam had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the conversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan Air Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel forces. (Source Comment: Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam Hallaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, to instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future.) On March 2, a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number of Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of the Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U.S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for opposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father,Hafez al- Assad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long- standing, close links with Moscow. Note from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Doc No. C057395464841 Date: 05/13/2015 In exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds in support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money helped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etatin 1983, to leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. According to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second team of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime who are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they met with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. (Source Comment: During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi stated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the announcement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of the 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head of Gadhafi's personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization (Abuzaid Dorda), the spokesman of the regime (Musa Ibrahim), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mousa Kousa). This source added that Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing.) From: Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appears they have few missiles; the military in the East having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. I know some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi victory is possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. I'm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours David UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739546 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.

H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID

From: Hillary Clinton To: Huma Abedin Date: 2011-03-11 06:36 Subject: H: LATEST: HOW SYRIA IS AIDING QADDAFI AND MORE... SID
UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739554 Date: 05/13/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 1:36 PM To: Huma Abedin Subject: Fw: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid Attachments: hrc memo syria aiding libya 030311.docx Pis print. B6 From: Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 09:45 PM To: H Subject: H: Latest: How Syria is aiding Qaddafi and more... Sid CONFIDENTIAL March 3, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Syria aiding Qaddafi This memo has two parts. Part one is the report that Syria is providing air support for Qaddafi. Part two is a note to Cody from Lord David Owen, former UK foreign secretary on his views of an increasingly complex crisis. It seems that the situation is developing into a protracted civil war with various nations backing opposing sides with unforeseen consequences. Under these circumstances the crucial challenge is to deprive Qaddafi of his strategic depth—his support both financial and military. I. Report During the afternoon of March 3, advisers to Muammar Qaddafi stated privately that the Libyan Leader has decided that civil war is inevitable, pitting troops and mercenary troops loyal to him against the rebel forces gathering around Benghazi. Qaddafi is convinced that these rebels are being supported by the United States, Western Europe and Israel. On March 2 Qaddafi told his son Saif al-Islam that he believes the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739554 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. Case No. F-2015-04841ate SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Doc No. C05739554 Date: 05/13/2015 Egypt, and France have deployed paramilitary officers to Benghazi to assist in organizing, _raining, and equipping opposition forces. Qaddafi is convinced that the National Libyan Council :NLC), and its leader, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Mohamed Abdel Gall have been :thosen by the foreign powers to replace him. On March 1 advisors to Qaddafi stated that Q,addafi's cousin, Col. Al Qaddafiddam had failed in efforts to recruit fighters among the Egyptian population living immediately across the border with Libya. These individuals added that during the week of February 21 the Libyan Leader spoke to Syrian president Bashir al-Assad on at least three occasions by secure telephone lines. During the :,onversations Qaddafi asked that Syrian officers and technicians currently training the Libyan /kir Force be placed under command of the Libyan Army and allowed to fight against the rebel tbrces. (Source Comment: Senior Libyan Army officers still loyal to Qaddafi added that On February 23, President Assad told General Isam HaIlaq, the commander in chief of the Syrian Air Force, :o instruct the pilots and technicians in Tripoli to help the Libyan regime, should full scale Civil War breaks out in the immediate future.) On March 2, a military officer with ties to Qaddfi's son Khamis stated privately that the number Df Libyan pilots defecting to the opposition has destroyed the morale and professional spirit of ,he Libyan Air Force at this critical moment, when Tripoli's air superiority is its principal weapon against insurgents. In the opinion of this individual Qaddafi and his senior military advisors are convinced that the European Union and the U.S will impose a no-fly zone over Libya in the immediate future. These advisors believe that the no fly zone will serve as air support for Dpposition forces. They are also prepared for the Western allies to bomb anti-aircraft facilities in and around Tripoli in preparation for the establishment of the no-fly zone. Foreign Minister Mousa Kousa is convinced that that Russia and Turkey will oppose the move, and may prevent the implementation of the no fly zone. The Syrian soldiers in Libya are part of a mission established in 1984 following the signing of a military agreement between Qaddafi and Syria's long-time ruler and Bashir's father, Hafez al- UNCLASSIFIED IL from David Owen, former UK foreign secretary U.S. Department of State Case No F-2015-04841 Doc No C05739554 STATE DEPT - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Case No. F-2015-04841 Date: 05/13/20154 kssad, in the presence of General Soubhi Haddad, who was the commander in chief of the Air Force at the time. Both Air Forces are equipped with Russian materiel and have had long- ;tanding, close links with Moscow. :n exchange for Syria's help, Libya provided financial support to the Syrian state, including funds n support of operations carried out by the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon. Libyan money -iped Hafez al-Assad bribe his brother Rifaat, the author of an attempted coup d'etat in 1983, .o leave the country and go into exile in Spain and France, where he has remained ever since. kccording to individuals with access to the Syrian military, Damascus has also sent a second earn of pilots and technicians to Tripoli. These are lower-ranking officers loyal to the regime Afho are specialized in flying helicopters. Before their departure for Tripoli on February 23, they net with General Allaq and General Jamil Hasan, head of Air Force's Intelligence. :Source Comment: During the afternoon of 3 March, an associate of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi ;tated that he and the Libyan leaders other family members were concerned over the trmouncement of Jose Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal .2ourt (ICC), announced that he was investigating Qaddafi, his sons Khamis, the commander of .he 32 battalion, and Montasem, as well as the head of Gadhafi's personal security detail, the Director-General of the External Security Organization (Abuzaid Dorda), the spokesman of the -egime (Musa Ibrahim), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mousa Kousa). This source added :hat Saif al-Islam had said that Qaddafi himself found the announcement amusing.) From: Lord Owen Cody, Realistically the UN will not authorise a no fly zone while Gaddafi continues to hold off bombing and strafing but keeping it up front and on the military agenda keeps him worried. Yet for a few frustrating months that ambivalence kept the Serbian aeroplanes on the ground before we acted. My hope is that preparations continue with visuals of planes flying off carriers, airborne early warning planes flying and people with clout outside the Administration demanding preparations. But and it is a big BUT what else can and should we be doing? Encourage humanitarian ships and convoys from Egypt to bring in supplies since we must ensure the cities in the East can hold up living standards, maybe for months. More adventurous, Egyptian Special Forces to go in and advise, even supplying hand held missiles. It appeatheyhavefewmissiles; themilitaryintheEast having been deliberately kept ill-equipped. There is old Nasserite sentiment for a Federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. Iknow some will say Egypt has enough problems and they should stay resolutely focused on domestic reforms. it is delicate but words alone and the balance of advantage will slip to Gaddafi. A Gaddafi UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739554 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. UNCLASSIFIED STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM. U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. Doc No. C05739554 Date: 05/13/2015 victory is possible and needs to be weighed in the balance now when deciding what to do. Pm more worried than I am ready to say publicly. Yours David UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-04841 Doc No. C05739554 STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.

SYRIA

From: Hillary Clinton To: Robert Russo Date: 2012-07-24 10:11 Subject: SYRIA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795370 Date: 11/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2012 5:11 PM To: 'Russorv@state.gov. Subject Fw: Syria Attachments: press release briansayers (2).docx Importance: High Pis print. From: Anne-Marie Slaughter Sent: Thursday, July 19, 201z 09:17 PM To: H Cc: Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ©state.gov ) ; Burns, William J (BurnsWJ©state.gov ) ; Cheryl Mills ; Abedin, Huma Subject: Syria It was great to see you today, both at FPAB and at the data summit. I've been avoiding haranguing you directly on Syria, putting my thoughts on the op-ed page instead. But this time I really think we have an opportunity that I'm afraid we are going to miss, at least judging by the presentation that Bob Ford gave today. I didn't want to say anything in front of the group, but here goes. Below is the Declaration of Values that the nine commanders of the military councils of the FSA have signed and are making public. They are exactly the values that we would want a new Syrian government to subscribe to, put forward by military commanders on the ground who may not represent the entire Syrian armed opposition, but at least reflect a good part of it — and the part that we would most want to triumph or at least triumph enough to be able to share power with the Islamist groups. Further, if we put this together with the transition plan that Bob Ford came out of Cairo, we have something tangible to go on. Further, see the attached press release, which I just received, in which the FSA is following exactly the strategy that I laid out months ago. They are establishing safe zones, `perimeters where all Syrian citizens can live under an umbrella of peace and security, regardless of their ethnic background or religion." I see six reasons why we should publicly declare that we support these safe zones and will be prepared to help defend them against the Syrian regime, in addition to the basic point that it is the right thing to do. 1) We have done much better in those MENA countries in which we have taken the initiative (Libya, Yemen) rather than hanging back and responding to events (Egypt, Syria). And if we can make a go of this and it comes out even half decently, then your legacy re US diplomacy in the equivalent of 1848 or 1989 will be remarkably good. 2) After the Russian/China veto yesterday we have the perf&t opportunity to say that given their determination to support a murderous government, we are standing with the Syrian people and their regional neighbors. 3) The opposition is going to win and is going to ask where we were. Supporting the declaration below and the safe zones does not prevent us from reaching out to the Islamist opposition; on the contrary, we might be able to help broker a coalition, working with the Turks/Saudis. 4) The time to act is running out fast. This revolution is not going to wait on our election. 5) If we don't seize this opportunity, the Republicans will. The Syrian Support Group is a fairly well organized and funded group of Syrian-Americans, as you probably know, many of whom are from the UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795370 Date: 11/30/2015 mid-West and who are working every contact they have. This declaration of principles and the safe zones are going to make the issue look much more black and white from the perspective of the Romney campaign. 6) It will be easier to move covertly to secure chemical weapons if we are actively and openly working with relatively well-organized groups on the ground. That's as succinct as I can make it. It's time to act. Best, AM Message from the Free Syrian Army to the World: "We're fighting for a democratic and peaceful nation, but we need your help." Last week, an extraordinary event occurred inside Syria that went largely unnoticed by almost everyone with exception of nine individuals and a few informed people abroad. The nine commanding generals of the Military Councils of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) --- the de facto opposition to President Bashar al-Assad' s regime -- signed a "Declaration of Values" that would please the likes of Jefferson, Mandela and Liu Xiaobo. Pressed by the international media over abetting certain extremist factions including al-Qaeda, the FSA fighters are hitting back and telling the world that not only are they deeply misunderstood, but that they are fighting for fundamental human rights including liberty, justice and peace and against the barbarity and sectarianism that Assad's regime is inflicting upon the Syrian people. None of the nine commanders claim to run perfect military councils, nor have they denied that pockets of extremist groups are fighting on the side of the opposition. But what they will also say is that a political vacuum in Syria, the probability of which is increasing over time, will only mitigate shaping the future of the country, including removing undesirable elements of sectarianism and extremism. Either the international community provides the relevant capabilities, assets and intelligence to support the FSA or history will record that the world stood idle while both Syria and perhaps the wider region descended into turmoil. The declaration below is more than agreeable words - it is a plea from embattled freedom-loving soldiers to rational, fair-minded nations that their support is essential to end the bloodshed and bring about a lasting peace. Maybe it's time that we stop shrugging our shoulders and understand what they have to say: Free Syrian Army Declaration of Values We the Commanders of the Military Councils of the Free Syrian Army, and representing the General Council of Syria, hereby affirm this Declaration of our Values: • We believe in a free and democratic Syria where all Syrian citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, creed, religion, or class, shall live in liberty, justice and peace; • We believe in a pluralistic, multi-ethnic society which honors and upholds freedom of expression, thought and conscience; • We believe in free association and assembly. No Syrian citizen shall be forced into a political association; UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795370 Date: 11/30/2015 o We believe that the Rule of Law shall be honored by the Governing bodies of Syria and reign supreme throughout the nation; o We believe that the Governing bodies and civil authorities shall protect its citizens from persecution, fear and cruel or unusual punishment; o We wekome peace and security along our regional borders and we look forward to political partnerships and alliances in the Middle East and beyond; o We believe that the Free Syrian Army military structure shall be guided by the decisions of a democratically elected civilian Government; • We will fight to end the tyranny and dictatorship of the Assad regime and we welcome our international allies and partners to join us in this Revolution for Freedom. Signed by the nine Commanders of the Military Councils of the Free Syrian Army Brian Sayers Director of Government Relations Syrian Support Group 1000 Connecticut Ave NW Suite 900 Washington DC 20036 o: 202 787 1050 C:

NEW IRAN AND SYRIA 2.DOC

From: To: Date: 2001-01-01 03:00 Subject: NEW IRAN AND SYRIA 2.DOC
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05794498 Date: 11/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL The best way to help Israel deal with Iran's growing nuclear capability is to help the people of Syria overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad. Negotiations to limit Iran's nuclear program will not solve Israel's security dilemma. Nor will they stop Iran from improving the crucial part of any nuclear weapons program — the capability to enrich uranium. At best, the talks between the world's major powers and Iran that began in Istanbul this April and will continue in Baghdad in May will enable Israel to postpone by a few months a decision whether to launch an attack on Iran that could provoke a major Mideast war. Iran's nuclear program and Syria's civil war may seem unconnected, but they are. For Israeli leaders, the real threat from a nuclear-armed Iran is not the prospect of an insane Iranian leader launching an unprovoked Iranian nuclear attack on Israel that would lead to the annihilation of both countries. What Israeli military leaders really worry about -- but cannot talk about -- is losing their nuclear monopoly. An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would not only end that nuclear monopoly but could also prompt other adversaries, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to go nuclear as well. The result would be a precarious nuclear balance in which Israel could not respond to provocations with conventional military strikes on Syria and Lebanon, as it can today. If Iran were to reach the threshold of a nuclear weapons state, Tehran would find it much easier to call on its allies in Syria and Hezbollah to strike Israel, knowing that its nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent to Israel responding against Iran itself. Back to Syria. It is the strategic relationship between Iran and the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria that makes it possible for Iran to undermine Israel's security — not through a direct attack, which in the thirty years of hostility between Iran and Israel has never occurred, but through its proxies in Lebanon, like Hezbollah, that are sustained, armed and trained by Iran via Syria. The end of the Assad regime would end this dangerous alliance. Israel's leadership understands well why defeating Assad is now in its interests. Speaking on CNN's Amanpour show last week, Defense Minister Ehud Barak argued that "the toppling down of Assad will be a major blow to the radical axis, major blow to Iran.... It's the only kind of outpost of the Iranian influence in the Arab world...and it will weaken dramatically both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza." Bringing down Assad would not only be a massive boon to Israel's security, it would also ease Israel's understandable fear of losing its nuclear monopoly. Then, Israel and the United States might be able to develop a common view of when the Iranian program is so dangerous that military action could be warranted. Right now, it is the combination of Iran's strategic alliance with Syria and the steady progress in Iran's nuclear enrichment program that has led Israeli leaders to contemplate a surprise attack — if necessary over the objections of Washington. With Assad gone, and Iran no longer able to threaten Israel through its, proxies, it is possible that the United States and Israel can agree on red lines for when Iran's program has crossed an unacceptable threshold. In short, the White House can ease the tension that has developed with Israel over Iran by doing the right thing in Syria. The rebellion in Syria has now lasted more than a year. The opposition is not going away, nor is the regime going to accept a diplomatic solution from the outside. With his life and his family at risk, only the threat or use of force will change the Syrian dictator Bashar Assad's mind. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05794498 Date: 11/30/2015 The Obama administration has been understandably wary of engaging in an air operation in Syria like the one conducted in Libya for three main reasons. Unlike the Libyan opposition forces, the Syrian rebels are not unified and do not hold territory. The Arab League has not called for outside military intervention as it did in Libya. And the Russians are opposed. Libya was an easier case. But other than the laudable purpose of saving Libyan civilians from likely attacks by Qaddafi's regime, the Libyan operation had no long-lasting consequences for the region. Syria is harder. But success in Syria would be a transformative event for the Middle East. Not only would another ruthless dictator succumb to mass opposition on the streets, but the region would be changed for the better as Iran would no longer have a foothold in the Middle East from which to threaten Israel and undermine stability in the region. Unlike in Libya, a successful intervention in Syria would require substantial diplomatic and military leadership from the United States. Washington should start by expressing its willingness to work with regional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to organize, train and arm Syrian rebel forces. The announcement of such a decision would, by itself, likely cause substantial defections from the Syrian military. Then, using territory in Turkey and possibly Jordan, U.S. diplomats and Pentagon officials can start strengthening the opposition. It will take time. But the rebellion is going to go on for a long time, with or without U.S. involvement. The second step is to develop international support for a coalition air operation. Russia will never support such a mission, so there is no point operating through the UN Security Council. Some argue that U.S. involvement risks a wider war with Russia. But the Kosovo example shows otherwise. In that case, Russia had genuine ethnic and political ties to the Serbs, which don't exist between Russia and Syria, and even then Russia did little more than complain. Russian officials have already acknowledged they won't stand in the way if intervention comes. Arming the Syrian rebels and using western air power to ground Syrian helicopters and airplanes is a low-cost high payoff approach. As long as Washington's political leaders stay firm that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed, as they did in both Kosovo and Libya, the costs to the United States will be limited. Victory may not come quickly or easily, but it will come. And the payoff will be substantial. Iran would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East. The resulting regime in Syria will see the United States as a friend, not an enemy. Washington would gain substantial recognition as fighting for the people in the Arab world, not the corrupt regimes. For Israel, the rationale for a bolt from the blue attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would be eased. And a new Syrian regime might well be open to early action on the frozen peace talks with Israel. Hezbollah in Lebanon would be cut off from its Iranian sponsor since Syria would no longer be a transit point for Iranian training, assistance and missiles. All these strategic benefits and the prospect of saving thousands of civilians from murder at the hands of the Assad regime (10,000 have already been killed in this first year of civil war). With the veil of fear lifted from the Syrian people, they seem determine to fight for their freedom. America can and should help them — and by doing so help Israel and help reduce the risk of a wider war.

SYRIA IS OBAMA'S SREBRENICA" GINSBERG ON HUFFPOST FRONT PAGE

From: Hillary Clinton To: Oscar Flores Date: 2012-04-05 11:36 Subject: "SYRIA IS OBAMA'S SREBRENICA" GINSBERG ON HUFFPOST FRONT PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05794254 Date: 11/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Friday, April 6, 2012 6:36 PM To: Oscar Flores Subject: Fw: "Syria is Obama's Srebrenica" Ginsberg On HuffPost Front Page Pls print. From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov] Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 05:31 AM To: H Subject: Fw: "Syria is Obama's Srebrenica" Ginsberg On HuffPost Front Page From: John Podesta [mailto: Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 05:14 AM To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J Subject: Fw: "Syria is Obama's Srebrenica" Ginsberg On HuffPost Front Page From: Marc Ginsberg [mailto:, Sent: Wednesda March 28, 2012 11:12 PM To: undi-sclose

A STRATEGY FOR SYRIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW TO END THE ASAD DICTATORSHIP WHILE RESTORING NONVIOLENCE TO THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION

From: To: Date: 2012-03-01 03:00 Subject: A STRATEGY FOR SYRIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW TO END THE ASAD DICTATORSHIP WHILE RESTORING NONVIOLENCE TO THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL ;?.."2 ••.1r . : ,A n th :74e ;• A A Stratezy fir S\"Aia 1-lo\-,z to tiria the Asaci Tpictators'r- Lio While Resa.iring Nonviolence to the Syran. Re n Thibli Janc Hodgcs, n1":71, Sj7,',1CD!WW1,Sharh.,i13eCI al-2iee;-n...1ohn S.1., Yong -1'.ardi, STA KES The ions role of the A sad ch ,ist y over peo pl,is fort-two vcars old. Jr begat; in 1970 when then Defense nis:er ai-Asad carried t:d.lt a bloods cot in his own ;:Arty colitagocs and appointed a imself presidcnt, Hafez, the fanaila pazniatch and dic7ator for iife, killed or t,.3..ilect cOmpanions he perceived as his rivals; supf)orted kriolent extremism 'a enssve; he found it useful, and plundered Soda's riches \vhile arresting and to1::1 ng ens' u:sseriter„ O ver tw o generations of P'...ads, a brutal trovernmenr its Dar— ,scus has been the main Micieasr ally of an increasinlyiv Ti-te authors wish io thank Paul .Kahn, Er terd MO-Cti= r, Email Shaker, sarI Anne-Marie Slaughter. \,Ve are ,grarefui for the1r arse spent look(w etthis piece and their heipOl criticisms.;ind strengthened it. Of cc,urse, ail the views expressed herein err those of the a Iji::i1OTS. 2012 th e P :iei.-iident Fellows of Harvard Colle ge. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 2012 / A Strategy for Syria Under International Law 145 Iran. Bashar al-Asad, the son, has acted as the chief facilitator for Sunni extremist killers in Iraq over the past ten years. In Lebanon, Asad's father and son have wrought havoc since 1975, killing in turn Palestinians, Muslim Lebanese, Christian Lebanese, and whoever dared help the return of stability to a country torn asunder. They assassinated the most prominent Lebanese leaders who stood in their way, including Kamal Jumblat in 1977, Bashir Gemayel in 1982, and in all likelihood Rafik Hariri in 2005. Operatives of self-proclaimed "Loyal to Asad's Syria" Hizbullah are now under indictment before the Special Tribunal of Lebanon for Hariri's murder, and scores of journalists and politicians along with hundreds of other innocent people have been assassinated, "disappeared," or randomly killed. Most tragically, the Asads never hesitated to commit mass murder against the Syrians. Hama's historic center was leveled to the ground in 1982, and the relentless siege, bombardment, and mass killing continues to this day a pattern of ruthless governance across the country, with Homs the latest victim. Both the future of the Middle East and the success of the formidable nonviolent mass movement in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen depend on what happens next in Damascus. If the dictatorship survives, if its main pillars are not brought to justice on the way to a democratic transition, Asad's continued rule will doom domestic and international peace in the region and beyond. W hy? Because the nonviolent movement will find it hard to recover from this blow. Asad's regime itself will have its own noxious effect on peace. Yet more deeply, more world-historically, it will be harder—much harder—to argue to any brave young man or woman cleaving to nonviolence that this path, although potentially bloody in sacrifice, is the right form of resistance to tyranny. Our joint reflection seeks to bring recognition to the unparalleled bravery and sustained nonviolent resistance of Syria's revolution and to provide concrete political means to help end the forty-two year long reign of death and fear. Drawing on the appropriate tools of international law and the strength of Syrian revolution, the ends and the means of the strategy proposed must remain worthy of the sacrifice of Syria's thousands of nonviolent demonstrators. II. A CLEAR OBJECTIVE: ENDING THE DICTATORSHIP The objective is clear and has been defined by the year-long revolution. Left in place, the system formed around Bashar al-Asad, his notorious brothers, and the circles around them will continue to murder Syrians they dislike, while gradually causing their opponents to become like them, and sending a signal to the diminishing dictatorships in the world that the way to win is to shoot nonviolent protesters and cling to power at all costs. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 1 46 trio/. 5.3 ;■_sacl anci his accomplices must be removed from. power ',113(1 brought. to 't.',stiee. N othing lesstil do. A s the coutittys death toll 'nears the i000n m ark and m any more Syrians lamtuish in prison,. the pert iously dominant nonviolent character of :the re yoluticin i loy,-1y ii;ivinit-w ay tf.:, revota,tionaries---civilians or defect:v' soldiers--taking tip arm s against. one of the best honed repressive m achines in the. world. On their own, the protesters do nor stai)ci a ch2IFICrz:. Pip‘VER NONVIOL.E1,:1i. RECOGNIZED ANF.: i.31-A.:?.,RD1'.1 -): -THE DI.P1.0:■1ACY Mon.: difficult chin) elarif,Fin.):riseobiiective of the revoiuti,:n the' ii:eatis to achieve It. r-s)r tent we propose a. 11CV, nteana: militant elipic.nlacv. The means of militant (-I:von:la:e demand and Foternoat toe proactiv,' rec.:so:hi:non: of the S.:1C3'1fICC:,,tria::ie by Syrian resnolutionarN" ,i,..)17P:10tti.:110.:. The West has nor aufficiently iv)ticed the demo and streniilir,h of the norn7lioient movement actoss Middle East. Itiar 17,()V,tiTt00l' has 1:00 CS 111' Gandhi, the ktacv01: -the ciyii ITI0Veill(":;1: in the 1.init:i States, and the examples of Ear-tem Elort.a„),:.- iii 1919 and rbia.II2Cifil1.1. it had a iiiienesis of its in the J.,clininese Cedar Revo;utiii:,n 06 and the Iranian Green :1009. treh S:33:;,-a*; 7011 ham(' from. 'he Spirini.t of 'which ilo rislied bricily in Damascus un til Bashar yirchiessk, r.estrover: it be sencline to ciisri.i.Dt ,.;:::CU.S.:(:r theetinii;s in hornes----i-ri,ist the orrtin cliab”--beatin?' up its leaden- end throw irG them in ;ail. CE1. 201 huhair tasi ioined ()their oelt111 wotlicr, iitatl'ieted in; silence befc) Interior in the ;place: at herbii to protest the clisaphearance A theirson:, fatheta, and husbands.. she was by her 1tail: 005011l 01(1 vo'n.:•.2; women wore bc0u20, insuitea and fltr:::SI'Cd. f i:11r s; Hr.: Followed the First recorded street dem onstration. 10 Old Dam ascu'is district the OreHOU.S d'aV. the soufb;-...1:0 city of D0 eta 51505 bCuil OIO.00O 0711," C>i.-- a dozen of its children for scribbling the sioc,ans of the Eyptian a:volt' don on the erect erupted on M arcili IS in a masi.i0e non vio11.17;r r::bclijon that oriiil spot-Italie:Gush: and massivelii and w hich continue:, to date. :is. Hama and Homa, .Asad's ranks were sent in to cinell peaceful protesta. And as in 1.-Iarni'i and .FIonis, the moment the tanks .disappcar, Deraa tud 1 be instantly !reclaimed i")"; , its people. tIoppo and I) 11011005 2`.:C. 110 dif.f.tct. Remove the aliiparaius (if tcp.rff:ssi,. -)11, atld be celebtatin ti the street their reclaimed coon ::•1otiv1o1e0ce as belic,.f and practice— ecrtocC; In couatty aftet money in the words ricacefullv, peacclifili,"---bas had e., itta.ordinary traction. Responsible in large parr fur the rz.m oval of B orn: d ubayak and L ine E l :iiibidine Ben i \di in code 201 the nonviolence movement has travelled from the l!,,,1,! East to Undkfllaile the Buyrnesc military dictatorship and the African presidents-for-life and has reached into UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 2012 / A Strategy for Syria Under International Law 147 the heart of Russia and China's authoritarian systems, not to mention, in a very different context, the Occupy Wall Street protests in the United States. Only eleven countries voted against the resolution condemning Syria's government passed by the U.N. General Assembly on February 16, 2012, a vote that followed the veto of Putin's Russia and the Communist Party's China in the Security Council. In the General Assembly, Russia and China led the list of Asad's friends and supporters—let us call them Friends of the Asads (FA). The Russian and Chinese governments were unsurprisingly joined by the most brutal governments on earth: Iran, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Belarus. These FA countries, their despots terrified by the possible precedent that may soon haunt them, are next in line in the worldwide sweep of the nonviolent revolution's march. This is why the global future, and not only the future of the Middle East, is being decided in Syria. Thousands of Syrians have walked into the jaws of death, trusting that their acts would bring about the basic rights and governance they deserve. Meanwhile, a bloody regime gloats and persists, putting the lie to nonviolence not only in Syria but in each land that takes the evil lesson from its course: nonviolence will fail when repression rules. Since the first nonviolent protests of the women of the place of Marja and the children of Deraa in mid-March 2011 and the unimaginable violence rained on them by the Asad government, the world has been derelict in its duty to protect Syria's nonviolent heroes. It is beyond the time to act. What Support CanBe GivenInternationally tothe Nonviolent Protestors? Given the continued veto by Russia and China of any meaningful resolution in the Security Council, other sources of legitimacy must be sought. The Friends of Syria (FS) will defeat the few dictatorships in the FA camp by a comprehensive counter- strategy—one adumbrated in their first meeting in Tunis at the end of February 2012, but which is in need of better articulation. On thediplomaticfront, FS governments can act individually and collectively in a dual pincer strategy. The general principle is simple: delegitimize the Asad government institutionally, while legitimizing the nonviolent opposition through international recognition. The relatively new Syrian National Council (SNC) has significant claims on such recognition. It has created an ever-closer process of consultation with the many groups in Syria, growing as a body in legitimacy as Syria's people turn collectively in horror from the tyrant's long train of abuses. Despite inevitable dissensions in a group whose leaders are scattered in exile and managing disagreements over matters of life and death, it has achieved an imperfect but functional unity. Despitethe daily dangers accrued through overt association with the SNC, nonviolent demonstrators have repeatedly expressed their support for it. There is no other "game in town" for the nonviolent movement. Yet it is essential to understand that the SNC can be only provisionally and partially legitimate until free elections are carried out in Syria. In the UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 148 Hart,;ard Internaliohd Lan journal Online / Vol: 53 interim, it needs to expand its representativeness, giving particular prominence to women, minorities, Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Kurds, and fulfill its promise of as efficient a rotation in its leadership as possible• Its legitimacy depends on five factors: (1) the support of the people as expressed in continuing non-violent demonstrations; (2) the maximum exercise of democratic deliberation despite the practical difficulties; .-•i) the continuing guest for descriptive and substantive representativeness of all parties in the absence of electoral representativeness; (4) a growing internationai recognition, in law and in fact, that they stand on a at superior ground than the regime as the right interlocutors—therebY also a recognition that the massive popular disaffection is a Repoli/lion, and not a "civil war"; and, (5) on a moral plane, its continued adherence to the path of either no violence or, in the most dire circumstances, the least possible use of force. 'Like the signers of the U.S. Declaration of independence and of m any other founding documents of great nations, the SNC and any group purporting to speak for a people in turmoil must have their legitimacy laded by some criteria. We suggest these. By any of the five interlocked criteria, the SNC is the most legitimate group in Syria— certainly including the present totally discredited re!ilme of BaShar It is not surprising, then, that European Union (EU) capitals and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries severed diplomatic relations with the current Syrian government. the.EU officially recogr11 ed,the SNC on 28 February. As for the Asad regim e, m uch m ore can he done to accelerate the process of &legitimization. First steps would include surrendering the Syrian embassies to the opposition as a far more legitimate representative of Syria's people than the present envoys. This measure woulci immediately promote defections in those embassies and in the Syrian diplomatic services. Should ES governments decide that giving the embassy to the Syrian people as represented transitionally by the opposition is nor sufficiently supported by consular law, they cart simply expel the local Syrian ambassador and top aides at the embassy. hey can also provide serious logistics to assist the SNC as the most significant umbrella group for this transitional. period, in order to better advance the agenda of Syrian democracy. Despite its inevitable organizational problems, the opposition must act as the real government and be increasingly recognized as such. The U.N. General Assembly can meet again to yore formally for such recognition. Individual governments can start the process immediately. Governments are free under international law to recognie the foreign government they consider legitimate in a given country. 'While tile effective control or territory is sometimes developed as a condition of recognition internationally, it is left to individual governments to decide. This is the time to advance the better part of a halting doctrine and practice.: in situations such as Syria, a government cannot claim to represent people it kills massively and sYsternatically. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 2012 / A Strategy for Syria Under International Law 149 One highly symbolic, extremely practical, measure that results from this dual strategy of derecognition and recognition is that it is virtually costless. Many Syrians have been deprived of travel documents for years. This hampers their action and increases the risks on their lives. These Syrians should be issued passports by the SNC government and their passports recognized for travel abroad by the FS. In addition to official recognition of the resistance envoys as the temporary government, with the consequences such recognition entails for the isolation of Asad and his circle of killers, the leading political parties from both the government and the opposition in FS countries can help enhance the quality of support to the revolution. Party leaders across the political spectrum of FS societies should meet with designated representatives of the opposition and offer them headquarters, logistical, and media support. Parliaments in supportive countries in the seventy-strong FS group can also play a key role by organizing open debates and working m eetings where nonviolent revolutionary Syrians can be heard and their requests studied and discussed seriously, both for immediate needs and in preparation for the transition to democracy. The U.N. Secretariat and the Arab League apparatchiks must immediately stop their pointless mediation with a killer regime, now being formalized by their joint envoy calling for a "dialogue" that puts the two sides on an equal moral footing and threatens to destroy the revolution. Instead, it should address the SNC and the resistance inside the country as the only worthy interlocutors for Syrian society until free elections are possible, that is, after Asad is removed from power. On the front of judicial accountability, Syrian and international human rights organizations have been active in gathering the evidence needed for the indictment and eventual trial of Syria's leading killers. Two practical measures can be further developed in coordination with the opposition, which knows the country best First, a list personaenongratae needs to be established, tallying the central pillars of the repression and their financiers. Such a "list of shame" has already been established in various countries for the most notorious henchmen of Asad. The process needs to be enhanced, regulariied, and rigorously documented, and its parameters publically adopted. Fighting corruption is central to accountability. The immediate kin involved in mass murder and the financiers of the Asad family must have their assets frozen, and they must be questioned and eventually arrested when they travel, or they must be denied visas. To the extent allowed by the law, they must be separated from their ill-gotten properties abroad, to be held in trust for their Syrian victims, and some frozen assets must be disbursed to the extent possible to the families of those killed and jailed. A joint committee of oppositional representatives, honest wealthy Syrians, and respected international figures can establish a special compensation fund for bereaved families. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 150 Harvard Intemationai Law journal Online / Vol. 53 Conversely, efforts to openly distance the merchants and industrialists from the regime need to be perceived as an important aspect of the opposition's strategy. Not only m ust the SN C press them further for support, but it is im portant for the revolution to have stronger views on the day after, thereby reducing the fears of the minorities and the wealthy, and involving them in the formation of a short anti longer term economic vision that covers (a) managing the economics of the revolution to lessen the terrible plight of ordinary people and to accelerate the demise of the regime, (b) preparing for the economic transition, and (c) working on the day and years after Asad's removal. This work will prepare for full judicial accountability. 'A massive international investigation that registers names of the victims, the circumstances of their death, and the names of the main commanders of the repression and its most notorious thugs, should be started immediately. Here also much work has already been achieved by leading Syrian and international human rights organizations and by the Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights. These flies cannot just gather dust. The office of the ICC cannot continue to hide between formal pretexts to. ignore the Syrian dossier. It is high time for Prosecutor Luis .viloreno Ocampo to officially start the investigaticso that the files are ready when the circumstances are ripe to formally proceed with an tnglictment. Once the SNC is recognized by the more than seventy PS countries, it can ask the ICC Prosecutor to move on the indictment, with the help of the FS if China and Russia continue blocking the ICC, from carrying out its legal duty as inscribed in itsraisor; d'ein the first place. In short, Asad's government must be isolated politically, delegitimized diplomatically, and investigated criminally, while the Syrian nonviolent revolution represented in part by the SNC should be increasingly recognized, assisted, and dealt with as the transitional government of Syria. In this transition period, the responsibility of the Syrian opposition to enhance its unity and develop its ties to the resistance inside Syria cannot he emphasized enough. Only free elections after the removal of Asad can give it full legitimacy, but the opposition can take many steps in the meantime: the rotation in the leadership, as agreed when the SNC was announced, must be respected; women and minorities must be included in a real and visible way; collective, professional debates to sharpen the vision of democratic post-Asad Syria must be a daily concern; the Syrian youth and the professional diaspora must be involved through finance, organization, and technology in support for human rights and election monitoringi,and m oves to connect with the other revolutions in the region should be ongoing, along with discussion of nonviolent means to end all regional disputes, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. These measures are important in themselves. They are important to set the stage for a constructive transition to democracy when the dictator is removed. They are important, above all, because the world needs a serious oppositional entity as a UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 2012 / A Strategy for Syria Under International Law 151 Syrian partner for change, with provisional and partial but real legitimacy, in order to bring to an end the forty years of bloodshed for which Asad rule is responsible in Syria and in the Middle East. Nothing in international law requires a Security Council resolution for FS governments and societies to take any of the above steps. Call it militant diplomacy. IV. ON THE GROUND:A COERCIVE STRATEGY BUILT ON HUMAN RIGHTS Humanitarian support cannot wait for a positive response from Asad to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s continuous begging him for entry or to the lamentably hollow calls, in the United Nations and elsewhere, for him to please be nice and stop the killing machine. The more quickly militant diplomacy proceeds, the more quickly international derecognition will suffocate the Asad regime. Yet as Asad's crimes mount in Syria, the urgent need to protect the nonviolent demonstrators and the civilian population at large requires not only that the screws be tightened relentlessly but also that they be given a potential razor edge. The killers in Syria will be tried, but they must first be removed from power. Although the status of Responsibility to Protect remains imprecise in international law, Syria's nonviolent revolution presents both a test case and a formidable occasion to set new standards for dictatorships whose murders mount into the thousands. In December 2004, a forty-strong coalition of Middle East Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) expressed at the G-8 meeting in New York its firm belief that "dictatorship is a crime against humanity." Nothing proves the point more than the Asad system. Decisive action on the ground requires a coalition of governments willing to stop the killing of unarmed demonstrators. Several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Arab League leaders have already expressed their support for ending the dictatorship. In the New York Times on February 23, Anne-Marie Slaughter, director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department from 2009 to 2011, argued that the Friends of Syria should militarily establish "no-kill zones" in several places as near as possible to the borders of Syria and gradually expand these zones. Army defectors and others could flee to the zones, which would be used only defensively and would protect all Syrians within them. We support this strategy and add that within these zones, political and judicial institutions could be established that would then maintain the law, prevent revenge killings, and at the same time allow the Syrian opposition to articulate its differences and its unity within a legal structure that enhances its domestic and international legitimacy. The zones would allow widespread consultation, discussion, and even protest, providing in the best case the genesis for the fledgling democracy that would take over from the Asad regime. At the same UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 152 Harvard International Law journal Online / Vol. 53 time, a significant military buildup on the borders of Syria would make clear the potential for action if all peaceful and nonviolent means should fail. The combination of "no-kill zones" and an international military build-up form a coercive strategy,that accomplishes three goals. First it demoralizes the dictator. His hope for prevailing through the continued use of 'force against unarmed citizens will be undermined when his apparatus of repression sees a growing international coalition commanding a formidable force of last resort. Second, it demoralizes the core of the army and the bureaucracy. By demonstrating the illegitimacy of the regime and making it clear that it will riot prevail, it encourages soldiers and officers to desert and to link their future with a growing civil opposition. Particularly in conjunction with increased diplomatic delegitimization of the Syrian foreign office and sanctions on the leading financiers of the repression, the gathering; mobilization encourages the domestic Syrian bureaucracy to express its disquiet in various ways, from resignations to establishing open or secret bridges to the opposition. Third, it gives hope to the nonviolent movement and encourages persistence in this path. The opposition can then continue to pursue peaceful strategies knowing that its actions will have results and that the regime will eventually be defeated and its leaders tried. Realistically, we must recognize that strictly peaceful strategies can continue only in a climate that promises the increasing certainty of an ever-closer end of Asad's political life. Only in the worst case and in the last resort might force be needed. Even then, it should he applied selectively, gradually, and with the least possible violence. If the exercise of outside force is required, it must in the best case he legitimated by the Security Council. In the next best case it would be legitimated by (1) a substantive application of the Responsibility to Protect by the FS governments, individually and collectively, (2) a combination of extensive consultations within the coalition and with the Syrian opposition, w ith dem onstrations of various sorts of dom estic and international measures to assist civilians and end the killing, (3) the features that make the nonviolent opposition a far more legitimate representative interlocutor than Asad's government, (4) the moral act itself of holding back until the last possible moment, and (5) the justice and appropriateness of the acts of force if and when they are exercised. How can a coenive sttateg be put in place? Before any troops move on the ground, small symbolic measures can frighten and unnerve the tyrant. Daily drones with cameras can transmit close-up images of his palace, the headquarters of his apparatus of repression, and the rubber stam p UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 2012 1 A t.,7thier 153 parliament to tiice-te pillars of the regime a tangible warning. On the tequi.....s: 01 'the S.:NC and in conjunction :with its military buteaii just eStablished to integtate the Fte.c: Syrian. Array, stealth helice,D l nd C t s can follow into the Syrian ciriinpirw; sum m ons to the InzPrnational Crim inal Court (!CC) and leaflets w ith health and security instructions, followed pefhairis with non- lethal bom bs the wouiti eplode with noise but no hatm, pointing only to pot-co:hal luture action. TisJops from Jordan and Terltey--even •from Iraq. if 1 . 17. wants to *host the Arab Sumnut lite:" this month. and in Lebanon under a new 2:0v t. to move to every possible boi:der of the country, in preparation for any e.\-etuality. These troops siVOtlid Clefnd the "no-kill" safeti-, established first at the lordet: and later farther in, to shelter the ref14...t:es and procidt: a ,:ane-rastv for dcfectirG scdh it.. V..)*Ihere Asaclls troops thin O M hC;cntIe to W II7rant the. sin7.1.!.nder 01 the territory to the revolution:int co all',1;IrtCeS ! Aem t• !inder SNC governiyientai and the Frey: S":i71 .',.•■ control. dozens o nterruitional Is,l. ClOs can lend their: tOrrnidable orl:zanizational know-how to help the onpotition organize us a en.iiimare. i:-,ovempeent. \vithin ris e territories, while NATO will Protect the safe zones and a blithe logistical sr:pi:port needed for eNp:Inding them. Air !hat pt...lnt, 1 -triv use of force inns,: 0: coordinated closely enoi.igh to be a Ott St.:‘,11:Cp" I:.*;.::173CC:::n the;nrernati,..)11:1! c. imnunitv and, tit co in a term n eed ed b e d r: iv: C OF i \ tilt. S. appositional Government ("SOC.l--). I the ..k:iad rind Cl .5.. be nothing.: more than criminal fugitives that the - S!")G" is seelcintn:ni attest and bring ...J.) iustice with the help of the FS.. An importann measure-in this 1p-cocess is the deplitt-rnefit of ianraan ha:his monitors fl..) ensure that re\,elate killing does not. as in the de.-nise of the dictator and tiC flCtic!aen. Some of us ativocatti. :Ills "human rights mon:tots' approach end the regime of Saddam Husain in Iraq fl the 1_990S, tr..-:2;ethC:". With his indicayient in. a Special Tr:but:AI Iraq, borh niciasures to be inscribrd in a. Securit:: C ouncil R esolution tune constdared hi the le::ntiniatc talc; of ) r:a SI cider international law. still believe that. nad this "117211 Dt1110Cratk- Initiative been adopted, the disastrous war of 200:I could have bee:; avoidect. If these mccisures arc. not enoi..azh r.A.,sttl scurrying in fear, Or FliS realiation reaches a Bengliazi-Srebtenica level, tt.ea at loisg riesessar:-.-nicans m ust be used to prevent a new Hama. It may be that Asad's systematic 1)n:tali:Ie .; has already reached a "Hama level." The R.esponsibilin: to Protect is facing a severe test in Syria. This is why doing it right at this critical. moment or Middle East and) worlci histoty Wilt help international law define more precisely the threshold of crimes against hurrianin, and the set of contextual circumstance.s that jtastify in law an international military intervention. Yet even mt this last stage, which we may ferventi.:,-' hope v,-ill never :arise, violence should be kept to minimum, and niusi: specifically target the political and military commanders of the machine. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790537 Date: 10/30/2015 Harvard International Law Journal Online / i%cl. 53 154 The likelihood is high that in the end massive violence will not be needed. But only a credible coercive strategy developed by the nonviolent opposition and its backers worldwide, expressed with as little actual violence as possible, will ensure that the nonviolent character of the revolution is responsible, and is seen as responsible, for its success. The alternatives are defeat or another Libya. Both outcomes would deeply undermine the growing commitment to nonviolence across the globe, from Damascus to Beijing. That would be the greatest loss, both for the Middle East and for humanity. Sadek Jalal al-Atm is the leadingpublic intellectual of Syria and is emeritus Professor Philosophy at the University of Damascus and the recipient of numerous human rights awards; Ishac Divan is director for Africa and the Middle East at the growth lab of the Center for International Development at KennedySchool of Government.Harvard; John J. Donohue, S.J. scholarof boththeclassical andcontemporaryMiddleEast andhastaught foroverfortyyearsin isa theregion;Mansoor al-jawri is editor of the Bahraini independent daily Al Fasat and recipient of CPI's International Press Freedom Award for 2011; Yang penal, Ph.D. is a prominent Chinese dissident, founder of Initiatives for China and Harvard Fellow;hibli Mallat is a Lebaneselawyerand 41211rofessor,. Jane Man sbridge is Adams Professor of Political l_eadership and Democratic 'Values at Harvard Kennedy School and President-elect of the American Political ScienceAssociation;Sharhabeel al-Zaeern ISaleadingPalestinianlawyer inGaza. arepart of Right to Nonviolence, an international NGO based in the Middle East, for which the Executive Director is Trudi Hodges.

ANALYSIS BY EMIRATI DEFENSE ANALYST OF MILITARY ACTION IN SYRIA, PUBLISHED IN EMIRATI NEWSPAPER THE NATIONAL

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2012-02-04 07:02 Subject: ANALYSIS BY EMIRATI DEFENSE ANALYST OF MILITARY ACTION IN SYRIA, PUBLISHED IN EMIRATI NEWSPAPER THE NATIONAL
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788023 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: Anne-Marie Slaughter < Sent: Saturday, February 4, 2012 2:02 PM To: H Cc: Abedin, Huma; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov); Cheryl Mills Subject: analysis by Emirati defense analyst of military action in Syria, published in Emirati newspaper The National I know this is not on the table, but I thought you should see it. AM As war engulfs Syria, foreign forces could turn the tide Ahmad Al Attar and William J Moloney Feb 5, 2012 fl c57770f1845310VgnVCM200000e66411acRCRD As the Syrian city of Homs tipped towards open war yesterday, international resolve was still mired in confusion. The ability of a UN Security Council resolution to stem the bloodshed is in doubt, while with few exceptions foreign observers are waffling on military intervention. The strongest statements have come from Qatar's Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who recently told the US television channel CBS that "troops should go to stop the killing". The proposal, however, was short on details, and it remains to be seen who would be involved. Turkey is still trying to hold on to the last vestiges of its "no problems with neighbours" foreign policy. The Arab League is caught between states that are dealing with their own revolutions, states that are wary of what comes after the Assad regime and states that are apathetic. There is a general lack of political resolve, but if the violence continues as we have seen in Horns, intervention is the only option left on the table. But even if there was the will to intervene, could it be accomplished? First and foremost, the goals of intervention must be highlighted. The mandate behind such a mission would be explicitly to bring an end to the Assad regime. As was witnessed in Libya last year and in Iraq in 2003, the only way to bring an end to a despotic and highly centralised regime is to decapitate it by seizing the capital. Diehard units may continue to hold out after the political centre has been captured, but for all intents and purposes, the dictatorship would have lost the ability to use the state apparatus to wield control. The forceful removal of the Assads by military means faces several key challenges. The Free Syrian Army does not have the manpower, materiel, or necessary organisation and support capabilities to defeat the much larger Syrian Army and Republican Guard (not to mention Damascus's extensive naval and air assets). Unlike Libya, intervention in Syria would require the deployment of foreign ground forces. The staging of a ground intervention would be critical. While Syria borders five countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq) not all of them would be suitable candidates to support an invasion. A militia that is invested in the survival of the Syrian regime controls Lebanon; Israel is unlikely to support the removal of the "devil they know"; and Iraq is too unstable to support another deployment of foreign troops on its territory. Only Turkey and Jordan would be capable, and potentially willing, to host a ground offensive. To defuse Damascus's claims of "imperialism", the ground component would best be conducted by a Turkish-Jordanian-GCC force, fighting the regime on both northern and southern fronts, with US and Nato air and intelligence ground support. The Syrian ground forces seem formidable on paper, with 1,600 T-72 tanks, 2,200 BMP armoured vehicles, plentiful anti-tank weapons (including advanced AT-14 Kornet missiles) and substantial artillery and air-defence systems. While the Syrian air force has about 60 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788023 Date: 10/30/2015 relatively modern planes, the remaining 524 combat aircraft are ageing models from the 1960s and 1970s. The navy is the smallest and most poorly equipped of the branches, and would be almost irrelevant anyway in an intervention staged from Turkey or Jordan. The first phase would be the aerial campaign preparing the way for close air support of a ground advance. Surface-to-air missile sites (SAMs) and air force planes and installations would have to be completely destroyed, which would take significantly longer than the initial salvo against air defences in Libya. There is a precedent in the 1999 Nato intervention in Kosovo, which stretched out over three and a half months, involving over 1,000 combat aircraft and 38,000 combat sorties. It involved almost all Nato members, and heavily relied on the US air force's diverse capabilities. The 2011 intervention in Libya relied even more heavily on US air force support. While US and Nato forces should not have boots on the ground, their expertise in winning air superiority would drastically limit casualties. The best-case scenario would be a two-front war. On the northern front, the Turkish army would push south to take Aleppo and severe Damascus's links to the Syrian Mediterranean region (which contains a large Alawite population). This would reduce the likelihood of a repeat of the battle of Sirte, where Qaddafi loyalists held out for several weeks after the fall of Tripoli. On the southern front, a combined Jordanian-GCC force would take Al Harisa and Shahba, before pushing on to Damascus. The rationale is based on low population density. The Syrian military may have units that are better trained in defensive asymmetric warfare, which would fortify themselves in urban environments, having learnt from the experience of Hizbollah in Lebanon. The southern approaches to Damascus are relatively flat, supported by a road network and have a lower population density, allowing a mobile offensive that avoided urban areas and minimised civilian casualties. Middle East militaries' ever-present problems with practical combined forces and manoeuvre warfare would slow the southern advance, but a conventional ground offensive backed by close air support could avoid a long, drawn-out war, as was seen in Libya. Estimates of Libyan civilian casualties are uncertain, but certainly aggravated by urban warfare and the poor training of Libyan militias. If the political or humanitarian situation in Syria changes to a degree where intervention is the only option, it could be successful. But it must be focused and decisive to shorten the conflict and minimise casualties. As the Homs massacre continues, this could be the only solution to the crisis. Ahmed Al Attar is an Emirati security affairs commentator. William J Moloney is a defence analyst Anne-Marie Slaughter Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs Princeton University 440 Robertson Hall Princeton, NJ 08544 Assistant: Terry Murphy Website: www.princeton.edui—slaughtr

MY LATEST COLUMN ON SYRIA

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2012-01-23 03:00 Subject: MY LATEST COLUMN ON SYRIA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788183 Date: 10/30/2015 B6LEASE IN PART From Anne-Marie Slaughter Sen : Monday, January 23, 2012 5:52 PM To H Cc: Cheryl Mills; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gova Subject: My latest column on Syria How the World Could And Maybe Should Intervene in Syria By Anne-Marie Slaughter Jan232012, 7:37 AM ET 99 Allowing the violence to go on could have worse consequences than an intervention, though only one that meets certain conditions Top of Form HOWLONGW ILLYOU wh a t sTOP KILLING. .UvTNI W E PR (W O R Th HASS TOWN. 2e'llar Bottom of Form Protesters in Syria / Al Jazeera English In his article onsible intervention in Syria, Cook has broached a subject that I agree must be raised. He forces us to confront the possibility -- he would argue the probability -- that the Western mantra of the inevitability of Assad's fall is both the triumph of hope over expectation and a cover for not taking more direct action to help the Syrian opposition. Saying it will not make it so, and as Cook points out, tightening sanctions and regional and international isolation is not having any measurable effect on Assad's calculations about his ability to stay in power. Indeed, they may even be stiffening his resistance. Cook challenges us to face alternative scenarios that will force the international community to make much more difficult choices. Suppose Assad is still in power a year from now, having killed 10 or 15 thousand of his people -- the number that his father obliterated in the city of Hama in 1982. Or suppose Syria descends into full-fledged civil war with an outgunned rebel army holding specific towns and even swathes of territory against a central government armed by Russia and Iran. Can fellow Arab states and the United Nations stand by and allow either scenario to play out? Consider the consequences. If the Arab League, the U.S., the European Union, Turkey, and the UN Secretary General spend a year wringing their hands as the death toll continues to mount, the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine will be exposed as a convenient fiction for power politics or oil politics, feeding precisely the cynicism and conspiracy theories in the Middle East and elsewhere that the U.S. spends its public diplomacy budget and countless diplomatic hours trying to debunk. If you believe, as I do, that R2P is increased peace and respect for human rightshe long term; that each time it is invoked successfully to UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788183 Date: 10/30/2015 authorize the prevention of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave and systematic war crimes, and ethnic cleansing as much as the protection of civilians from such atrocities once they are occurring; it becomes a stronger deterrent against the commission of those acts in the first place. Governments' systematic abuse of their own citizens have either caused or presaged countless conflicts around the world: the crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Jews and other minorities by the Nazi government before World War II; Saddam Hussein's systematic war crimes in his war with Iran in the 1980s before his invasion of Kuwait in 1991; the Rwandan genocide leading to 15 years of conflict in the Congo; the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans before and during the war in Bosnia, Croatia, and ultimately Kosovo; and countless cases of such behavior triggering civil war and ethnic conflict that create massive refugee flows and destabilization across entire regions. Deterrence and prevention of crimes of this magnitude is thus a force for peace. Equally important is the age-old strategic need for credibility. If the U.S. says it stands behind R2P but then does nothing in a case where it applies, not only will dictators around the world draw their own conclusions, but belief in the U.S. commitment to other international norms and obligations also weakens, just at a time when the U.S. grand strategy is to expand and strengthen an effective international order. The credibility of the U.S. commitment to its own proclaimed values will also take yet another critical hit with every young person in the Middle East fighting for liberty, democracy, and justice. The second scenario is even worse. A full-fledged civil war in Syria could quickly become a proxy war between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and/or at least some NATO countries on one side against Iran, Russia, Hizbollah, and possibly Iraq and Hamas on the other. That is a deeply dangerous and destabilizing prospect. Streams of refugees will burden and potentially disrupt local politics in Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the Druze in Lebanon might join in on the side of their respective Syrian cousins. The economy of the entire region would be badly disrupted, even independent of any impact on oil prices. And Syria itself would be devastated, inviting the same power struggles and sectarian violence we see in Iraq today. Still, intervention makes sense only if it actually has a higher chance of making things better than making them worse. In the Syrian case, a number of conditions would have to be met to satisfy this test. First, the Syrian opposition itself would have to call for some kind of armed intervention. Groups of protesters in different towns have requested international help, but the Syrian National Council would have to make a formal request. Second, the Arab League would have to endorse this request by a substantial majority vote. Third, the actual intervention proposed would in fact have to be limited to protection of civilians through buffer zones and humanitarian cordons around specific cities, perhaps accompanied by airstrikes against Syrian army tanks moving against those cities. It could not, as in Libya, take the form of active help to the opposition in their effort to topple the government. Instead, the Arab League should work with the opposition and members of the business community and the army within Syria to craft a political transition plan that would create some kind of unity government and a timetable for elections. Fourth, the intervention would have to receive the authorization of a majority of the members of the UN Security Council -- Russia, actively arming Assad, will probably never go along, no matter how necessary -- as an exercise of the responsibility to protect doctrine, with clear limits to how and against whom force could be used built into the resolution. Finally, Turkish and Arab troops would have to take the lead in creating zones to protect civilians, backed by NATO logistics and intelligence support if necessary. Openly raising the possibility of armed intervention does not mean that intervention is bound to occur. Much of the diplomatic activity to date has been aimed at getting Assad's supporters -- particularly the Sunni business community of Damascus and Aleppo -- to rethink their allegiances. It is a game of perceptions and assumptions, whereby the international community has tried to make Assad's fall seem inevitable and Assad himself has made clear that he will not be cowed into leaving or making real concessions. Injecting the possibility of armed intervention to protect opposition protesters into this mix, with the accompanying prospect of a much longer and much more destructive conflict in which more members of the military could defect to the Free Syrian UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788183 Date: 10/30/2015 Army, could tip this domestic political balance in favor of a negotiated deal and put real internal pressure on Assad. It is still true, however, that the credible threat of force requires an actual willingness to make good on that threat. Last week the Carnegie Corporation, the Stanley Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation sponsored a terrificconference on the next decade of R2P. Panel members discussed the pros and cons of R2P interventions to date and what we might expect in the future. During the question period after the second morning panel, former International Criminal Court Prosecutor and current International Crisis Group President Louise Arbour said that she agreed with Gareth Evans' (the former Australian foreign minister and a member of the original commission that gave rise to R2P) analysis that the preconditions for an R2P intervention in Syria were not met. Arbour said that, in terms of the magnitude of the crimes being committed in Syria (over 5,000 deaths, destruction of opposition towns) and the lack of effective alternatives other than force, the threshold for an R2P intervention was met. But she said an intervention in Syria failed the third criterion, whether intervention would do more good than harm. I disagree with Arbour's assessment, if in fact the conditions I spelled out above could be met. But that's not the point. She made the further point that if the international community is NOT going to intervene, then R2P includes the responsibility to tell protesters on the ground that help will not be forthcoming, so that they can make their own plans accordingly. Arbour is right. But then the U.S., Turkish, and other governments saying that Assad's fall is "just a matter of time" must be prepared to answer the question posed by protesters in the picture below honestly: "we won't be coming." But then we must also be prepared to face the consequences. In a recent Al Jazeera report,the source of the photo at the top of this page, reporter Zeina Khodr quoted one opposition figure as saying that Syria will descend into "endless chaos." Khodr added, "Activists, however, say that armed rebellion is being fueled by the lack of action from the international community, which has made them realize they have no choice but to take up arms and fight this battle alone." Anne-Marie Slaughter Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and InternationaAffairs Princeton University 440 Robertson Hall Princeton, NJ 08544 Assistant: Terry Murphy Website: www.princeton.edu/—slaughtr

RUSSIA DIGS IN HEELS ON SYRIA RESOLUTION (REUTERS)

From: Huma Abedin To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2012-01-17 16:41 Subject: RUSSIA DIGS IN HEELS ON SYRIA RESOLUTION (REUTERS)
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05789035 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From: Abedin, Huma Sent: Tuesday,January17,20123:41PM To: Subject: Fw: RussiadigsinheelsonSyriaresolution(Reuters) From:OpsNewsTicker Sent: Tuesday, January17, 201202:54PM To:NEWS-EUR;NEWS-10;NEWS-Mahogany Cc: SES-0 Subject:RussiadigsinheelsonSyriaresolution(Reuters) MOSCOW, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Russia signalled on Tuesday it would not make major concessions over its draft Security Council resolution to end bloodshed in Syria, sticking by its key ally in the Middle East. Moscow and Western members of the U.N. body have been deeply divided over the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov did little to suggest there was sufficient common ground to agree a resolution with France, Britain and the United States. Syria is Moscow's chief ally in the region, one of its biggest arms customers and home to naval base it uses. A Russian-operated ship docked in Syria last week that carried ammunition, Russian and Cypriot sources said. Western capitals are pushing for strong condemnation of Syria and Western diplomats have said they cannot accept Russian wording they say assigns equal blame to the government and opposition for violence the United Nations says has killed more than 5,000 people, mostly civilians. Gatilov said the West's proposed changes to its Dec. 15 draft resolution had "in essence emasculated" the document, removing text affirming Syria's sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in its internal affairs. "These most important, key clauses were simply crossed out by our Western partners," Gatilov told a news conference. "We cannot accept that approach." Any resolution had to assign blame to both the government and its opponents, he said. "To say only that the Syrian authorities are responsible for everything would be wrong." At the same time, he added, Russia was "not shutting the door on negotiations on the draft. We are ready to discuss all questions with our Western partners." Gatilov spoke as mid-level diplomats from Security Council members, including China, prepared for talks on the third version of the draft resolution, a document Western diplomats said on Monday was confusing. Moscow's surprise presentation of the draft last month raised Western hopes that action was possible after Russia and China in October vetoed a European-drafted resolution threatening sanctions against Syria. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05789035 Date: 10/30/2015 But there has been little progress since then, and Western diplomats have privately accused Moscow of delaying tactics to give Assad more time. As well as stressing Moscow's opposition to any Western backed intervention in Syria, similar to NATO's campaign in Libya, Gatilov also cautioned against Arab involvement, as Qatar has mooted. He said anyone thinking about sending troops should "consider very carefully what the use of forces from outside, Arab or otherwise, could lead to". "I don't think this would lead to anything good, and it certainly would not lead to the resolution of the problems that exist." NewsTickers alert senior Department officials to breaking news. This item appears as it did in its original publication and does not contain analysis or commentary by Department sources.

6 SOLDIERS AMONG DEAD; SYRIA WEIGHING OBSERVERS(AP)

From: Hillary Clinton To: Huma Abedin Date: 2011-12-18 08:44 Subject: 6 SOLDIERS AMONG DEAD; SYRIA WEIGHING OBSERVERS(AP)
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790827 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From: H Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 3:44 PM To: 'abedinh@state.gov' Subject Re: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) I was totally turned around. I tried walking there from my house down Conn! Finally drove. Anyway, I'm home now. From: Abedin, Huma [mailto:AbedinH@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 03:16 PM To: H Subject: Re: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) Off wisconsin. From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com] Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 03:13 PM To: Abedin, Huma Subject: Re: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) Is Dalton Brody off Conn or Wisconsin? From: Abedin, Huma [mailto:AbedinH@state.gov] Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 03:00 PM To: H Subject: Fw: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) From: AOC SESO OS Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 02:54 PM To: Syria Unrest; NEWS-NEA; NEWS-Mahogany Cc: SES-O Subject: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) (SBU) Embassy Damascus is unable to confirm the Qatari prime minister's assertion that Syrian President Asad will sign the Arab League plan on Syria. (U) BEIRUT (AP) - Armed clashes erupted in Syria Sunday, killing at least 15 civilians and six government troops, activists said. Isolated and faced with a possible civil war, Syria appeared to be bending toward allowing Arab League observers in as a step toward ending the conflict. The Al-Arabiya TV channel said it had information from the Qatari prime minister that Syrian President Bashar Assad will sign an observer deal but gave no further details. Last month Syria agreed to an Arab League plan but balked at its implementation The foreign minister of Oman, speaking to reporters ahead of a Gulf Cooperation Council meeting in Saudi Arabia, also UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790827 Date: 10/30/2015 said Sunday he is "optimistic" that Syria will sign the protocol within 24 hours "and save the Arab world from foreign intervention. The Arab League has given Syria until Wednesday to sign a protocol to allow observers into the country, or else it will likely turn to the U.N. Security Council for action to try to end the deadly violence against regime opponents Syria's state-run news agency SANA quoted Assad Sunday as saying in front of an Iraqi delegation that Syria has "dealt positively with proposals presented because it's in (Syria's) interest for the world to know what is happening in Syria." Syria has in the past said it would accept to have the monitors but then placed conditions that were rejected by the Arab League. Syria's foreign minister was scheduled to hold a news conference Monday, when he is expected to announce Syria's position. The head of the Iraqi delegation met later Sunday with Arab League chief Nabil Elaraby in Cairo. He told reporters Iraq wished to play "an active role in supporting Arab League efforts" on Syria which he described as the "sole and appropriate framework" to solve the crisis in Syria. Attacks by Syrian security forces and clashes with gunmen believed to be army defectors continued in Syria Sunday in the latest sign that the nation's uprising may be deteriorating into civil war. The British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said an army officer was among the six soldiers killed in the town of Qusair in Horns province, near the border with Lebanon. "Three armored vehicles were destroyed, and those inside were killed and wounded," according to the group, which relies on a network of activists inside the country. It said the clashes also resulted in the "partial destruction of some homes." Heavy gunbattles were also reported Sunday in several villages in the restive Jabal al-Zawiya region in the northern Idlib province near the Turkish border, where many defectors are believed to be operating. The Observatory and the Local Coordination Committees activist network said at least 15 civilians were killed in clashes and shootings by security forces toward civilian areas in the Homs region, as well as the Jabal al-Zawiya area and the town of Maaret al-Numan in the north. Among the dead was ,a young man who was killed when security forces opened fire during a funeral of a man killed earlier in the eastern Deir el-Zour province. The reports could not be confirmed independently, because Syria has banned most foreign correspondents and limited movement around the country. Syria has seen a sharp escalation in armed clashes recently, raising concerns the country of 22 million is slipping toward civil war nine months into the uprising against Assad. The Syrian revolt began in mid-March as protesters emboldened by uprisings across the Arab world took to the streets to demand an end to the Assad family's more than 40-year rule. The regime responded with a bloody crackdown that the U.N. says has killed at least 5,000 people. Speaking after an Arab ministerial committee meeting in Doha Saturday, Qatar's prime minister Sheik Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabr Al Thani said Arab foreign ministers will hold a "decisive and important" meeting in Cairo on Wednesday to decide on the next step. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790827 Date: 10/30/2015 He said there is near unanimity on taking the Arab League's plan to the Security Council in hopes the world body can press Damascus to accept it. Syria has demanded changes to the proposal, which calls for an end to the bloody crackdown. The United Nations has been waiting for word from the Arab League before moving ahead with a resolution on Syria. A clear nod from Damascus' Arab neighbors could ease Russian and Chinese opposition to sanctions. Both nations have veto power at the Security Council. The Arab League plan calls for Syria to halt its crackdown, hold talks with the opposition and allow in Arab observers to ensure compliance with the deal. It does not call for foreign military intervention, as in Libya. The 22-member League has also suspended Syria's membership and imposed sanctions, but it has been divided over whether to seek the help of the wider international community beyond the Arab world.

6 SOLDIERS AMONG DEAD; SYRIA WEIGHING OBSERVERS (AP)

From: Hillary Clinton To: Huma Abedin Date: 2011-12-18 08:14 Subject: 6 SOLDIERS AMONG DEAD; SYRIA WEIGHING OBSERVERS (AP)
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790813 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From: H Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 3:14 PM To: 'abedinh@state.gov' Subject Re: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) Is Dalton Brody off Conn or Wisconsin? From: Abedin, Huma [mailto:AbedinH©state.govj Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 03:00 PM To: H Subject: Fw: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) From: AOC SESO OS Sent: Sunday, December 18, 2011 02:54 PM To: Syria Unrest; NEWS-NEA; NEWS-Mahogany Cc: SES-O Subject: 6 soldiers among dead; Syria weighing observers (AP) (SBU) Embassy Damascus is unable to confirm the Qatari prime minister's assertion that Syrian President Asad will sign the Arab League plan on Syria. (U) BEIRUT (AP) - Armed clashes erupted in Syria Sunday, killing at least 15 civilians and six government troops, activists said. Isolated and faced with a possible civil war, Syria appeared to be bending toward allowing Arab League observers in as a step toward ending the conflict. The Al-Arabiya TV channel said it had information from the Qatari prime minister that Syrian President Bashar Assad will sign an observer deal but gave no further details. Last month Syria agreed to an Arab League plan but balked at its implementation The foreign minister of Oman, speaking to reporters ahead of a Gulf Cooperation Council meeting in Saudi Arabia, also said Sunday he is "optimistic" that Syria will sign the protocol within 24 hours "and save the Arab world from foreign intervention. The Arab League has given Syria until Wednesday to sign a protocol to allow observers into the country, or else it will likely turn to the U.N. Security Council for action to try to end the deadly violence against regime opponents Syria's state-run news agency SANA quoted Assad Sunday as saying in front of an Iraqi delegation that Syria has "dealt positively with proposals presented because it's in (Syria's) interest for the world to know what is happening in Syria." Syria has in the past said it would accept to have the monitors but then placed conditions that were rejected by the Arab League. Syria's foreign minister was scheduled to hold a news conference Monday, when he is expected to announce Syria's position. The head of the Iraqi delegation met later Sunday with Arab League chief Nabil Elaraby in Cairo. He told reporters Iraq UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05790813 Date: 10/30/2015 wished to play "an active role in supporting Arab League efforts" on Syria which he described as the "sole and appropriate framework" to solve the crisis in Syria. Attacks by Syrian security forces and clashes with gunmen believed to be army defectors continued in Syria Sunday in the latest sign that the nation's uprising may be deteriorating into civil war. The British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said an army officer was among the six soldiers killed in the town of Qusair in Horns province, near the border with Lebanon. "Three armored vehicles were destroyed, and those inside were killed and wounded," according to the group, which relies on a network of activists inside the country. It said the clashes also resulted in the "partial destruction of some homes." Heavy gunbattles were also reported Sunday in several villages in the restive Jabal al-Zawiya region in the northern Idlib province near the Turkish border, where many defectors are believed to be operating. The Observatory and the Local Coordination Committees activist network said at least 15 civilians were killed in clashes and shootings by security forces toward civilian areas in the Horns region, as well as the Jabal al-Zawiya area and the town of Maaret al-Numan in the north. Among the dead was a young man who was killed when security forces opened fire during a funeral of a man killed earlier in the eastern Deir el-Zour province. The reports could not be confirmed independently, because Syria has banned most foreign correspondents and limited movement around the country. Syria has seen a sharp escalation in armed clashes recently, raising concerns the country of 22 million is slipping toward civil war nine months into the uprising against Assad. The Syrian revolt began in mid-March as protesters emboldened by uprisings across the Arab world took to the streets to demand an end to the Assad family's more than 40-year rule. The regime responded with a bloody crackdown that the U.N. says has killed at least 5,000 people. Speaking after an Arab ministerial committee meeting in Doha Saturday, Qatar's prime minister Sheik Hamad Bin Jassem Bin Jabr Al Thani said Arab foreign ministers will hold a "decisive and important" meeting in Cairo on Wednesday to decide on the next step. He said there is near unanimity on taking, the Arab League's plan to the Security Council in hopes the world body can press Damascus to accept it. Syria has demanded changes to the proposal, which calls for an end to the bloody crackdown. The United Nations has been waiting for word from the Arab League before moving ahead with a resolution on Syria. A clear nod from Damascus' Arab neighbors could ease Russian and Chinese opposition to sanctions. Both nations have veto power at the Security Council. The Arab League plan calls for Syria to halt its crackdown, hold talks with the opposition and allow in Arab observers to ensure compliance with the deal. It does not call for foreign military intervention, as in Libya. The 22-member League has also suspended Syria's membership and imposed sanctions, but it has been divided over whether to seek the help of the wider international community beyond the Arab world.

DISASTER/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DIPLOMACY RE SYRIA

From: Hillary Clinton To: Oscar Flores Date: 2011-11-23 09:38 Subject: DISASTER/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DIPLOMACY RE SYRIA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05788274 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Wednesday, November 23, 2011 4:38 PM To: Oscar Flores Subject: Fw: Disaster/Humanitarian Assistance Diplomacy re Syria Pls print. From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [mailto Sent:Saturday, November 12, 2011 12:59 PM To: H Cc: Cheryl Mills ; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov) ; Abedin, Huma

DISASTER/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DIPLOMACY RE SYRIA

From: Hillary Clinton To: Monica Hanley Date: 2011-11-12 06:03 Subject: DISASTER/HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DIPLOMACY RE SYRIA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787365 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Saturday, November 12, 2011 1:03 PM To: 'hanleymr@state.gov' Subject Fw: Disaster/Humanitarian Assistance Diplomacy re Syria PIs print. From: Anne-Marie Slaughter Sent:Saturday, November 12, 2011 12:59 PM To: H Cc: Cheryl Mills ; Jacob J Sullivan (SullivanJJ@state.gov) ; Abedin, Huma

HAMAS, SYRIA, ISRAEL, ETC.

From: Sidney Blumenthal To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2011-05-17 02:00 Subject: HAMAS, SYRIA, ISRAEL, ETC.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE IN FULL May 17, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Hamas, Syria, Israel, etc. Everything is more complicated than even first-level cynical explanations. It seems likely that Syria's motive in encouraging Palestinian protestors to breach Israeli border barriers on "Nakba Day," resulting in Israeli overreaction, is not only to distract from its own internal crisis but also to undermine the Fatah-Hamas conciliation with Fayyad sustained as PM. David Lesch, professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, and author of one of the definitive books on modern Syria, "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria," who is probably the single American with the most personal contact with Assad, told me on May 12, directly after his meeting with the Syrian ambassador, that the branch of Hamas headquartered at Damascus had departed that city. Either it had been expelled or left on its own accord to distance itself from Assad, his troubles and potential manipulation. This information has not been reported in the press. I have included below a private report from "Stratfor" that underscores that Syria is attacking the moderate wing of Hamas and the Palestinian accord. I have also included Lesch's most recent articles in the NYT and FT. He also privately briefed last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before which he has publicly testified in the past. Tuesday, May 17, 2011 MSTRATFOR.COM ()Diary Archives Israel's Post-Nakba Crisis Though Syria initially gave the green light to Hamas to make amends with Fatah as a means of extracting Arab support in a time of internal stress, both Syria and Iran would share an interest in undermining the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement and bolstering Hamas' hardliners in exile. This may explain why large numbers of Palestinian protesters were even permitted to mass in active military zones and breach border crossings with 1 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 Israel in Syria and Lebanon while security authorities in these countries seemed to look the other way. Israel remains locked in internal turmoil following Sunday's deadly demonstrations on the 0 Day of Nakba, or "Day of Catastrophe," a term Palestinians use to refer to the anniversary of the events that surrounded the birth of the modern state of Israel. Though the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were bracing themselves for unrest within the Palestinian territories, they were caught unprepared when trouble began on the borders with Syria and Lebanon instead. Hundreds of Palestinian refugees on Israel's northern frontier trampled the fence and spilled across the armistice line on Sunday, prompting shooting by the IDF that killed 10 Palestinians and injured dozens of others. "With uncertainty rising on every Arab-Israeli frontier, Israel is coming face to face with the consequences of the Arab Spring." IDFMilitary Intelligence (MI) and Northern Command traded accusations in leaks to the Israeli media Monday. The MI claimed a general warning had been issued to the Northern Command several days prior to Sunday, indicating that attempts would be made by Palestinians to escalate this year's protests and breach the border. However, the MI said, despite real-time intelligence on buses in Syria and Lebanon ferrying protesters to the border, the warning had been ignored by the Northern Command. The Northern Command countered that the warning by the MI was too general and the intelligence insufficient, resulting in failures by the IDF to provide back-up forces, crowd control equipment and clear lines of communication to disperse the demonstrations. Either way, much of the Nakba protest planning was done in public view on Facebook. Israel's political leadership, meanwhile, spoke in ominous tones of a bigger problem Israel will have on its hands as the revolutionary sentiment produced by the Arab Spring inevitably fuses itself with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Israeli Intelligence Minister Dan Meridor said, "There is a change here and we haven't internalized it." Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned Sunday that this "may only be the beginning" of a new struggle between largely unarmed Palestinians and Israel, cautioning that "the danger is that more mass processions like these will appear, not necessarily near the border, but also other places," placing Israel under heavy pressure by allies and adversaries alike to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians. With the Arab Spring sweeping across the region, STRATFOR early on pointed out Israel's conspicuous absence as a target of the unrest. Indeed, anti-Zionism and the exposure of covert relationships between unpopular Arab rulers and Israel made for a compelling rallying point by opposition movements seeking to overthrow their respective regimes. When two waves of Palestinian attacks hit Israel in late March and early April, it appeared that at least some 2 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 Palestinian factions, including Hamas, were attempting to draw Israel into a military conflict in the Gaza Strip, one that would increase the already high level of stress on Egypt's new military- led government. Yet, almost as quickly as the attacks subsided, Hamas, with approval from its backers in the Syrian regime, entered an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation process with Fatah in hopes of forming a unity government that would both break Hamas out of isolation and impose a Hamas-inclusive political reality on Israel. While those negotiations are still fraught with complications, they are occurring in the lead-up to the September U.N. General Assembly when the Palestinian government intends to ask U.N. members to recognize a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Israel thus has a very serious problem on its hands. As Barak said, the Nakba Day events could have been just the beginning. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, along with Palestinian refugees in neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, could theoretically coalesce behind an all-too-familiar, but politically recharged campaign against Israel and bear down on Israel's frontiers. This time, taking cues from surrounding, largely nonviolent uprisings, Palestinians could wage a third intifada across state lines and place Israel in the position of using force against mostly unarmed protesters at a time when it is already facing mounting international pressure to negotiate with a Palestinian political entity that Israel does not regard as viable or legitimate. Israel does not only need to worry itself with Palestinian motives, either. Syria, where the exiled leaderships of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are based, could use an Israeli-Palestinian conflict to distract from its intensifying crackdowns at home. Iran, facing obstacles in fueling unrest in its neighboring Arab states, could shift its efforts toward the Levant to threaten Israel. Though Syria initially gave the green light to llamas to make amends with Fatah as a means of extracting Arab support in a time of internal stress, both Syria and Iran would share an interest in undermining the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement and bolstering llamas' hardliners in exile. This may explain why large numbers of Palestinian protesters were even permitted to mass in active military zones and breach border crossings with Israel in Syria and Lebanon while security authorities in these countries seemed to look the other way. The threat of a third Intifada carries significant repercussions for the surrounding Arab regimes as well. The Egyptian military-led government, in trying to forge reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, is doing whatever it can to contain Hamas in Gaza, and thus contain Islamist opposition forces in its own country as it proceeds with a shaky political transition. The Hashemite kingdom in Jordan, while dealing with a far more manageable opposition than most of its counterparts, is intensely fearful of an uprising by its majority Palestinian population that could topple the regime. With uncertainty rising on every Arab-Israeli frontier, Israel is coming face to face with the consequences of the Arab Spring. As the Nakba Day protests demonstrated, Israel is also finding 3 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 itself inadequately prepared. A confluence of interests still needs to converge to produce a third intifada, but the seeds of this conflict were also laid long ago. The New York Times March 29, 2011 The Syrian President I Know By DAVID W. LESCH San Antonio, Tex. WHERE has President Bashar al-Assad of Syria been this past week? Thousands of Syrians across the country have staged demonstrations against the government, and dozens of protesters have been reported killed by security forces. The cabinetwas dismissed on Tuesday, although that's a meaningless gesture unless it's followed by real reform. Through it all Mr. Assad has remained so quiet that rumors were rampant that he had been overthrown. But while Syrians are desperate for leadership, it's not yet clear what sort of leader Mr. Assad is going to be. Will he be like his father, Hafez al-Assad, who during three decades in power gave the security forces virtually a free hand to maintain order and sanctioned the brutal repression of a violent Islamist uprising in the early 1980s? Or will he see this as an opportunity to take Syria in a new direction, fulfilling the promise ascribed to him when he assumed the presidency upon his father's death in 2000? Mr. Assad's background suggests he could go either way. He is a licensed ophthalmologist who studied in London and a computer nerd who likes the technological toys of the West; his wife, Asma, born in Britain to Syrian parents, was a banker at J. P. Morgan. On the other hand, he is a child of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the cold war. Contrary to American interests, he firmly believes Lebanon should be within Syria's sphere of influence, and he is a member of a minority Islamic sect, the Alawites, that has had a chokehold on power in Syria for decades. In 2004 and 2005, while writing a book on him, I had long interviews with Mr. Assad; after the book was published, I continued to meet with him as an unofficial liaison between Syria and the United States when relations between the two countries deteriorated. In that time I saw Mr. Assad evolve into a confident and battle-tested president. 4 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 I also saw him being consumed by an inert Syrian system. Slowly, he replaced those of questionable loyalty with allies in the military, security services and in the government. But he does not have absolute power. He has had to bargain, negotiate and manipulate pockets of resistance inside the government and the business community to bring about reforms, like allowing private banks and establishing a stock exchange, that would shift Syria's socialist-based system to a more market-oriented economy. But Mr. Assad also changed along the way. When I met with him during the Syrian presidential referendum in May 2007, he voiced an almost cathartic relief that the people really liked him. Indeed, the outpouring of support for Mr. Assad would have been impressive if he had not been the only one running, and if half of it wasn't staged. As is typical for authoritarian leaders, he had begun to equate his well-being with that of his country, and the sycophants around him reinforced the notion. It was obvious that he was president for life. Still, I believed he had good intentions, if awkwardly expressed at times. Even with the escalating violence there, it's important to remember that Syria is not Libya and President Assad is not Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The crackdown on protesters doesn't necessarily indicate that he is tightening his grip on power; it may be that the secret police, long given too much leeway, have been taking matters into their own hands. What's more, anti-Assad elements should be careful what they wish for. Syria is ethnically and religiously diverse and, with the precipitous removal of central authority, it could very well implode like Iraq. That is why the Obama administration wants him to stay in power even as it admonishes him to choose the path of reform. Wednesday, President Assad is expected to announce that the country's almost 50-year emergency law, used to stifle opposition to the regime, is going to be lifted. But he needs to make other tough choices, including setting presidential term limits and dismantling the police state. He can change the course of Syria by giving up that with which he has become so comfortable. The unrest in Syria may have afforded President Assad one last chance at being something more than simply Hafez al-Assad' s son. Addendum from the author: The world is strewn with unemployed dictators who blamed "a plot" and nameless "enemies" for their country's problems. Yet when President Bashar al-Assad did just that in his long-awaited speech to the nation today, he was exhibiting a typically Syrian conspiratorial mindset, one that will sway those of his citizens who were already primed to believe him. This, however, totally denies the genuine 5 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 socio-economic, political and personal frustration of ordinary Syrians that generated the protests to begin with. President Assad spoke of some reforms in a disappointingly ambiguous manner that is unlikely to quell the demonstrations. No one denies the difficulty of announcing, much less carrying out, serious reforms in a country like Syria. Certainly, Mr. Assad would have to bargain with a variety of the country's powerful established interests to get anything done. But he had the opportunity with this speech to build up a critical mass of public support for reform before a critical mass of opposition forms against him that would make anything he says too little, too late. Sadly, he did not do so. David W. Lesch, a professor of Middle East history at Trinity University, is the author of "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria." Financial Times Why Assad will rise again — and then fall By David Lesch Published: May 10 2011 23:391Last updated: May 10 2011 23:39 Having met Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president, a number of times, I can say with confidence that he was startled when the tumult in the Arab world spread into his own country. Like so many autocrats over the years, he truly thought he was secure, and even popular. He liked to say that his country was "different". He certainly saw it as immune to the uprisings besetting other countries. His regime's mouthpieces of course echoed this, stressing that these states' elderly rulers were out-of-touch and corrupt American lackeys. The implication was that Mr Assad, at 45 young by the standards of fellow autocrats, understood the Arab youth, having faced down America and Israel and thus brandishing credentials that played well in the "Arab street" Only a month ago there was a debate in the west as to whether or not Mr Assad, who had long liked to present himself as different from his hardline father, would sanction a crackdown. Now, of course, that hope is over. He has relied on tanks and troops to repress protesters, killing nearly 600 people, according to human rights groups. Given the course of the past few years this should not be a surprise. One encounter I had with him is illuminating. It was in 2007 during the referendum to determine whether or not he would "win" another seven-year term in office. (His name was the only one on the ballot.) Then, amid 6 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787427 Date: 10/30/2015 parades reminiscent of the celebrations for Saddam Hussein, for the first time I felt he had succumbed to the aphrodisiac of power. The sycophants had convinced him Syria's well-being was synonymous with his and that he must hold on to power at all cost. So he appears now close to a reincarnation of his father, Hafiz al-Assad, who sanctioned the crackdown on Islamic militants in 1982. But now that he seems more confident of restoring control I suspect he believes he can again recover from the pariah status facing him. He did after all survive the fallout of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon in 2005 in which Syria was implicated. For now he has withdrawn into a sectarian fortress, apparently intent on maintaining his minority Alawite sect's hold on power. At critical times in his presidency, he has given in to the hardliners, particularly the Alawite generals who dominate the security apparatus. So how can he manoeuvre his way back to acceptability? As the crackdown continues, the international community has given him leeway fearing what might happen in Syria and the region should he fall. He seems to be using it to buy time to quell the uprising. Should the regime survive, I expect he will try to engage in some level of reform, as the generals return to their barracks. But I fear he will continue to focus on economic reform, only throwing protesters some bones of political reform that will fall far short of their demands, and, possibly, draw closer to Iran. If this only gets him back to where he was before the uprisings intensified, he will probably be satisfied. A classic authoritarian state is, after all, the regime's default condition. Corruption, institutional inertia and a repressive apparatus ensure that its instinct is to recoil into survival mode. Mr Assad's hope will be that repression will stamp out the fervour that removed the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. As in the past, he will think he has made significant concessions, but this is a different Middle East today. The momentum of change is harder to reverse in the long term. He may confront a more determined opposition sooner than he realises. He thought Syria was different but he was wrong. The true meaning of the Arab spring is that people are weary of autocrats. The west may for reasons of realpolitik have to pretend to accept his reforms but his people will not. For now he survives. But he is not leading and, eventually, he will join the list of former Arab dictators. The writer is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. He is author of The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.comand redistribute by email or post to the web.

H: SYRIA, PALESTINE, ISRAEL. SID

From: Hillary Clinton To: Jake Sullivan Date: 2011-05-16 07:10 Subject: H: SYRIA, PALESTINE, ISRAEL. SID
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787416 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:10 PM To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov' Subject: Fw: H: Syria, Palestine, Israel. Sid Attachments: hrc memo Syria palestinians 051711.docx Fyi. From: sbwhoeop Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 10:43 AM To: H Subject: H: Syria, Palestine, Israel. Sid CONFIDENTIAL May 17, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Hamas, Syria, Israel, etc. Everything is more complicated than even first-level cynical explanations. It seems likely that Syria's motive in encouraging Palestinian protestors to breach Israeli border barriers on "Nakba Day," resulting in Israeli overreaction, is not only to distract from its own internal crisis but also to undermine the Fatah-Hamas conciliation with Fayyad sustained as PM. David Lesch, professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, and author of one of the definitive books on modern Syria, "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modem Syria," who is probably the single American with the most personal contact with Assad, told me on May 12, directly after his meeting with the Syrian ambassador, that the branch of Hamas headquartered at Damascus had departed that city. Either it had been expelled or left on its own accord to distance itself from Assad, his troubles and potential manipulation. This information has not been reported in the press. I have included below a private report from "Stratfor" that underscores that Syria is attacking the moderate wing of Hamas and the Palestinian accord. I have also included Lesch's most recent articles in the NYT and FT. He also privately briefed last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before which he has publicly testified in the past. Tuesday, May 17, 2011 5TRATFOR.COM is Archives Israel's Post-Nakba Crisis Though Syria initially gave the green light to Hamas to make amends with Fatah as a means of extracting Arab support in a time of internal stress, both Syria and Iran would share an interest in undermining the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement and bolstering Hamas' hardliners in exile. This may explain why large numbers of Palestinian protesters were even permitted to mass in active military zones and breach border crossings with Israel in Syria and Lebanon while security authorities in these countries seemed to look the other way. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787416 Date: 10/30/2015 Israel remains locked in internal turmoil following Sunday's deadly demonstrations on the of Nakba, or "Day of Catastrophe," a term PaleStinians use to refer to the anniversary of the events that surrounded the birth of the modern state of Israel. Though the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were bracing themselves for unrest within the Palestinian territories, they were caught unprepared when trouble began on the borders with Syria and Lebanon instead. Hundreds of Palestinian refugees on Israel's northern frontier trampled the fence and spilled across the armistice line on Sunday, prompting shooting by the IDF that killed 10 Palestinians and injured dozens of others. "With uncertainty rising on every Arab-Israeli frontier, Israel is coming face to face with the consequences of the Arab Spring." IDF Military Intelligence (MI) and Northern Command traded accusations in leaks to the Israeli media Monday. The MI claimed a general warning had been issued to the Northern Command several days prior to Sunday, indicating that attempts would be made by Palestinians to escalate this year's protests and breach the border. However, the MI said, despite real-time intelligence on buses in Syria and Lebanon ferrying protesters to the border, the warning had been ignored by the Northern Command. The Northern Command countered that the warning by the MI was too general and the intelligence insufficient, resulting in failures by the IDF to provide back-up forces, crowd control equipment and clear lines of communication to disperse the demonstrations. Either way, much of the Nakba protest planning was done in public view on Facebook. Israel's political leadership, meanwhile, spoke in ominous tones of a bigger problem Israel will have on its hands as the revolutionary sentiment produced by the Arab Spring inevitably fuses itself with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Israeli Intelligence Minister Dan Meridor said, "There is a change here and we haven't internalized it." Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned Sunday that this "may only be the beginning" of a new struggle between largely unarmed Palestinians and Israel, cautioning that "the danger is that more mass processions like these will appear, not necessarily near the border, but also other places," placing Israel under heavy pressure by allies and adversaries alike to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians. With the Arab Spring sweeping across the region, STRATFOR early on pointed out Israel's conspicuous absence as a target of the unrest. Indeed, anti-Zionism and the exposure of covert relationships between unpopular Arab rulers and Israel made for a compelling rallying point by opposition movements seeking to overthrow their respective regimes. When two waves of Palestinian attacks hit Israel in late March and early April, it appeared that at least some Palestinian factions, including Hamas, were attempting to draw Israel into a military conflict in the Gaza Strip, one that would increase the already high level of stress on Egypt's new military-led government. Yet, almost as quickly as the attacks subsided, Hamas, with approval from its backers in the Syrian regime, entered an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation process with Fatah in hopes of forming a unity govemment that would both break Hamas out of isolation and impose a Hamas- inclusive political reality on Israel. While those negotiations are still fraught with complications, they are occurring in the lead-up to the September U.N. General Assembly when the Palestinian government intends to ask U.N. members to recognize a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Israel thus has a very serious problem on its hands. As Barak said, the Nakba Day events could have been just the beginning. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, along with Palestinian refugees in neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, could theoretically coalesce behind an all-too-familiar, but politically recharged campaign against Israel and bear down on Israel's frontiers. This time, taking cues from surrounding, largely nonviolent uprisings, Palestinians could wage a third intifada across state lines and place Israel in the position of using force against mostly unarmed protesters at a time when it is already facing mounting international pressure to negotiate with a Palestinian political entity that Israel does not regard as viable or legitimate. Israel does not only need to worry itself with Palestinian motives, either. Syria, where the exiled leaderships of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are based, could use an Israeli-Palestinian conflict to distract from its intensifying crackdowns at home. Iran, facing obstacles in fueling unrest in its neighboring Arab states, could shift its efforts toward the Levant to threaten Israel. Though Syria initially gave the green light to Hamas to make amends with Fatah as a means of extracting Arab support in a time of internal stress, both Syria and Iran would share an interest in undermining the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement and bolstering Hamas' hardliners in exile. This may explain why large numbers of Palestinian protesters were even permitted to mass in active military zones and breach border crossings with Israel in Syria and Lebanon while security authorities in these countries seemed to look the other way. The threat of a third Intifada carries significant repercussions for the surrounding Arab regimes as well. The Egyptian military-led government, in trying to forge reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, is doing whatever it can to contain Hamas in Gaza, and thus contain Islamist opposition forces in its own country as it proceeds with a shaky political transition. The Hashemite kingdom in Jordan, while dealing with a far more manageable opposition than most of its counterparts, is intensely fearful of an uprising by its majority Palestinian population that could topple the regime. With uncertainty rising on every Arab-Israeli frontier, Israel is coming face to face with the consequences of the Arab Spring. As the Nakba Day protests demonstrated, Israel is also finding itself inadequately prepared. A confluence of interests still needs to converge to produce a third intifada, but the seeds of this conflict were also laid long ago. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787416 Date: 10/30/2015 The New York Times March 29, 2011 The Syrian President I Know By DAVID W. LESCH San Antonio, Tex. WHERE has President Bashar al-Assad of Syria been this past week? Thousands of Syrians across the country have staged demonstrations against the government, and dozens of protesters have been reported killed by security forces. The cabinet was dismissed on Tuesday, although that's a meaningless gesture unless it's followed by real reform. Through it all Mr. Assad has remained so quiet that rumors were rampant that he had been overthrown. But while Syrians are desperate for leadership, it's not yet clear what sort of leader Mr. Assad is going to be. Will he be like his father, Hafez al-Assad, who during three decades in power gave the security forces virtually a free hand to maintain order and sanctioned the brutal repression of a violent Islamist uprising in the early 1980s? Or will he see this as an opportunity to take Syria in a new direction, fulfilling the promise ascribed to him when he assumed the presidency upon his father's death in 2000? Mr. Assad's background suggests he could go either way. He is a licensed ophthalmologist who studied in London and a computer nerd who likes the technological toys of the West; his wife, Asma, born in Britain to Syrian parents, was a banker at J. P. Morgan. On the other hand, he is a child of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the cold war. Contrary to American interests, he firmly believes Lebanon should be within Syria's sphere of influence, and he is a member of a minority Islamic sect, the Alawites, that has had a chokehold on power in Syria for decades. In 2004 and 2005, while writing a book on him, I had long interviews with Mr. Assad; after the book was published, I continued to meet with him as an unofficial liaison between Syria and the United States when relations between the two countries deteriorated. In that time I saw Mr. Assad evolve into a confident and battle-tested president. I also saw him being consumed by an inert Syrian system. Slowly, he replaced those of questionable loyalty. with allies in the military, security services and in the government. But he does not have absolute power. He has had to bargain, negotiate and manipulate pockets of resistance inside the government and the business community to bring about reforms, like allowing private banks and establishing a stock exchange, that would shift Syria's socialist-based system to a more market-oriented economy. But Mr. Assad also changed along the way. When I met with him during the Syrian presidential referendum in May 2007, he voiced an almost cathartic relief that the people really liked him. Indeed, the outpouring of support for Mr. Assad would have been impressive if he had not been the only one running, and if half of it wasn't staged. As is typical for authoritarian leaders, he had begun to equate his well-being with that of his country, and the sycophants around him reinforced the notion. It was obvious that he was president for life. Still, I believed he had good intentions, if awkwardly expressed at times. Even with the escalating violence there, it's important to remember that Syria is not Libya and President Assad is not Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The crackdown on protesters doesn't necessarily indicate that he is tightening his grip on power, it may be that the secret police, long given too much leeway, have been taking matters into their own hands. What's more, anti-Assad elements should be careful what they wish for. Syria is ethnically and religiously diverse and, with the precipitous removal of central authority, it could very well implode like Iraq. That is why the Obama administration wants him to stay in power even as it admonishes him to choose the path of reform. Wednesday, President Assad is expected to announce that the country's almost 50-year emergency law, used to stifle opposition to the regiffre, is going to be lifted. But he needs to make other tough choices, including setting presidential term limits and dismantling the police state. He can change the course of Syria by giving up that with which he has become so comfortable. The unrest in Syria may have afforded President Assad one last chance at being something more than simply Hafez al- Assad's son. Addendum from the author: The world is strewn with unemployed dictators who blamed "a plot" and nameless "enemies" for their country's problems. Yet when President Bashar al-Assad did just that in his long-awaited speech to the nation today, he was exhibiting a typically Syrian conspiratorial mindset, one that will sway those of his citizens who were already primed to believe him. This, however, totally denies the genuine socio-economic, political and personal frustration of ordinary Syrians that generated the protests to begin with. President Assad spoke of some reforms in a disappointingly ambiguous manner that is unlikely to quell the demonstrations. No one denies the difficulty of announcing, much less carrying out, serious reforms in a country like Syria. Certainly, Mr. Assad would have to bargain with a variety of the country's powerful established interests to get anything done. But he had the opportunity with this speech to build up a critical mass of public support for reform before a critical mass of opposition forms against him that would make anything he says too little, too late. Sadly, he did not do so. David W. Lesch, a professor of Middle East history at Trinity University, is the author of "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modem Syria." Financial Times UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787416 Date: 10/30/2015 Why Assad will rise again — and then fall By David Lesch Published: May 10 2011 23:39 I Last updated: May 10 2011 23:39 Having met Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president, a number of times, I can say with confidence that he was startled when the tumult in the Arab world spread into his own country. Like so many autocrats over the years, he truly thought he was secure, and even popular. He liked to say that his country was "different". He certainly saw it as immune to the uprisings besetting other countries. His regime's mouthpieces of course echoed this, stressing that these states' elderly rulers were out-of-touch and corrupt American lackeys. The implication was that Mr Assad, at 45 young by the standards of fellow autocrats, understood the Arab youth, having faced down America and Israel and thus brandishing credentials that played well in the "Arab street". Only a month ago there was a debate in the west as to whether or not Mr Assad, who had long liked to present himself as different from his hardline father, would sanction a crackdown. Now, of course, that hope is over. He has relied on tanks and troops to repress protesters, killing nearly 600 people, according to human rights groups. Given the course of the past few years this should not be a surprise. One encounter I had with him is illuminating. It was in 2007 during the referendum to determine whether or not he would "win" another seven-year term in office. (His name was the only one on the ballot.) Then, amid parades reminiscent of the celebrations for Saddam Hussein, for the first time I felt he had succumbed to the aphrodisiac of power. The sycophants had convinced him Syria's well-being was synonymous with his and that he must hold on to power at all cost. So he appears now close to a reincarnation of his father, Hafiz al-Assad, who sanctioned the crackdown on Islamic militants in 1982. But now that he seems more confident of restoring control I suspect he believes he can again recover from the pariah status facing him. He did after all survive the fallout of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon in 2005 in which Syria was implicated. For now he has withdrawn into a sectarian fortress, apparently intent on maintaining his minority Alawite sect's hold on power. At critical times in his presidency, he has given in to the hardliners, particularly the Alawite generals who dominate the security apparatus. So how can he manoeuvre his way back to acceptability? As the crackdown continues, the international community has given him leeway fearing what might happen in Syria and the region should he fall. He seems to be using it to buy time to quell the uprising. Should the regime survive, I expect he will try to engage in some level of reform, as the generals return to their barracks. But I fear he will continue to focus on economic reform, only throwing protesters some bones of political reform that will fall far short of their demands, and, possibly, draw closer to Iran. If this only gets him back to where he was before the uprisings intensified, he will probably be satisfied. A classic authoritarian state is, after all, the regime's default condition. Corruption, institutional inertia and a repressive apparatus ensure that its instinct is to recoil into survival mode. Mr Assad's hope will be that repression will stamp out the fervour that removed the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. As in the past, he will think he has made significant concessions, but this is a different Middle East today. The momentum of change is harder to reverse in the long term. He may confront a more determined opposition sooner than he realises. He thought Syria was different but he was wrong. The true meaning of the Arab spring is that people are weary of autocrats. The west may for reasons of realpolitik have to pretend to accept his reforms but his people will not. For now he survives. But he is not leading and, eventually, he will join the list of former Arab dictators. The writer is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. He is author of The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.

HAMAS, SYRIA, ISRAEL, ETC.

From: Sidney Blumenthal To: Hillary Clinton Date: 2011-05-17 02:00 Subject: HAMAS, SYRIA, ISRAEL, ETC.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL CONFIDENTIAL May 17, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: llamas, Syria, Israel, etc. Everything is more complicated than even first-level cynical explanations. It seems likely that Syria's motive in encouraging Palestinian protestors to breach Israeli border barriers on "Nakba Day," resulting in Israeli overreaction, is not only to distract from its own internal crisis but also to undermine the Fatah-Hamas conciliation with Fayyad sustained as PM. David Lesch, professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, and author of one of the definitive books on modern Syria, "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria," who is probably the single American with the most personal contact with Assad, told me on May 12, directly after his meeting with the Syrian ambassador, that the branch of Hamas headquartered at Damascus had departed that city. Either it had been expelled or left on its own accord to distance itself from Assad, his troubles and potential manipulation. This information has not been reported in the press. I have included below a private report from "Stratfor" that underscores that Syria is attacking the moderate wing of llamas and the Palestinian accord. I have also included Lesch's most recent articles in the NYT and FT. He also privately briefed last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before which he has publicly testified in the past. Tuesday, May 17, 2011 0.STRATFOR.COM taDiary Archives Israel's Post-Nakba Crisis Though Syria initially gave the green light to llamas to make amends with Fatah as a means of extracting Arab support in a time of internal stress, both Syria and Iran would share an interest in undermining the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement and bolstering llamas' hardliners in exile. This may explain why large numbers of Palestinian protesters were even permitted to mass in active military zones and breach border crossings with 1 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 Israel in Syria and Lebanon while security authorities in these countries seemed to look the other way. Israel remains locked in internal turmoil following Sunday's deadly demonstrations on the O Day of Nakba, or "Day of Catastrophe," a term Palestinians use to refer to the anniversary of the events that surrounded the birth of the modern state of Israel. Though the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)were bracing themselves for unrest within the Palestinian territories, they were caught unprepared when trouble began on the borders with Syria and Lebanon instead. Hundreds of Palestinian refugees on Israel's northern frontier trampled the fence and spilled across the armistice line on Sunday, prompting shooting by the IDF that killed 10 Palestinians and injured dozens of others. "With uncertainty rising on every Arab-Israeli frontier, Israel is coming face to face with the consequences of the Arab Spring." IDF Military Intelligence (MI) and Northern Command traded accusations in leaks to the Israeli media Monday. The MI claimed a general warning had been issued to the Northern Command several days prior to Sunday, indicating that attempts would be made by Palestinians to escalate this year's protests and breach the border. However, the MI said, despite real-time intelligence on buses in Syria and Lebanon ferrying protesters to the border, the warning had been ignored by the Northern Command. The Northern Command countered that the warning by the MI was too general and the intelligence insufficient, resulting in failures by the IDF to provide back-up forces, crowd control equipment and clear lines of communication to disperse the demonstrations. Either way, much of the Nakba protest planning was done in public view on Facebook. Israel's political leadership, meanwhile, spoke in ominous tones of a bigger problem Israel will have on its hands as the revolutionary sentiment produced by the Arab Spring inevitably fuses itself with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Israeli Intelligence Minister Dan Meridor said, "There is a change here and we haven't internalized it." Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak warned Sunday that this "may only be the beginning" of a new struggle between largely unarmed Palestinians and Israel, cautioning that "the danger is that more mass processions like these will appear, not necessarily near the border, but also other places," placing Israel under heavy pressure by allies and adversaries alike to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians. With the Arab Spring sweeping across the region, S IKATFOR early on pointed out Israel's conspicuous absence as a target of the unrest. Indeed, anti-Zionism and the exposure of covert relationships between unpopular Arab rulers and Israel made for a compelling rallying point by 'opposition movements seeking to overthrow their respective regimes. When two waves of Palestinian attacks hit Israel in late March and early April, it appeared that at least some 2 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 Palestinian factions, including Hamas, were attempting to draw Israel into a military conflict in the Gaza Strip, one that would increase the already high level of stress on Egypt's new military- led government. Yet, almost as quickly as the attacks subsided, Hamas, with approval from its backers in the Syrian regime, entered an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation process with Fatah in hopes of forming a unity government that would both break Hamas out of isolation and impose a Hamas-inclusive political reality on Israel. While those negotiations are still fraught with complications, they are occurring in the lead-up to the September U.N. General Assembly when the Palestinian government intends to ask U.N. members to recognize a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Israel thus has a very serious problem on its hands. As Barak said, the Nakba Day events could have been just the beginning. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, along with Palestinian refugees in neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, could theoretically coalesce behind an all-too-familiar, but politically recharged campaign against Israel and bear down on Israel's frontiers. This time, taking cues from surrounding, largely nonviolent uprisings, Palestinians could wage a third intifada across state lines and place Israel in the position of using force against mostly unarmed protesters at a time when it is already facing mounting international pressure to negotiate with a Palestinian political entity that Israel does not regard as viable or legitimate. Israel does not only need to worry itself with Palestinian motives, either. Syria, where the exiled leaderships of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are based, could use an Israeli-Palestinian conflict to distract from its intensifying crackdowns at home. Iran, facing obstacles in fueling unrest in its neighboring Arab states, could shift its efforts toward the Levant to threaten Israel. Though Syria initially gave the green light to llamas to make amends with Fatah as a means of extracting Arab support in a time of internal stress, both Syria and Iran would share an interest in undermining the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement and bolstering llamas' hardliners in exile. This may explain why large numbers of Palestinian protesters were even permitted to mass in active military zones and breach border crossings with Israel in Syria and Lebanon while security authorities in these countries seemed to look the other way. The threat of a third Intifada carries significant repercussions for the surrounding Arab regimes as well. The Egyptian military-led government, in trying to forge reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, is doing whatever it can to contain Hamas in Gaza, and thus contain Islamist opposition forces in its own country as it proceeds with a shaky political transition. The Hashemite kingdom in Jordan, while dealing with a far more manageable opposition than most of its counterparts, is intensely fearful of an uprising by its majority Palestinian population that could topple the regime. With uncertainty rising on every Arab-Israeli frontier, Israel is coming face to face with the consequences of the Arab Spring. As the Nakba Day protests demonstrated, Israel is also finding 3 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 itself inadequately prepared. A confluence of interests still needs to converge to produce a third intifada, but the seeds of this conflict were also laid long ago. The New York Times March 29, 2011 The Syrian President I Know By DAVID W. LESCH San Antonio, Tex. WHERE has President Bashar al-Assad of Syria been this past week? Thousands of Syrians across the country have staged demonstrations against the government, and dozens of protesters have been reported killed by security forces. The cabinetwas dismissed on Tuesday, although that's a meaningless gesture unless it's followed by real reform. Through it all Mr. Assad has remained so quiet that rumors were rampant that he had been overthrown. But while Syrians are desperate for leadership, it's not yet clear what sort of leader Mr. Assad is going to be. Will he be like his father, Hafez al-Assad, who during three decades in power gave the security forces virtually a free hand to maintain order and sanctioned the brutal repression of a violent Islamist uprising in the early 1980s? Or will he see this as an opportunity to take Syria in a new direction, fulfilling the promise ascribed to him when he assumed the presidency upon his father's death in 2000? Mr. Assad's background suggests he could go either way. He is a licensed ophthalmologist who studied in London and a computer nerd who likes the technological toys of the West; his wife, Asma, born in Britain to Syrian parents, was a banker at J. P. Morgan. On the other hand, he is a child of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the cold war. Contrary to American interests, he firmly believes Lebanon should be within Syria's sphere of influence, and he is a member of a minority Islamic sect, the Alawites, that has had a chokehold on power in Syria for decades. In 2004 and 2005, while writing a book on him, I had long interviews with Mr. Assad; after the book was published, I continued to meet with him as an unofficial liaison between Syria and the United States when relations between the two countries deteriorated. In that time I saw Mr. Assad evolve into a confident and battle-tested president. 4 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 I also saw him being consumed by an inert Syrian system. Slowly, he replaced those of questionable loyalty with allies in the military, security services and in the government. But he does not have absolute power. He has had to bargain, negotiate and manipulate pockets of resistance inside the government and the business community to bring about reforms, like allowing private banks and establishing a stock exchange, that would shift Syria's socialist-based system to a more market-oriented economy. But Mr. Assad also changed along the way. When I met with him during the Syrian presidential referendum in May 2007, he voiced an almost cathartic relief that the people really liked him. Indeed, the outpouring of support for Mr. Assad would have been impressive if he had not been the only one running, and if half of it wasn't staged. As is typical for authoritarian leaders, he had begun to equate his well-being with that of his country, and the sycophants around him reinforced the notion. It was obvious that he was president for life. Still, I believed he had good intentions, if awkwardly expressed at times. Even with the escalating violence there, it's important to remember that Syria is not Libya and President Assad is not Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The crackdown on protesters doesn't necessarily indicate that he is tightening his grip on power; it may be that the secret police, long given too much leeway, have been taking matters into their own hands. What's more, anti-Assad elements should be careful what they wish for. Syria is ethnically and religiously diverse and, with the precipitous removal of central authority, it could very well implode like Iraq. That is why the Obama administration wants him to stay in power even as it admonishes him to choose the path of reform. Wednesday, President Assad is expected to announce that.the country's almost 50-year emergency law, used to stifle opposition to the regime, is going to be lifted. But he needs to make other tough choices, including setting presidential term limits and dismantling the police state. He can change the course of Syria by giving up that with which he has become so comfortable. The unrest in Syria may have afforded President Assad one last chance at being something more than simply Hafez al-Assad' s son. Addendum from the author: The world is strewn with unemployed dictators who blamed "a plot" and nameless "enemies" for their country's problems. Yet when President Bashar al-Assad did just that in his long-awaited speech to the nation today, he was exhibiting a typically Syrian conspiratorial mindset, one that will sway those of his citizens who were already primed to believe him. This, however, totally denies the genuine 5 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 socio-economic, political and personal frustration of ordinary Syrians that generated the protests to begin with. President Assad spoke of some reforms in a disappointingly ambiguous manner that is unlikely to quell the demonstrations. No one denies the difficulty of announcing, much less carrying out, serious reforms in a country like Syria. Certainly, Mr. Assad would have to bargain with a variety of the country's powerful established interests to get anything done. But he had the opportunity with this speech to build up a critical mass of public support for reform before a critical mass of opposition forms against him that would make anything he says too little, too late. Sadly, he did not do so. David W. Lesch, a professor of Middle East history at Trinity University, is the author of "The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria." Financial Times Why Assad will rise again — and then fall By David Lesch Published: May 10 2011 23:39 I Last updated: May 10 2011 23:39 Having met Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president, a number of times, I can say with confidence that he was startled when the tumult in the Arab world spread into his own country. Like so many autocrats over the years, he truly thought he was secure, and even popular. He liked to say that his country was "different". He certainly saw it as immune to the uprisings besetting other countries. His regime's mouthpieces of course echoed this, stressing that these states' elderly rulers were out-of-touch and corrupt American lackeys. The implication was that Mr Assad, at 45 young by the standards of fellow autocrats, understood the Arab youth, having faced down America and Israel and thus brandishing credentials that played well in the "Arab street". Only a month ago there was a debate in the west as to whether or not Mr Assad, who had long liked to present himself as different from his hardline father, would sanction a crackdown. Now, of course, that hope is over. He has relied on tanks and troops to repress protesters, killing nearly 600 people, according to human rights groups. Given the course of the past few years this should not be a surprise. One encounter I had with him is illuminating. It was in 2007 during the referendum to determine whether or not he would "win" another seven-year term in office. (His name was the only one on the ballot.) Then, amid 6 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787385 Date: 10/30/2015 parades reminiscent of the celebrations for Saddam Hussein, for the first time I felt he had succumbed to the aphrodisiac of power. The sycophants had convinced him Syria's well-being was synonymous with his and that he must hold on to power at all cost. So he appears now close to a reincarnation of his father, Hafiz al-Assad, who sanctioned the crackdown on Islamic militants in 1982. But now that he seems more confident of restoring control I suspect he believes he can again recover from the pariah status facing him. He did after all survive the fallout of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon in 2005 in which Syria was implicated. For now he has withdrawn into a sectarian fortress, apparently intent on maintaining his minority Alawite sect's hold on power. At critical times in his presidency, he has given in to the hardliners, particularly the Alawite generals who dominate the security apparatus. So how can he manoeuvre his way back to acceptability? As the crackdown continues, the international community has given him leeway fearing what might happen in Syria and the region should he fall. He seems to be using it to buy time to quell the uprising. Should the regime survive, I expect he will try to engage in some level of reform, as the generals return to their barracks. But I fear he will continue to focus on economic reform, only throwing protesters some bones of political reform that will fall far short of their demands, and, possibly, draw closer to Iran. If this only gets him back to where he was before the uprisings intensified, he will probably be satisfied. A classic authoritarian state is, after all, the regime's default condition. Corruption, institutional inertia and a repressive apparatus ensure that its instinct is to recoil into survival mode. Mr Assad's hope will be that repression will stamp out the fervour that removed the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. As in the past, he will think he has made significant concessions, but this is a different Middle East today. The momentum of change is harder to reverse in the long term. He may confront a more determined opposition sooner than he realises. He thought Syria was different but he was wrong. The true meaning of the Arab spring is that people are weary of autocrats. The west may for reasons of realpolitik have to pretend to accept his reforms but his people will not. For now he survives. But he is not leading and, eventually, he will join the list of former Arab dictators. The writer is professor of Middle East history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. He is author of The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad and Modern Syria Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.